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This dissertation is an ethnographic study of small business entrepreneurship and developing 
capitalism in the Russian Republic of Karelia.  The entrepreneurial-minded individuals at the 
heart of my research began organizing labor and production in the mid 1990’s to create 
businesses that are now thriving within a spirit of capitalism that is emerging locally as a part of 
their efforts.  Their energy and imagination unite Western-inspired ideas with Soviet-era 
structural continuities to accumulate capital at impressive rates.  I examine the inner workings of 
their enterprises and the business networks within which they operate, focusing both on labor 
control and on how the entrepreneurs effectively socialize and retain workforces that can 
withstand the demands of a new market economy.  This dissertation is based upon 15 months of 
field work in 2001-2002, which included months of participant-observation as a production 
worker in commercial cake and bread bakeries and also extended interactions with entrepreneurs 
and their managers.  
I use the language and concepts from the French Regulation School, which focuses on 
how regimes of capital accumulation operate and the regulating forces and institutions necessary 
to sustain them, to explore the relationship between structural continuities from the Soviet mode 
of regulating the economy and the emerging capitalist regime of accumulation.  In this way, I 
focus on the underpinnings of capitalist circulation in Karelia—the ways in which individuals, 
institutions, and sectors are coordinating a process that at its essence seeks to reproduce social 
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life through commodity production.  I draw two fundamental conclusions from my research.  
First, Russia's shift to a capitalist system of accumulation, especially within the small business 
sector of the economy, has been less problematic than many scholars have understood or 
acknowledged.  Second, anthropological investigations of capitalism must focus on the general 
logic of the underlying structures that control, promulgate and replicate the conditions necessary 
for capital to effectively accumulate, in addition to the unique characteristics associated with 
particular capitalist economies.   
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PREFACE  
Doing good while doing well was the honest, if a bit clichéd, goal of a group of Midwestern 
businessmen embarking on a business (ad)venture in capitalism’s newest wild west.  Pledging 
to help Russia’s fledgling capitalist economy by modeling ‘western’ business practices, their 
aim was to make a fortune investing and trading in natural resources through the creation of a 
Russian-based trade and investment firm in the early 1990s.  The Chairman of this American 
investment group, an industrialist from St. Louis, was a close friend of the U.S. Russian 
Ambassador at the time. The Ambassador introduced the Americans to a deputy prime 
minister from the Autonomous Republic of Karelia, who would go on to be the group’s host 
and chief proponent in the Republic. 
Karelia is situated north of St. Petersburg and south of Russia’s Murmansk region 
sharing a long border with Finland.  It is the only place Russia neighbors a European Union 
country.  As a recent college graduate with some Russian language skills, experience working 
on a student exchange program in socialist Russia, and a healthy sense of adventure, I agreed 
to help the group establish its office in the Karelian provincial capital of Petrozavodsk in 
1991.  
The time I spent in Russia for the Americans laid the groundwork, almost a decade 
later, for this dissertation.  My experiences provided a longitudinal context and perspective for 
understanding the wrenching changes in the lives and livelihoods of people at the center of 
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my ethnographic research.  It also allowed me to develop a network of friends and associates 
that provided me entrée for my research into the typically inaccessible business/personal 
circles of several Russian families, their affines, and the business empires they created out of 
the chaos associated with the undoing of socialism. 
The Americans began their Russian foray by dispatching gift-laden investor 
delegations to survey the scene and lend their particular acumen to the various investment 
opportunities presented to the group.  By the spring of 1992, we had registered the company 
as a wholly foreign-owned firm—a first, we were told, in all of Russia at a time when joint-
ventures were the norm—and hung out our placard for business.  These were the euphoric 
days of Russia’s experiment with capitalism and, even as the West’s neoliberal prescription 
for Russia’s economic ‘transition’ caused the economy to implode, the air was ripe with 
possibility.   
A parade of would-be Russian entrepreneurs arrived at our door from the first day we 
set up shop. From a fellow who had befriended a somewhat tipsy member of our Board of 
Directors on the overnight train ride from St. Petersburg, and now loitered weekly in the dank 
stairwell of our 5th story walk-up office hocking ladles-full of ‘fresh’ caviar from a metal 
bucket, to the leather-clad duo nervously peddling M-8 helicopters that they said ‘had to be 
bought immediately,’ it seemed as though everyone in Russia had become a biznesman 
overnight. The Americans, however, were interested in investing in the seemingly endless 
projects associated with wood harvesting and processing, which accounted for nearly 60 
percent of Karelian economy at the time. 
If the business opportunities were dizzying for the Americans, our gifts were equally 
so for the Russians.  The ‘humanitarian support,’ as we referred to our largess, surpassed the 
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usual business accouterments—click pens, business card holders, and calculators—that were 
popular at the time, to include shipping containers of surplus medical supplies and equipment 
and promises of low-cost and free pharmaceuticals for the state-run hospital.  The gifts came 
at a time when the Russian economy was in a free-fall.  Consumer price liberalization and the 
floating currency wiped out personal wealth overnight and paralyzed food and durable goods 
manufacturing, distribution, and sales.  I arrived in the middle of winter in Petrozavodsk to 
freezing temperatures, completely empty store shelves, and, as I would find out, critical 
shortages of everything from children’s pharmaceuticals to insect spray that protected 
foresters from mosquito-borne illnesses.   
Our gifts were distributed through folks the Americans deftly labeled as our ‘local 
sponsors,’ intuitively, if not fully, understanding the importance of the patronage networks 
used by local and regional politicians to build and maintain their spheres of influence and 
power.  The gifts led in circuitous paths to favors big and small for the Americans, including a 
railroad company local phone line that provided us a St. Petersburg exchange (we were 
located 300 miles North of St. Petersburg); a generous five year Karelian tax abatement; and 
liberal interpretations of rules regarding the ‘closed-type’ privatization scheme for a particular 
wood processing plant the Americans wanted to purchase.   
Looking back over the last 15 years, this big favor—the closed privatization of a 
lespromhos (a wood cutting and processing operation) so that a 49 percent share could be sold 
to the Americans—was a change that had far-reaching and demonstrable impact on both the 
success of the enterprise and the personal careers of the managers-cum-owners on the Russian 
side who benefited from the transaction.  In fact, while the story of how the director of this 
privatized facility and later his son would parlay their unique position of running a privatized 
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closed joint-stock company (ZAO) into successful political careers is somewhat tangential to 
my dissertation, it illustrates how what I call cultural transaction points, or specific events at 
an identifiable place and time, can create circumstances that lead to demonstrable outcomes in 
the future.   
In general, however, foreign investment in Karelia was seemingly insignificant in 
1992.  The number of newly incorporated joint ventures in Karelia numbered in the low 
dozens, and the foreigners living in Petrozavodsk could be counted on one hand.  Even so, 
these firms and the foreigners who represented their interests touched an innumerable number 
of everyday Russians in this city of 280,000.   
Take for instance, Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream, which was by far the most high profile 
foreign presence in town at the time.  This American icon for entrepreneurism exported an 
entire factory to Petrozavodsk, replete with black and white cows on the walls and its norms 
for quality control, customer service, staff training, product packaging, and marketing.  
Although Ben and Jerry’s came to Russia as part of a cultural exchange between the sister 
states of Vermont and Karelia and the venture was not envisioned as a money making project, 
it was a huge success.  In its first summer of operation the store was actually more profitable 
than many of the firm’s branches in the United States.  The rarely pleasant activity of queuing 
became the social event of the summer.  Everyday from ten in the morning until closing 10 
hours later, the line for ice cream stretched down the gently sloping Karl Marx Prospect some 
five blocks to the shore of Lake Onega. Never mind that inflation was in the high double-
digits and the exchange rate was rocketing upwards, everyone, it seemed, wanted a taste of 
the future.   
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I can remember the store’s line being filled with chatter about the amazing flavors of 
ice cream—banana and apple pie to name two.  In fact, from my observations, the wait for ice 
cream was due as much to patron indecision as it was to demand.  The whole phenomenon 
was somewhat ironic given the fact that Russians made their own ice cream, which was, and 
remains, a point of pride and a treat enjoyed year-round on the streets of Petrozavodsk. 
Two of the many Russians caught up in the Ben and Jerry’s juggernauts that summer 
were Galya and Anna—sisters who started a bookkeeping business in 1990 to capitalize on 
the fact that, as they would put it, “to survive in Russia you have to know Russian accounting 
laws and how to ‘keep’ the books.”  Ben and Jerry’s was their first client and they were 
introduced to the firm through Galya’s husband who was a partner on the Russian side of Ben 
and Jerry’s joint-venture agreement.  The story of how these women, one trained as a 
bookkeeper, the other as a doctor, would parlay their experience with Ben and Jerry’s into a 
corporate mini-empire that would put them at the center of commerce and politics in Karelia a 
decade later is at the heart of this dissertation.   
One postscript to the American investor’s adventure is captured in the remembrance of 
a Russian who was familiar with the Americans’ efforts in 1992.  When I became re-
acquainted with him in 1999 he remarked: 
Oh yes, I remember those Americans, they just didn’t 
understand Russian business…Here you have to be quick and 
decisive…you cannot plan and plan or be too cautious because 
the opportunities will pass by… 
 
I could not help but think of how offended the titans of Corporate America would have 
been by this commentary, or how accurate this Russian’s assessment of their efforts was.  The 
Americans had left Petrozavodsk after another three years of mixed results in trading lumber 
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and no success in exporting value-added wood products.  The failure of the latter activities 
probably had as much to do with demand for lumber in Europe and the U.S. at the time as it 
did with the challenges inherent in working in Russia during this period.  Ben and Jerry’s 
pulled up stakes at about the same time, leaving their Russian partners to fend for themselves. 
However, through some quirks in the joint venture agreement Ben and Jerry’s was forced to 
allow them to keep selling ice cream under the Ben and Jerry’s trademark.  By 1999, the 
Russians’ stock of Ben and Jerry’s printed ice cream containers and flavor additives were 
running so low there was never any guarantee that the label on the ice cream container would 
match the flavor inside, which provides a great metaphor for trying to understand and analyze 
Russia’s version of capitalism—it looks like Ben and Jerry’s, the texture is about right, but 
you don’t know the flavor until you take the top off and have a taste. 
 
 1 
1.0  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RUSSIAN 
ACCUMULATION STRATEGIES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
One of the main findings in this dissertation is that the emergence of a Russian capitalist 
system of accumulation had a shorter, less problematic distance to travel than most scholars 
have understood or acknowledged.  I use the term ‘emergence’ to avoid the teleological 
pitfalls associated with ‘transition’ as well as the sentimentality of holding out for a 
‘transformation’ to a new, third form of market economy.   
My observations and conclusions are based upon an ethnographic investigation of 
Russian entrepreneurs1 in the Russian Republic of Karelia (Respublika Kareliya) that own 
private (chastni) enterprises.  I focus in large part on the general underlying structures in the 
Russian society and economy that impede or promote the success of these enterprises. The 
responses and subjectivities of the entrepreneurs, wage earners, and managers who work in 
the enterprises I investigated are also central to this dissertation 
It is fitting on several levels that the entrepreneurs I studied, and in a sense 
collaborated with to produce this dissertation, first ventured into private business by baking 
bread.  From the bread riots at the time of the 1917 revolution… to meager bread rations that 
helped keep the population of Leningrad alive during the 900-day siege (blokada 
                                                 
1 I use three classic characteristics of an entrepreneur—achievement motivation, risk–taking propensity, and 
preference for innovation (Stewart, et al 2003)—as relative criteria for classifying the businesspeople I studied as 
entrepreneurs.   
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Leningrada)… to infamous stories of farmers feeding their pigs bread because it was cheaper 
than livestock feed in the soviet economy, the symbolic and cultural heritage of bread is 
undeniable.  As it relates to the title of this dissertation, the importance of bread is multi-fold.  
First, the entrepreneurs I worked with arrived at the decision to make bread by chance, 
circumstance, and hard work—themes that resonate throughout this dissertation and with all 
Russians that lived through the upheavals of the 1990s.  Second, the symbolic and financial 
import of a private enterprise taking on formerly State-owned bakeries by offering a myriad 
of cheaper, better tasting alternatives to Russia’s beloved bread by using market principles 
and capitalist imagery was not lost on the entrepreneurs, their competitors, or the Karelian 
government.  The emergence of small, private businesses as a source of political and socio-
economic power had implications for both the entrepreneurs and the people that worked for 
them.  And finally, the willingness of the workforce to be disciplined and productive enough 
to make baking and selling bread as seemingly lucrative as printing money, which is captured 
in one baker’s sentiment: “A roof over my head and a belly full of warm bread…I really can’t 
ask for much more,” illustrates a third point.  This quote highlights workers’ accommodations 
and relative lack of power to the demands of a capitalist economy, which is also a central 
theme in this dissertation.   
My approach to the study of capitalism in Karelia is somewhat in contrast to 
anthropologists who have endeavored to show how the various machinations of capitalism 
and individuals’ responses to it are unique around the world: from Verdery’s (1996) ‘political 
capitalism’ in Eastern Europe to Hutchcroft’s (1998) ‘booty’ capitalism in the Philippines and 
Bestor’s (1998) cliques and cartels in Japan’s fish markets, these works are concerned with 
how capitalism interacts with local economic and social systems.  This important line of 
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inquiry  is seductive—trekking to the frontiers of capitalism to investigate the mechanics of 
local social processes and reporting back capitalism’s unique adaptations and opportunities 
for rejecting or mitigating its influences—and seems more fulfilling (and publishable) than 
returning from the field and reporting on the vast structural similarities between ‘western 
capitalism’ and its fledgling cousins.   
The challenge with typification of this nature is that it invites comparisons to often 
essentialized versions of ‘western capitalism’ that make implicit assumptions about how 
western capitalist economies function. As a result, the analyses may end up masking 
similarities that could be the best guideposts for understanding the development of Russia’s 
capitalist-based economy.  For example, anthropologists, sociologists, and others have written 
extensively and often derisively on the role of formal and informal networks/groups in the 
economies of Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries (see Chapter 4), but they 
rarely discuss the robust literature on capitalist networks in western economies (cf  Murray 
2006) or the specific literature on positive and negative aspects interlocking Corporate 
Directorates (cf Mizruchi 1996; Carroll and Alexander 1999).  Likewise, family-run 
businesses in Russia are labeled as ‘clans’ or cliques, whereas the closest western facsimile 
might simply be a ‘family business.’ 
I place a renewed emphasis in this dissertation on the underlying structures that 
control, promulgate, and replicate the conditions necessary for capital to be effectively 
accumulated. The reflexive interrelations of these structures with individuals are creating a 
coherent, reproducing body of laws, habits, and norms that support the capitalist system now 
in operation in Russia. 
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I follow Sewell’s (2005) lead in conceptualizing structures in a way that recognizes 
the role of social actors in creating and changing structures. Sewell clarifies and strengthens 
Gidden’s (1984) notion of a duality of structure by suggesting that structures have a dual 
character composed simultaneously of schemas (or rules) that are virtual or abstract in nature, 
and of resources, which are actual and can be classified as either human or non-human, but in 
each case are controlled by individual members of society (2005:133). Under this 
understanding, schemas produce resources, but schemas are also the effects of resources 
(2005: 137).  The resources generated must be sufficient to empower or regenerate the schema 
or they will be abandoned.  Power in this definition is manifest in the resources.  As resources 
become available to different actors—in the case of my research, women entrepreneurs—the 
schemas influencing how various actors behave can be changed.   
My research shows that the power once shared by Russian workers under socialism 
(Burawoy and Krotov 1993; Clarke 1993) eroded throughout the 1990s, and that the new, 
asymmetrical power relations are a product of the successful adoption and manipulation of 
technologies, ideas, and images associated with western capitalism and of a basket of policies, 
norms, and traditions from the former socialist order that were well suited for supporting 
capitalism.  I follow Boyer (2007) in using capitalism as an analytical concept.  Stripping 
ideology from the term, he calls capitalism “a legal regime, an economic system and a social 
formation that unfolds in history and that is built upon two basic social relations: the market 
competition and the capital/labor nexus” ( 2007:4).   
I focus much of this dissertation on labor management and production strategies in a 
half-dozen or so food production and distribution enterprises; the owners of which take 
distinctly different approaches to the hiring and management of their workforces.  By 
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documenting and analyzing employee policies and relations in these enterprises, my research 
sheds light on the hegemonic potential of capitalist ideology and mode of production writ 
large in Russia.   
The family from which I draw these conclusions and with whom I conducted my 
research is led by sisters Galya and Anna. Each have three children and their families have 
had a long association with Western influences and institutions through sport and cultural 
exchanges promoted by the Karelian government going back to the late 1980s.  Chapter 3 
describes the various enterprises now operated by the family, which include a café/bar and 
three bakeries.  Galya’s and Anna’s husbands play a role in running the bread bakery and 
have input in all business decisions, which are generally made by consensus; but Galya 
maintains disproportionate influence say by virtue of her day-to-day oversight of business 
operations.   
Much of this dissertation focuses on Galya as the matriarch of the family.  With a mop 
of dark wavy hair and a proclivity for wearing jeans and smoking cigarettes (and occasionally 
cigars), Galya is a formidable businesswoman who runs her enterprises with a gritty 
determination, a flare for the creative, and a relentless drive to bring innovation to her 
business efforts.  The family’s network of enterprises started with a bread bakery in the mid-
1990s, which came into being as an opportunity associated with acquiring used commercial 
ovens from Germany with capital financing through a Moscow-based brother of the only non-
family member who could be considered a partner in Galya’s enterprises.   
The café/bar that became the lifeblood of the network was the second business Galya 
opened, followed shortly by two other bakeries that were initially intended to just provide the 
café with a steady supply of new, interesting, and high-quality baked goods at a time when 
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they were hard to attain.  Beyond creating an important vertical supply chain for the café, the 
new bakeries served to cement horizontal commercial relationships that not only made money 
for the family but tied the enterprises to important political-economic networks of 
relationships that minimized many of the traditional impediments to doing business in post-
socialist Russia (e.g. access to credit, protection from over-zealous regulators, favorable terms 
for off-the-books transactions, etc.).   
In addition to Galya and Anna I worked with two male entrepreneurs, each with their 
own enterprises—one a specialty cake maker and the other a wholesale food distributor—that 
I spent a considerable amount of time with as well.  Their management styles and business 
strategies contrasted in many ways to Galya’s, which has important implications for 
understanding the effectiveness of different business management strategies. 
My research extends Ong’s (1991) argument that different modes of production can be 
seen as generating a field of force related to alternative symbol systems through an analysis of 
how women entrepreneurs use what I call gendered capital for the expression and 
legitimization of power and control in the workplace.  
Most ethnographies of capitalism acknowledge that the communities under scrutiny 
are linked to larger social, political, and economic orders in which they are embedded but go 
on to focus on mostly local events and processes.  My project does this as well but also 
confronts the issues of how to empirically and causally link the local with the national and 
global by identifying a series of semi-autonomous social fields (Moore 1973) and explicating 
how these fields influence processes of production and labor management, which in turn 
shapes the experience of working in Russian private businesses.   
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Moore suggests that a social field observable to anthropologists at the local level be 
analyzed for its semi-autonomy as it can “…generate rules and customs and symbols 
internally, but it is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the 
larger world by which it is surrounded” (1973: 170).  She notes: 
The Semi-autonomous social field is defined and its boundaries 
identified not by its organization (it may be a corporate group, it 
may not) but by processual characteristic, the fact that it can 
generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to them. Thus 
any arena in which a number of corporate groups deal with each 
other may be a semi-autonomous social field.  Also the 
corporate groups themselves may each constitute a semi-
autonomous social field.  Many such fields may articulate with 
others in such a way as to form complex chains, rather the way 
the social networks of individuals, when attached to each other, 
may be considered as unending chains.  The interdependent 
articulation of many different social fields constitutes one of the 
basic characteristics of complex societies (1973:170).    
 
Moore also notes that “…social arrangements can be effectively stronger than new 
laws at affecting change and importantly, that the processes that make internally generated 
rules effective are often also the immediate forces that dictated the mode of compliance or 
non-compliance with state-made legal rules” (1973:721). Her observations are remarkably 
prescient with regard to the initial failure of neoliberal legal reforms associated with shock 
therapy in Russia in the early 1990s but also to the eventual adaptation and eventual success 
of the reforms and practices that resulted from those initial policies.  Moore’s observations 
that local norms and rules are often, if not determinant, certainly necessary for effective legal 
reform, buttress my observation that socialist-era social relationships, traditions, and 
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workplace norms have been important forces in the successful adaptation of a capitalist 
economy in Russia.    
I conducted research on the relationships within what I believe are four definable 
semi-autonomous social fields: 1) the owners and directors of small private firms and their 
immediate families; 2) the interlocking enterprises joined by ties of affinity and 
consanguinity; 3) larger informal networks of enterprises and political affiliations that rely on 
tight allegiances and complex systems of reciprocity to survive and thrive; and, 4) local and 
state governmental structures and the business interests that influence them.  I attempt to 
‘study through’ (Wedel 2005) each of these localities from the perspective of how they impact 
or are influenced by each other and the experience of the shop floor workers.   
1.2 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the Republic of Karelia, my research sites, the 
research methodology I employed, and a detailed review of the political economy literature in 
anthropology related to the study of capitalism and spread of neoliberal ideology, which has 
helped me frame the direction and central research questions this dissertation addresses.   
Chapter 2 provides an examination of the Karelian economy and infrastructure by 
focusing on issues such as economic growth rates, population demographics, and labor issues 
and policies in the Republic, which have direct bearing on the businesses and livelihoods of 
my informants.  Chapter 3 describes the complex relationships, goals, and strategies of both 
Galya’s network and several related business networks with which she interacts.  The nature 
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and role of both formal and informal business groups are discussed in this chapter as well as a 
more detailed description of enterprises and entrepreneurs who run them. 
Chapter 4 focuses on labor and production issues within the businesses I researched by  
exploring labor control strategies—described by Harvey as “…an intricate affair [that] entails 
…some mix of repression, habituation, co-option, co-operation…” of the workforce both in 
the workplace and in society in general (1996:122) employed by Galya, which include a 
modified Soviet-era system of rewards and fines that is based on an innovative computerized 
inventory control system and also use of an ideology of ‘new capitalism’ that focuses on 
preserving employee livelihood through quality production and efficiency.  
Chapter 5 explores the gendered aspects of my field research by focusing on how 
women entrepreneurs and managers use their identities as mothers, primary household 
providers, and entrepreneurs as management techniques and to accumulate and use political 
and economic capital. This chapter necessarily explores the role that politics and holding 
political office plays in Russian commerce.   
The concluding chapter reviews the case for how capitalism emerged from the chaos 
of the early 1990s within Russia.  Beginning with a review of the theoretical framework that 
broadly captures social processes and structures integral to capitalist economies, this chapter 
summarizes the evidence presented in each chapter of the dissertation.   
1.3 THE RESEARCH SETTING  
Karelia is situated in northwest Russia, forming part of the North-Western Federal 
District of the Russian Federation (Figure 1).  Karelia has a land area of 180,000km2 or just 
 10 
over one percent of the territory of the Russian Federation. To its west, Karelia has a 798km-
long border with Finland; to the south, it borders the St. Petersburg and Vologda regions, to 
the north the Murmansk region, and to the east the Archangelsk region (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. Russian Republic of Karelia on the Russian map  
Source:  Wikipedia  
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Figure 2. The Administrative Regions of Karelia 
 
According to the 2006 All-Russian Census, the population of the Republic of Karelia 
is 716,000 with the urban population comprising 75 percent of the total population.  The 
capital city of Petrozavodsk, where my research takes place, has 37 percent of the Republic’s 
population, or about 265,000 people.  The Republic’s population is composed of 73.6 percent 
Russians, 10 percent Karelians, 7 percent Byelorussians, 3.6 percent Ukrainians, 2.3 percent 
Finns, and 0.8 percent Vepsians.  
Twenty five percent of Karelia’s surface area is water with over 60,000 lakes, 
including the two largest freshwater lakes in Europe—Lake Lodega and Lake Onega—and 
24,000 rivers and streams.  Approximately 49 percent of the republic is covered with pine and 
fir tree forests.  The Karelian economy is driven primarily by natural resource extraction and 
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processing (timber, wood processing, pulp and paper, ferrous metallurgy, and building 
materials), as well as machine-building and non-ferrous metal industries, which use imported 
raw materials.  For a land mass encompassing one percent of the Russian Republic and a 
population that is even smaller, the Republic’s production rates are impressive, including 10 
percent of iron, 23 percent of paper, nine percent of pulp, 7.3 percent of manufactured wood, 
and four percent of sawn timber; also, about 60 percent of the paper sacks in Russia are made 
in the Karelian Republic2. Most official maps, at least those published by the Karelian 
government, show the proximity of Karelia to Europe’s eastern edge as opposed to the 
Republic being Russia’s north-western frontier (Figure 3). This orientation figures 
prominently in more than just spatial terms, with the government’s economic and social 
policies encouraging more cultural integration and economic collaboration with the 
Republic’s western neighbors. 
 
Figure 3. Karelia in a European Context  
Source: ‘ Passport of the Republic of Karelia’  Feb 2007 
http://www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/Different/karelia_e.html 
 
                                                 
2 Source: Karelkomstat (2002), Social and economic situation in the Republic of Karelia from January-June 
2003, Petrozavodsk: Karelkomstat 2002. 
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The Karelian Border and the official designation of the Republic has changed many 
times in the 20th century (Table 1).  Taken from the official Karelian government Web site, 
Table 1 shows the chronology and language used to talk about changes in Karelia: 
 
Table 1. Karelian Historic Milestones 
July 23, 1923 Karelian ASSR is established 
1929 Konopozhskaya pulp and paper mill is the first enterprise of pulp and 
paper industry in Karelia 
March, 31 1940 Karelian ASSR is reestablished into Karelian-Finnish SSR 
June 1941 The Great Patriotic war begins 
December 1941 The Soviet troops seize territory of Karelia 
June-September, 1944 Karelia is set free from German-Finnish aggressors 
July 16 ,1956  Karelian-Finnish SSR is reestablished into Karelian SSR 
August 9,1990 State Sovereignty of Karelian ASSR is adopted by the Supreme Soviet of 
the Republic 
November 19, 1991 Karelian ASSR is renamed the Republic of Karelia 
 
The USSR annexed the Karelian province from Finland in 1940, only to have it taken 
back by the Finns during the early years of World War Two.  The Soviets succeeded in taking 
back Petrozavodsk in one of the largest ground offenses of the war in June of 1944. The 
Soviet Union incorporated the newly taken territory with the previous Karelian Autonomous 
Republic to form the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR), which had the status 
of a union republic in the federal structure of the Soviet Union.  In 1956 the Republic was 
changed to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), which was a down grade in 
status in the Soviet classification system for its territories.  The status changed again in 1990 
to the Karelian ASSR and again in 1991 when the name became the Russian Republic of 
Karelia (Respublika Kareliya) (Korableva, et al. 2001).  
While the Finnish portion of the name was dropped, the architecture of the villages 
(especially along the current border) has a noticeable Finnish influence. By 2001 the Republic 
and its financial stability was still influenced heavily by Finnish commerce and culture. For 
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example, a guest worker program sends thousands of Russians over the Finnish border each 
summer to pick berries.  Economically, Finland is Karelia’s largest trading partner, investing 
millions in the Karelian economy annually.  
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
I conducted the research for this dissertation in 2001 and 2002, building upon preliminary 
research I had completed in the summer of 1999 when I (re)introduced myself to the 
owners/directors of the enterprises where I would eventually conduct my research.  My 
primary research site consisted of two interrelated business networks: one run by Galya L. and 
her family and a second larger group closely aligned with Galya’s and other individuals and 
networks in the Republic. (Chapter 2 details how the business groups function and relate to 
one another.) The groups are made up of many, sometimes seemingly disparate, enterprises 
that are in reality closely joined at both the enterprise level (director/owner) and at the 
employee level by ties of affinity and consanguinity.  The networks play an important role in 
the firms’ collective survival, but also in the management and discipline of their respective 
workforces.  
In total, I conducted 16 months of ethnographic research that included formal and 
informal interviews and long stretches of participant-observation—working and socializing 
with the wage earners, managers, and owner/directors of several business groups.  Galya’s 
network of businesses and the larger group with which she is affiliated have a good deal in 
common with other types of formal and informal organizations—alternatively labeled 
financial industrial groups (FIGs), clans, mafias, cliques, etc.—in Eastern Europe and the 
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countries of the Former Soviet Union. Some examples include Collins (2000), Wedel (1998), 
Glinkina (1998), Johnson (Johnson 1997; Johnson 2000), Kryshtanovsky (1997) Dinello 
(1997), and Coulloudon (1997; 1998).  One challenge with this particular body of literature is 
its orientalist tendencies, which tend to obfuscate more than describe certain practices.  For 
instance, what would pass for a family-owned business in the West might be labeled as a clan-
run business in Russia; bartering, which is common among small business in the United 
States, might be seen as anti-market; and what might be considered successful lobbying or 
‘corporate welfare’ might be described as ‘capturing the state’.  While I refrain from using the 
terms coined by this literature for classifying or describing the groups I researched, the groups 
I researched do share some of the same characteristics as the groups identified in this 
literature, which I do identify and discuss in Chapter 3.   
I also undertook an extensive review of print media and political campaign literature 
as relevant to my research subjects. Both the news and editorial content of the papers—
profiles of various local business people and elected officials, exposés, and op ed 
endorsements—provided a detailed road map to allegiances and non-transparent connections 
between various political and commercial groups in the Republic.  I also kept up a series of 
relationships and conversations with local politicos, bankers, lawyers, police investigators, 
intellectuals, former party officials, and a number of wage earners, enterprise managers, and 
other entrepreneurs, which allowed me to test observations, triangulate stories and facts, and 
better understand the social-economic and political milieu in which my informants were 
operating.   
Finally, I administered a written survey to employees at each of the enterprises I 
investigated (Appendix 1).  The survey covered demographics, employment history, job 
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satisfaction, consumption, and household spending patterns.  Response rates from specific 
cohorts of workers at five different enterprises approached 100 percent.3  How I arrived at 
such high response rates is worthy of some discussion.  Galya and the other entrepreneurs 
agreed to survey all their relevant employees if I would share anonymous results with them 
and include comparisons to the other companies.  Their motivations were the same: they were 
keen on strengthening management effectiveness and production efficiency and saw an 
employee satisfaction survey as a tool that could be helpful in these endeavors.  I designed the 
survey to meet my needs but also answer critical questions from a human resources 
perspective.  Enterprise managers administered the surveys in their respective facilities.  At 
Galya’s enterprises, the surveys were given out and deposited by employees into sealed boxes 
that sat on the bookkeepers’ desks on payday. Participation was not obligatory and nobody 
checked to see if surveys were completed, but I suspect most workers treated it as a 
requirement.   
The method I used to deploy and gather the surveys illustrates the challenges, 
dilemmas, and tradeoffs associated with conducting field research from several vantage points 
at the same site. One question worth discussing is: Are results biased because the survey was 
provided to employees by the enterprise managers?  It is probably impossible to know 
entirely, just as it would be if I had administered the surveys personally, although the reasons 
for not being truthful might differ.  Had I collected the survey personally, either outside core 
works hours or by showing up at shift breaks, the survey response rates would have been 
lower as the logistics would have been more challenging and my relationships with 
employees, which were not even across all enterprises and brigades, would have played a 
                                                 
3 The exception to the high response rate is the NS Café, which had mostly part-time workers who were not a 
central part of my research.  
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greater role in the response rate.  However, judging from how meticulously the vast majority 
of surveys were completed and the amount of additional comments added beyond the required 
questions, employees took the survey very seriously (several employees even helpfully 
pointed out a few grammatical errors on the survey) and were not afraid to be forthright in 
their responses.  They spoke plainly about their likes and dislikes and often made suggestions 
for improvements. These actions point to employees feeling empowered by the rare 
opportunity to give unfettered feedback regarding their working conditions.   
A second issue deals with power at my field site—who has it and how it affects what 
information is collected or interpreted—which I consider an ethical issue.  It would seem that 
I used the power differentials between workers and management to my advantage to get a 
better response rate.  However, one could argue that the survey was empowering as it created 
a sense of awareness about the employees’ work environment that was not part of the daily 
conversations on the shop floor.  In one instance, the survey even prompted an employee-
requested meeting with the management to talk about changes they would like to see 
implemented (see Chapter 5).  On the other hand, the surveys served to set me farther apart 
from my informants in ways that had not been manifest during my many months conducting 
participant observation as junior baker or cake decorator, where my inquiries and 
conversation were much less formal.  
In general, however, my presence in the enterprises was always disruptive in some 
fashion.  For example, sticking-up for a colleague who might have been unfairly accused of a 
mistake and having the ‘American,’ male voice carry undue influence, or agreeing to have 
coffee with wage earners from Galya’s bread bakery after work hours in her café, which had 
the effect of raising the status of a young worker and, judging by the turned heads of 
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management, evoking exactly the response the young employee intended.  Deciding how and 
when to administer the survey was one of hundreds of judgment calls I had to make during the 
course of negotiating and conducting my research project.  
The survey results proved to be invaluable as a research tool, revealing trends 
associated with age, gender, and place of employment that I would not have been able to 
easily identify through my field journals or even well-coded interview transcripts, which 
would have had a much smaller sample size. The results also highlighted apparent 
contradictions or counter-intuitive results that were best explained or understood through the 
interviews I conducted.  In short, the survey results allowed me to draw more nuanced 
conclusions to my various lines of inquiry.   
Approximately half of my research consisted of participant-observation, either 
working as a wage earner, or spending time and working with managers, directors, and 
owners of the enterprises I investigated.  I tried to mitigate the natural distrust and skepticism 
of my colleagues in the bakeries by sequencing the time I spent working with coworkers, 
managers, and entrepreneurs over the course of my research.  I began participant observation 
with workers—minimizing time I spent at the enterprises with owners and managers—always 
politely declining lunch and afternoon breaks with managers to eat with my brigade and 
avoiding long conversations or communication that did not involve normal work issues.  Once 
I completed my predetermined stints as a baker and cake decorator, I moved to more formal 
interviews with managers and the participant observation with the directors/owners (e.g. 
Galya).  I often did this work away from the enterprises—at private residences, cafés or 
political campaign headquarters.  Segmenting the research based on whom I was working 
 19 
with helped to minimize the feeling that I might be some sort of spy for either workers or 
management.  
My participant-observation as a wage earner required working 12-hour shifts in a 
series of commercial bread, cake, and pastry bakeries over the course of many months.  I 
requested and was given positions that placed me on teams of bakers or decorators called 
brigades.  A brigade typically consisted of a leader, from two to five brigade members, and a 
few students on practicum as part of their secondary education.   
As I alluded to above, one of the largest challenges for me with this project was 
establishing trust and credibility with the brigade members, which was made more daunting 
by the novelty of being both an American and a male on predominately female brigades 
(except at the bread bakery, which was all male).  The relationships I was able to establish on 
the bakery floor depended a good deal on how the brigade leaders accepted me, and I helped 
this along by securing real positions of employment in the bakeries—contributing full 12-
hours of effort on each shift.  Of course managers who would do things like admonish their 
employees to ‘be more diligent like the American’ made developing these relationships that 
much more difficult.  
It was a crisis of sorts involving how I was to be compensated as a brigade member 
that may have been the turning point for my acceptance in the brigades.  I initially began 
working without compensation because one of my research grants stipulated “no outside 
employment” and the reviewers of my funding proposal (not anthropologists) had flagged this 
portion of my methodology as not meeting conditions of the research grant.  However, once 
word quickly spread among the employees that I was not being paid for my efforts, the level 
of incredulity and distrust among my new colleagues—managers and workers alike—
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increased dramatically and was on the way to becoming untenable.  Therefore, the 
compromise we struck was in the form of a barter agreement—I would work for cakes, which 
in terms of what my daily wages as a new employee would have been, were extremely 
expensive. When I explained how I would use the wonderful cakes as gifts that would help 
my research efforts—taking them everywhere I had interviews or when I was invited to a 
person’s house—the agreement was seen as plausible and, I suspect, flattering, and went a 
long way in restoring my credibility with my colleagues.   
Working as a brigade member was difficult. The long workdays, which rotated 
continually between three twelve-hour day shifts and two twelve-hour overnight shifts, was a 
schedule to which I was never fully able to adjust.  I also found that truly participating as a 
brigade member could alter what I was observing.  For example, when my brigade was 
unfairly fined for an alleged theft (see Chapter 4) my complaining about the situation got 
better/different results than would have probably occurred if the brigade leader had chosen to 
speak up.  On another occasion I became a trusted-enough member of a bread-baking brigade 
to be asked if my car could be used to store 80 kilos of flour ‘liberated’ from the storage room 
during the overnight shift. In this instance I managed to demur without hurting my 
relationships.  Challenges of this nature were ongoing and required me to make continual, on-
the-fly judgment calls and perform challenging role changes as the long shifts wore on.   
Participant-observation with owners and managers was not as straightforward as 
working as a wage earner on the bakery floor.  Like all things western that come into contact 
with this group of entrepreneurs, my presence was manipulated and used to their advantage.  
Off the bakery floors, participant-observation consisted of such things as lending my ideas or 
‘American perspective’ (and thus ‘expert’ opinion) or often just my presence to the group.  
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For example, I was consulted on designing effective negative ‘American-style’ political 
campaign literature and was asked to do Internet research on U.S. food handling and 
production regulations for comparison to the current Russian regulations (the U.S. 
regulations, especially at the municipal level, were more stringent than Russia’s). Galya also 
arranged several television interviews for me to talk about my research in her enterprises the 
week before the regional elections (both Galya’s and Anna’s husbands were candidates in 
local elections in 2002), and interviewed me for their local paper about burdensome 
government regulations.  In short, my hosts took full advantage of me throughout my 
research.  In return, I was allowed to peruse ledgers, review computerized inventory 
management systems, copy personnel policies and announcements (prekazi), conduct 
interviews, and generally ‘stop-by’ the various enterprises whenever I wished.   
I also was able to develop excellent relationships with managers of the enterprises who 
have the difficult job of pleasing the owners and dealing with complex and challenging 
situations that arise from managing large numbers of often young and sometimes troubled 
employees.  Here, Galya’s introductions helped immensely in that her instructions for 
cooperation and sharing information were taken quite literally by those I interviewed.  I was 
able to develop wonderful and highly productive relationships owing mostly to the fact that I 
was interviewing these women (all the managers that work for Galya are women) as 
professionals—asking them to elaborate on their management ‘ideologies’ and challenges as 
well as chronicling their career and life trajectories over the course of many interviews and 
conversations.  In a way, I was taking advantage of the work Galya and others have done to 
identify and grow a class of professional, women managers that were empowered to make 
decisions and that had a personal stake in the outcomes of the businesses. 
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The connections between many of these enterprises were numerous and at times 
invisible to employees and sometimes even to the managers.  In most cases, I received 
confirmation from owners/directors as to what enterprises were linked and by what means.  In 
the instances where significant ‘firewalls’ existed between organizations and individuals who 
for political, legal, or other reasons would not acknowledge direct relationships, I relied upon 
observation and triangulation (Fetterman 1998) with third parties to confirm the existence and 
types of relationships present. The start of the 2002 political season aided significantly in this 
endeavor as public endorsements, favorable (or unfavorable) newspaper coverage, and 
campaign literature helped uncover layers of relationships and point the way to where 
additional investigation was needed.  
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
My approach to theory in this dissertation is to use constructs that facilitate an 
accurate portrayal and nuanced analysis of the dimensions of life for entrepreneurs, managers, 
and wage earners working in an emerging capitalist economy.  In the broadest sense, I draw 
upon political economy theory in anthropology informed by an understanding of late 
modernity and a ‘newly globalizing’ world  (Giddens 1994; Kearney 1995) that is marked by 
such things as shifts to post-fordist production techniques, deterritorialized identity and 
imagination, increased information and financial transactions, and uneven state authority vis-
à-vis transnational corporations to frame my research questions.  These authors see the world, 
and thus the context in which anthropology operates, in terms of non-hierarchical, non-
oppositional conceptualizations of culture and power, though it is not at all clear that these 
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global processes are entirely new (Arrighi 1994). Finally, this dissertation harkens back to the 
study of an earlier transition, heeding Thompson’s advice by attempting to understand “...the 
whole political context of the period...[and]...the changes in social relationship and cultural 
modes which the industrial revolution entailed” (Thompson 1963: 170).  
My approach follows on the work of  (Foley 1983; Willis 1977) and others who have 
combined structural and interpretive approaches for the analysis of labor and identity 
formation, but with some important distinctions.  First, while this research begins with a 
Marxist frame for understanding the mechanics of capitalism, it does not presuppose a class-
based struggle over inequalities or what Kingsolver calls  “…dualistic, binding models that 
make analytical claims on power by the ‘active’ over the ‘resistant’…” (Kingsolver 1998). 
The approach allows some flexibility in my analysis of individual responses to capitalism in 
that the research does not default to resistance models that are concerned with the 
identification and explanation of various forms of resistance to capitalism4.   
Second, this is not an ethnography of identity formation as much as it is an in-depth 
look at the processes of building and maintaining a capitalist socio-economic order in post 
socialist Russia that in the end is probably concordant—despite some surface variability—
with U.S. inspired norms for how a capitalist economy operates. 
 Transformation of the political economy in the late 20th century centered around new 
forms of production and marketing, rapid shifts in consumption patterns and practices, and, 
especially, new forms of labor control (Harvey 1989:124).  To understand these changes in 
                                                 
4 For example Burawoy’s (1999) conclusion from Woodruff’s (1999) nuanced analysis of the reversion to barter 
by Russian managers during a currency crisis was that managers were resisting market, when in fact they were 
only doing what any rational, market-oriented manager would do in the same situation, violates Verdery’s good 
advice (1999) and moves into the realm of what ‘ought’ to be rather then what is occurring.  
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the Russian context of ‘transition,’ I use Marx’s conceptualization of the development and 
operation of capitalism.  Volume 1 of Capital, for instance, placed the organization, 
mobilization, and appropriation of labor at the center of his analysis, including:  1) loss of 
control of the work process; 2) transformations in the understanding of time; and, 3) reduction 
in the different types of work.  All three of these observations play an important role in how 
the entrepreneurs I worked with managed their respective workforces and can be seen as 
necessary for the imposition of a new kind of work discipline and control in late modern 
society (Roseberry 1997).  Additionally, they prefigure nearly all that has been said about the 
concept of flexible accumulation5 (Mintz 1998) which denotes a set of production and labor 
management practices that are discussed most notably in the context of the changing western 
capitalist economies, but also very important in the Russian context as well.  I explain the 
concept and its relevance to Russia below.   
Marx’s insights have also been the basis for a number of empirically grounded, 
theoretical works that have worked to criticize and reformulate his project, such as Arrighi 
(1999), Harvey (1990) and Lipietz (1987), which shed light on global economic processes in 
the late 20th century and provide an important touchstone for understanding what global 
capitalism looks like at the local level.  In particular, the Regulation School builds from 
Marx’s work to embrace a holistic approach to understanding how economies function, 
arguing that economic systems, or what they call regimes of accumulation (Flexible 
Accumulation is a type of regime), must control the actions of all types of actors—capitalists, 
business people, workers, state employees, etc.—in a manner that will keep its regime of 
                                                 
5 See Gary Standing (1999) for an exhaustive empirical analysis of global labor flexibility as well as a proposal 
for seeking redistributive justice for workers hurt by this process.  
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accumulation functioning.  Harvey describes the main goal of a regime of accumulation as 
being the stabilization of the allocation of the net product between consumption and 
accumulation (1990:121).  The bundle of social processes and rules that controls these actors 
is the ‘mode of regulation’ (Lapietz 1986 in Harvey 1990: 122).  The next section provides 
greater detail on the Regulation School framework and its relevance for understanding the 
political-economic changes occurring in Russia.  
1.5.1 The French Regulation School 
The Regulation School’s approach to understanding the dynamic nature of capitalism 
is to outline a total package of “…labor control practices, consumption habits, and political-
economic power…” that regulate capitalist systems (Harvey, 1996:122-124). The model 
works well in the case of Russia and other ‘transitioning’ nations because it focuses attention 
on social, political, and economic structures while providing language for conceptualizing the 
interiorized rules and social processes that buttress the system.  I use ethnographic field 
methods to focus on the interactions of individuals with the mechanics and logic of structures 
that support what I believe is an emerging regime of accumulation. 
It is hard to imagine a coherent system in place in Russia given the magnitude of 
changes in the intervening years during the fall of socialism and 2002, when this research took 
place.  However, comparisons between the two classic regimes of accumulation that have 
arguably dominated 20th century capitalist production—Fordism and its more contemporary 
counterpart, ‘flexible accumulation’—suggest that Russia under socialism had a quite effective 
regime of accumulation and that while the socio-political shifts in the intervening years have 
changed the nature of this regime, it is still highly effective in producing surplus value for the 
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holders of capital.  A closer analysis of how Fordism and Flexible Accumulation function will 
help to conceptualize and focus on the concrete ways labor is being organized and controlled in 
Russia under its emerging regime of accumulation.  
Fordism can be viewed as a social-economic system predicated on standardization of 
production and consumption.  It is associated with economies that enjoy stable growth in 
unchanging patterns of consumption and rely on long-term, large-scale, fixed capital 
investments in mass-production systems (Harvey 1990: 142).  These rigidities are molded by 
a “seemingly fixed configuration of political power and reciprocal relations that bind big 
labor, big capital and big government into...a dysfunctional embrace of such narrowly defined 
vested interests as to undermine rather than secure capital accumulation” (1990:142). 
Many ‘Fordist’ characteristics can also be found in Russia and the former socialist 
countries.  Socialist-era enterprises had fixed capital assets, large and immobile workforces, 
and production driven by resources, not by demand (Verdery 1996).  Despite the fact that 
socialist economies were not market driven and access to raw materials depended on an 
enterprise’s success in ‘negotiating the state plan,’ the enterprises faced real pressure to meet 
basic consumer demands, especially in food production.  As such, managing the workforce to 
increase productivity was a perpetual issue for socialist managers. 
Flexible Accumulation challenges the rigidities of Fordism through manipulation of labor 
processes, labor markets, and products and patterns of consumption (Boyer 2002).  In the United 
States, the recession and oil crisis of the 1970s precipitated the shake-up of Fordism (Harvey 
1990: 140).  In Russia, the implementation of the neoliberal policies—including rapid price and 
trade liberalization, privatization, and currency deregulation—of the early 1990s tore down many 
of the ‘rigidities’ that had so carefully entwined the state, communist party, and labor/production 
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processes.  The result in Russia, like in the U.S., was the emergence of more ‘flexible’ (thus the 
name) approaches to production and labor control.  In the U.S., the changes included increased 
global mobility and diversification of the industrial sector, a reduction in trade union power, and 
rapid changes in patterns of uneven development between industries and geographic areas 
(Harvey 1990: 147).  
In Russia the effects were similar, more pronounced, but also more segmented.  As 
Kideckel (2000) illustrated in Romania, post-socialist workers are not homogenous, and their 
experience of labor is dependent in large part on the particular ways they are incorporated into 
regional labor systems.  Other effects of more flexible approaches as evidenced by Galya and 
others include, generally, more innovation in the workplace, transfer or creation of private 
ownership where the state was the prior owner, and a reduction of the social role of the enterprise.  
Muller (2007) made similar observations in the former East Germany that were a result of Wende.  
Her work includes a rich analysis of the varied effects these types of changes had on the 
workforce and found that such things as education level, sector they were employed in, and career 
positions made significant differences for individuals.  
One of the main criticisms of the Regulation School is that it is too functionalist in that 
it focuses on the structures, rules, and institutions that are required for a system of 
accumulation to exist and ignores the fact that these structures interact with and are impacted 
by the activities of real people.  Sewell (2005), for example, points the way to get more utility 
from the concept of structure by insisting that it: “1) recognize the agency of social actors; 2) 
Build the possibility of change into social structure; and, 3) overcome the divide between 
semiotic and materialist visions of structure” (Sewell 2005: 126).  Sewell’s approach points to 
a long standing challenge within anthropology, which has increasingly turned to the 
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intentional actions of individuals through theories of practice as developed and used by 
Bourdieu (1977, 1990) in Ortner (1984) to address this issue.  Practice theory places 
individual agency and “…the production of cultural meanings and symbols...” (Marcus and 
Fisher 1986: 85) at the center of investigations of socio-cultural life.  My analysis largely 
follows in the same direction by focusing on the ways in which individuals and groups 
interact with the structures both of their own making and the ones seemingly imposed upon 
them.   
The Regulation School is also criticized for lacking predictive value—that it is so 
broad that anything and everything has a place within the model, which renders it ineffective.  
The strengths of the School, and the theoretical and methodological steps I undertook to make 
up for its shortcomings, make the Regulation model and approach entirely appropriate for this 
research.  First, I use the Regulation School’s construct as a heuristic device, making its 
predictive value largely not an issue. Second, the framework has a holistic orientation that 
lends itself well to the kind of anthropological investigations that are local in nature but must 
take larger structural and global processes into account. Finally, the framework forces 
concrete comparisons, limiting tendencies to use essentialized models of western capitalism. 
1.5.2 Anthropology and Capitalism 
In the last fifteen years the study of capitalism in anthropology has taken on new vigor 
and meaning (Blim 2000).6  Much of this work has been influenced by anthropologies of late 
modernity, questioning whether political economy can provide an adequate conceptual 
                                                 
6 See Boyer (2007) for an illustrative review of different definitions of capitalism from a number of various 
disciplines concerned and contributing to the study of capitalism. 
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framework for understanding and critiquing late-modern society and capitalism when many 
believe that even the most flexible theories of global development can not deal with the 
complexities of a new global cultural economy (Appadurai 1996).7 As Moore argues, “…the 
central traditional concepts of anthropology have changed in the face of globalization and 
changes in the forms of political economy, the nation state, violence, the media and cultural 
identities...” (Moore 1999: 19). 
Ethnographies of capitalism are spurred by the claim “…that traditional concepts and 
ways of doing things no longer work, that life is out running the pedagogies in which we have 
been trained” (Fisher 1999: 456).  Ong (1991) observes from her experiences working with 
Malaysian women (1987) and a review of the role of gender in labor studies within 
anthropology that “Reports from the new frontiers of industrial labor reveal a widening gap 
between our analytical constructs and workers’ actual experiences” (1991: 279).  In general, 
anthropologies of late modernity and capitalism argue that “…the emergence of new 
economies, new markets and new kinds of state policy, along with changes in the global flow 
of capital...has arguably made the dynamics of capitalism more complicated...” (Alter 2000) 
and thus perhaps more difficult to understand using the late-19th and early-20th century 
notions of class society and industrial processes.   
Fisher (1999), for instance, outlines three overlapping arenas of attention that provide 
challenges for social theorists:  
                                                 
7 The term can be substituted with postmodernity, postindustrial society, knowledge society, or  information 
society.  See Michael Fisher (1999) for a fuller discussion on anthropologies of postmodernities. Here I use the 
term in relation to large scale social and economic changes in western society as opposed to postmodernism, or 
the “...genre of refractory expression” (Knauft 1996: 67-71).  
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1) The continuing transformation of modernities by science and 
technology, themselves understood to be mutating social and cultural 
institutions… 
2) The reconfiguration of perception by and understanding of the 
human social sensorium by computer-aided and sensory devices…also 
called the third revolution…with implications as profound as the first 
two industrial revolutions…for global political economy… 
3) The reconstruction of society in the wake of social trauma caused by 
…war; collapse of command economies; massive demographic 
migrations and diasporas…(Fisher 1999: 457).   
 
Transnational or global processes are responsible, according to Fisher, for “reworking 
local cultures and in particular increased participation by diverse agents in the complex 
division of knowledge and labor…” (1999: 459).  Importantly, Fisher suggests that we should 
no longer speak of a single modernity, that “social theories grow out of experiences from 
which they are written...,” and that alternate modernities, prompted by events like the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, can/should be the basis for exploring connections between “changing 
subjectivities, social organization, modes of production, and symbolic or cultural forms…” 
(1999: 471).   
Within Russia, I believe several modernities can be identified, particularly when 
investigating capital accumulation strategies in different sectors of the economy.  For small- 
and medium-sized, private (chastni) corporations—such as the ones founded by Galya and her 
family—production and labor strategies are guided by norms, practices, and subjectivities 
specific (though not exclusive) to the manufacturing and production sectors, which have 
allowed a particularly virulent (and successful) form of capitalist accumulation to emerge in 
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what seems to be a relatively short period of time. (I discuss labor management strategies 
extensively in Chapter 4.) 
Blim (2000) argues that analysis of capitalism should explore the context and meaning 
of variation in capitalist activities and in particular attempt to sort out the ‘causal efficacy’ of 
recurrent social practices (2000: 29). He cites the documentation of guanxi—a set of social 
practices in China and Taiwan “…that refers to the exchange of gifts and favors to solidify 
social ties between cooperating parties” (2000: 28)—work that may lead to new ways of 
thinking about exchange relations within capitalist activities (Hamilton 1998; Mackie 1998; 
Smart 1993). In Russia, processes associated with using or investing in social capital are 
captured in the phenomena of blat (see Chapter 3), which is characterized by long, sometimes 
indirect, chains of relationships that trade in reciprocal gifts and favors.  While the social 
currency associated with blat was an essential part of life under the Soviet Union, some 
scholars have suggested that the new wealth of post-soviet economy has lessoned the need for 
blat among those with increased access to currency (cf Ledeneva 1998, Busse 2001).  I am not 
able to draw the same conclusion from my research.  While the need to trade in social capital 
may have lessoned with the burgeoning market-based economy, blat was fundamentally about 
the relationships behind the transactions, which still play an important role in Russian 
commerce and society.  
Blim’s challenge is significant.  While it is relatively straightforward to document 
surface variation within a particular capitalist system, it is another matter to show the causal 
significance of these variations. For instance, in the case of blat I can document the 
importance of certain relationships on the success of particular businesses, but it is another 
matter to show that that relationship, or type of relationship, was both necessary and sufficient 
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to make a difference either at the enterprise level or more broadly for the regime of 
accumulation in operation.  Nonetheless, the role of informal networks of linked businesses is 
one of the specific characteristics that I believe has demonstrable effects on the form and 
evolution of capital accumulation in Russia (see Chapter 3).  
The urgency of the inquiry into capitalism increased significantly as the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe shed socialism in favor market economies in one form or another (Boyer 
2007).  Much of the research in the social sciences at the time was contributing to an 
emerging body of literature called ‘transitology,’ which contributed significantly to our 
understanding of large-scale political processes and institutions by documenting the 
challenges associated with realigning or creating the structures, policies, and institutions 
necessary for a capitalist regime of accumulation (Berdahl 2000) (cf. Abrahams 1997; 
Jefferies 1993; Kovacs 1994; Stark 1992 for discussion on privatization, land rights and 
market economies, and Pridham 1994; Arato 1999 on democratization and civil society 
development, respectively). 
Within anthropology, some of the literature from this time period was criticized for 
teleological assumptions that predicted certain capitalist endpoints for formally socialist 
economies (Burawoy 1999), and for relying on ideologically laden concepts that were better 
at prescribing than describing the situation in formerly socialist countries (cf. Barsegian 
2000).  
Where anthropologists may have been negligent in their critique of the transition 
literature is in not using on-the-ground research methods to move beyond documenting 
individual responses and resistances to Russia’s particular form of socio-economy—an 
emerging capitalist system—and instead focus on the changes and continuities to the 
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structural underpinnings of the economy, which shapes and are shaped by individuals 
interacting with those structures.  Stepping back to define capitalism will help make my point.  
In contrasting capitalism to self-instituting and self-equilibrating markets, Boyer (2007) 
suggests “capitalism is a legal regime, an economic system and a social formation that unfolds 
in history and that is built upon two basic social relations: the market competition and the 
capital/labor nexus” (2007:5).  Much of this dissertation is focused on the structures that guide 
these social relations. 
To meet Sewell’s (2005) call for conceptualizing structures in a way that allows them 
to change and incorporates the “two important dimensions along which structures vary: depth, 
which refers to the schema dimensions of structures, and power, which refers to the resource 
dimension” (2005:146) it is instructive to review how several notable anthropologist have 
approached changes to fundamental economic structures.  For example, Wolf’s (1982) 
political economy formulation "...locks in on processes of material production, on history, 
political developments and state-building, on intersections of the local level with the national 
and the global levels" (Abbink and Vermeulen 1992: 96).  For Wolf, political economy is the 
infusion of culture, history, and practice with issues of capitalism, class, and power 
(Roseberry, 1989:11).  He assumes that: 1) power and equality, and conflict and domination 
are pervasive parts of everyday life; 2) the cultural and historical specificity of groups studied 
requires a global reference; 3) global processes must be interpreted at the local level, allowing 
structure/agency interplay; and, 4) history is a material social process characterized by 
economic and political inequality/domination.   
Wolf  applied this theoretical construct in The People of Puerto Rico where he used 
the notion of  "cultural history" to argue that the 400 years of Puerto Rican history was not 
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merely a reflection of outside interventions on a pre-existing structure and history, but also 
"…local responses and adaptations to colonial institutions that affected the development of 
‘wholly new sub-cultural configurations’" (Steward, et al. 1956: 32).  These new 
configurations resulted from "...modifications in world markets, trade regulations, labor 
supply, technology, credit and legislation [that] reacted upon every subculture..." (Steward et 
al., 1956:32).  In a similar fashion, the structural reforms in Russia can not be viewed solely 
as outside forces mapped onto pre-existing structures, polices and norms.   
In the context of the fall of socialism, Verdery (1996) works with a similar set of 
processes as she makes the case that to understand what transition will mean in former socialist 
countries will require a better understanding of socialist era processes.  Within the Russian 
enterprises I researched, the mix of socialist era workplace norms and ‘new’ rules to deal with 
what the managers would refer to as ‘new capitalist system’ were continually shifted and 
remixed in an effort to increase productivity through control of labor.   
The identification and importance of deep socialist-era continuities follows on work of 
a number of anthropologists including Wedel (1992) who illustrated Poland’s ‘second society’ 
that existed outside of socialist society, or Kideckel (1995) and Creed’s (1995) analysis of the 
parallels between collectivization and decollectivization and Nagengast’s (1991) argument that 
capitalism in Poland would be able to take advantage of masked class relations that were 
present under socialism. Likewise, but reaching to a period prior to socialism, Poznanski 
(1994) argues that the emergence of capitalism is due to the reemergence of civil society and a 
liberal economy in those states. 
Wolf recasts modes of production as kin-ordered, tributary, and capitalist, highlighting 
the notion of labor being harnessed in a social plurality and calling production a “product of 
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complex, mutually dependent relationships” within societies (Wolf 1982: 386). He uses this 
production analysis as a tool for describing/understanding how "…human beings confront 
their world in order to modify it in their favor..." (1982: 386).  When different modes of 
production come in contact with one another, the unique relationships, symbol systems, and 
practices that 'empower, inform and carry forward human action' in each mode come into 
conflict.  Under this scheme "…each mode of production could be seen as generating a field 
of force related to alternate symbol systems generated by a particular mode of production” 
(Ong 1987: 2).   
As far as I was able to discern, within the context of the transitions in Russia, the 
fields are generating power differentials that allow Galya and other entrepreneurs to 
manipulate symbols, images, subjectivities, and ideologies associated with capitalism to 
effectively socialize, condition, and control their respective workforces.  Dunn (1999) showed 
that the use of symbols and language associated with capitalism is significant in contesting 
and negotiating the space created by privatization and foreign investment.  In her work with a 
previously state-run baby food factory in Poland she documented the struggles between the 
product marketers—younger, more Western-oriented employees—and the more traditional 
socialist workers on the shop floor. 
Ong’s approach responds to critics who maintain that one cannot "…assume an 
economic sphere [i.e. modes of production] distinct from and determining a social and 
cultural one" (Ortner 1984: 97) by showing—as Marx insisted—that "the starting point of 
materialism was the social conceived as material…” (Roseberry 1997: 27; italics added).  
Roseberry also notes a number of problems with the modes of production framework, 
including the fact that the literature often “…paid too little attention to activity of human 
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subjects” and took for granted the history of noncapitalist modes of production by using 
concepts borrowed from European history (Roseberry 1988: 172).  He also argued that the 
framework conceived of social and cultural processes “...in terms of the lawful relationships 
among structures, seen as prior to and removed from human action... [and]...based on 
abstractly conceived laws of motion of non-capitalist systems” (Roseberry 1988: 171).   
The dissatisfaction with modes of production pointed scholars including Ong (1987),  
Stoler (1985), and Comaroff  (1985) towards an increased emphasis on Marxist studies of 
culture such as that of  Williams (1977) and Gramsci (1971) “...showing a more explicit 
concern for class, culture and politics” (Roseberry 1988: 171).  
In her review article on gender and labor Ong proposes that workers’ experiences be 
conceived of as cultural struggles as opposed to “…a conventional framing of working-class 
experiences as a trajectory from class consciousness to class struggle to structural change” 
(Ong 1991: 304).  She borrows Williams’ notion of “structure of feeling” (Williams 1977: 
132) to describe “…a kind of practical consciousness [of workers] derived from actively lived 
and felt relationships” that take place outside of (and resist) articulated formal systems, or 
ideologies (Ong 1991: 304).  Ong’s approach, rooted in her work with Malaysian women 
confronting new forms of industrial discipline (1987), provides a more nuanced version of 
resistance theory, suggesting that workers find ways to struggle against forms of labor 
commodification and capitalist processes that run contrary to more traditional orientations to 
work and life.  However, her approach still presupposes resistance as a norm, which I found to 
be a dangerous presupposition when attempting to craft a research methodology and frame of 
analysis that accurately captured what was occurring as wage earners confronted radically 
different, yet very familiar, feeling modes of control in the workplace.  In Chapter 4, I 
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describe patterns of worker accommodation, acceptance, and misdirected resistance to 
workplace discipline and control strategies.  
Roseberry’s (1988) general critique of work inspired by Williams and Gramsci is that 
it pays too little attention to the structures and systems within which people were acting. In 
short: “too much agency, too little structure” (1988:173).  He suggests a more balanced 
inspection of historical materialism and cites Thompson’s (1963) treatment of the changing 
role of the British state in working class formation during the industrial revolution as a good 
frame of reference.  Thompson reminds us that in the end it was not the invention of the 
cotton mill, per say, from which an English working class consciousness arose, but the 
combination of technological advancement, population explosion, and “…the state’s ‘counter-
revolution’ against the explosive precepts of Jacobinism that were at work” (Thompson 1963: 
196). 
1.5.3 Globalization and Reconfigured (Late) Capitalism 
When Kearney (1995) reviewed the anthropological literature concerned with both population 
movements and the movement of information, symbols, capital, and commodities in global 
and transnational spaces he lamented that while Appadurai’s metaphors of cultural flows are 
useful, they were somewhat removed from issues of political economy.8  Gill (1997) has 
suggested that more important to understanding the “instantaneous and heightened density of 
the global transmission of signs and symbols... [or]...the globalization of culture...[are the] 
                                                 
8 Kearney identifies transnationalism as overlapping with globalization, but with the more limited 
purview of being anchored in and transcending one or more nation-states vs global processes which 
are decentered from specific national territories.  For further discussion see (Basch, Glick Schiller, & 
Szanton Blanc, 1994: 5-10 in Kearney, 1995: 548). 
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changes in spatial and organizational nature of internationally mobile capitalist production, 
commerce, and finance” (Gill 1997 in Dash 1998: 54).  Likewise, Blim cautions against a 
“reversion to metaphors or to functionalistic descriptions of the world economy” when trying 
to describe the ways in which workers are connected together in the global accumulation 
process (Blim1998: 323). However, I would argue the metaphors are immensely useful and 
are only removed from political economic approaches if we allow them to be.  The metaphors 
are a way to connect theory to fieldwork in order to help us understand how change begins to 
happen and what it looks like for the people living through those changes.   
Harvey in particular links cultural change and flows of capital to the “marked 
acceleration of...space-time compression in capitalist political economy...” (Kearney 1995: 
551).9  For Harvey “...major shifts of representation, cultural forms and philosophical 
sentiment...” occur as a result of capitalism’s imperative to continually shorten the time 
between investment and profit taking (Harvey 1989: 239 in Kearney 1995: 531).  This 
imperative is felt during periods when capitalism must restructure itself in order to survive.  
The most recent restructuring began in the early 1970s when the “Fordist-Keynsian” model of 
labor control practices, technological mixes, consumer preferences, and regimes of political-
economic power gave way to a period of “rapid change, flux and uncertainty” (Harvey 1989: 
124).   
Harvey characterizes Fordist accumulation practices as ‘rigid,’ assuming stable growth in 
unchanging patterns of consumption, and thus relying on “long-term, large-scale fixed capital 
investments in mass-production systems” (1989: 142). These rigidities were comprised of a 
“seemingly fixed configuration of political power and reciprocal relations that bound big labor, 
                                                 
9 For example, see Verdery's (1996) argument that the destabilization of the Soviet economy and the 
eventual fall of socialism was a product of socialism collision with the ‘speed-up’ of capitalism. 
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big capital and big government into...a dysfunctional embrace of such narrowly defined vested 
interests as to undermine rather than secure capital accumulation” (1989:142).  I believe this 
definition, with adjustments for where the locust of power is held, can be applied to the Soviet 
economy, making Harvey’s analysis of why the Fordist system broke down an excellent heuristic 
device for framing and understanding the emergence of a particular kind of capitalism in Russia 
by the late 1990s.   
Harvey’s analysis maps well to much of what is happening in Russia at present, which 
suggests that the Socialist production had a good deal more in common with ‘fordism’ than 
previously understood or at least acknowledged in the literature documenting the ‘transition’ 
away from socialist economies. The implications for this oversight are significant and go to 
one of the main points of this dissertation—that the institutions and many of the structures 
that would support the emergence of capitalism in Russia were already in place.  Put another 
way, the industrial culture of the USSR (cf. Berliner 1957, Martin 1998) had much in 
common with its Western counterparts.  Other anthropologists have found Harvey’s analysis 
useful as a framework for studying new forms of labor control and exploitation (cf. Kasmir 
1999; Mathur 1998; Ong 1991). 
Harvey argues that the U.S. recession and oil embargo in 1972 challenged these 
rigidities and set in motion a new regime of “flexibility with respect to labour processes, 
labour markets, products and patterns of consumption...new ways of providing financial 
services...and greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological and organizational 
innovation” (1989:147).  The analogous, or triggering events, for Karelia were the formation 
of the Russian Federation in 1991 and ensuing neoliberal reform of the early 1990s.  The net 
effects of more flexibility were an increased mobility and diversification of industrial sector, a 
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reduction in trade union power, rapid changes in patterns of uneven development between 
industries and geographic areas, and a surge in the service sector as industry moved to less 
developed regions (1989: 147). Giovanni Arrighi (1994), in contrast, begins his analysis of 
capitalism’s development not with theorizing the transition to flexible accumulation, but with 
an “...investigation of... [capitalism’s]...current tendencies in light of patterns of recurrence 
and evolution, which span the entire lifetime of historical capitalism as a world system...[and 
thus make]...tendencies that look novel and unpredictable...familiar” (Arrighi 1994: 4; 
emphasis added).  He builds upon Baudel’s notion that “historical financial expansions are 
closing phases of major capitalist developments...” to breakdown capitalist development into 
cycles of accumulation (Arrighi, 1999: 55).  For Baudel, capitalism over its entire lifetime has 
been marked by a flexibility and eclecticism (Baudel 1982:197 in Arrighi 1994:4).  By adding 
Marx’s general formula for capital (MCM’) to Baudel’s analysis of capitalism’s development, 
Arrighi argues: 
Money capital (M) means liquidity, flexibility and freedom of 
choice.  Commodity capital (C) means capital invested in a 
particular input-output combination in view of profit.  Hence it 
means concreteness, rigidity, and...a closing of options.  M’ 
means expanded liquidity flexibility and freedom of 
choice...thus...capitalist agencies do not invest in Capital as an 
end in itself...[but]...as a means to an end of securing even 
greater flexibility...at some future point (1994:5). 
 
According to Arrighi, Marx’s formula tells us that capital tends/prefers to revert to a 
money form (1994: 5) and that expectations for flexibility and choice in commodity 
investments are second to the preferred liquidity of money.  This is evidenced by the large 
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accumulation of money in world financial centers, which also provides Arrighi’s rationale for 
the numerous historical withdrawals of world powers away from commerce/commodity trade 
(MC) and towards banking and finance (CM).  For example, the Dutch withdrew from 
commerce to become the bankers of Europe in the 18th century (Arrighi 1994: 5); or, more 
recently, finance in the U.S. gained heightened importance in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
capital flight out of Russia in the early 1990s is a testament to the validity of this claim.  
However, Russia in the 2000s saw development of robust domestic equity markets as the 
flow of capital out of the country was replaced with capital investments in Russian 
businesses and industry.  Perhaps an equally important indicator has been the relatively 
recent willingness to contribute liberally to political campaigns as an important investment 
that ensures, as Baudel, put it ‘greater flexibility’ in the future.  (Chapter 5 discusses the role 
of politics in accumulation strategies.) 
Arrighi (1994) also uses Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to construct a genealogy of 
capitalism’s development dependent on the rise of particular networks of power that exerted 
force over, and had imbedded in them, subordinate networks for capital accumulation. He 
identifies four historical cycles of accumulation during which the successful hegemons (i.e. 
the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States) incorporated into their state and war-
making arsenals the ability to accumulate capital by reaching out to their counterparts in 
other capitalist states to expand possibilities for accumulation (Arrighi 1994: 86).  Yet he 
also points out that capitalism “...triumphed by not being identified with any particular state, 
but by constructing world-encompassing, non-territorial business organizations” (1994: 86).  
The process by which capitalism went from subordinate to networks of state power to a 
system of networks of accumulation outside the state (e.g. transnational corporations) was 
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“...a series of systematic cycles of accumulation, each consisting of an MC phase followed by 
CM phase of financial expansion...[conceived as]...long periods of fundamental 
transformation of the agency and structure of world-scale processes of capital accumulation” 
(1994: 86).  This formulation provides a model and language with which to think about the 
political economic transitions within Russia, as networks and normative socialist era 
practices that existed because of the government have at least partially subsumed a number of 
governmental functions.  (cf. Stark and Bruszt 1998; Hellman et al 2000; Sava 2003; Wedel 
2002)  
I have situated this dissertation within a political economic framework because of the 
relevance and flexibility the framework provides.  At the same time, I have attempted to set 
up a research methodology that allows me to transcend the debate alluded to above between 
an overly structural focus and one that focuses on individual agency.10  In the broadest sense, 
I have tried to combine a materialist orientation that focuses on the emerging capitalist 
relations of production and its constitutive structures and technologies, with an interpretive 
approach that seeks to understand the cultural dimensions and symbolic power of capitalism 
and underscores the processes whereby individuals are the creators of the social systems yet 
created by them (Giddens 1990; Robertson 1992). 
                                                 
10 See Roseberry  (1988); Ong (1987); Stoler (1985); and, Comaroff (1985) for contrasting perspectives in this 
debate. 
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2.0  THE KARELIAN ECONOMY 
I arrived in Petrozavodsk after a seven-year hiatus to a city that felt intimately 
familiar, but was vastly different.  Petrozavodsk’s Lenin Prospect still ran on a gentle grade 
from the hammer and sickle-spired train station down some fifteen blocks to the shores of 
Lake Onega, the second largest body of fresh water in Europe. The pink, blue, and yellow-
hued stucco buildings—products of a massive rebuilding effort after the Soviets destroyed 
much of the city trying to retake it from Finland during the Second World War—still warmly 
reflected the light of the long summer days.  The city was also as clean as ever—a fact often 
remarked upon by visitors and an on-going source of local pride—and Lenin still towered 
over the city’s neo-colonial circle square (Figure 4), rooted there indefinitely, I was told, 
because he was simply too heavy to move. This left a diminutive statue of Peter the Great—
the square’s original occupier and the city founder—vanquished to a quiet corner of a park 
along Lake Onega.  My apartment afforded me a view of Lenin’s square and a daily reminder 
of the importance of continuity in structures, practices, and even expectations in daily Russian 
life.  
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Figure 4. Lenin Square in the Heart of Petrozavodsk  
 
Other outward changes in the city were dramatic. Every storefront and even the 
basements of most apartment buildings—many of which had previously been dirt-floored 
storage areas—along the main thoroughfares throughout the city had been transformed into 
new retail space, restaurants, or hair salons. From toasters to personal watercraft, everything 
was now for sale.  The taste for variety and Western-style consumption had caught on here as 
it had throughout much of Russia with retail trade turnover in Karelia growing by 9.2 percent 
in 2001, up from 5.8 percent a year ago at the same time (Figure 5). The share of foodstuffs in 
retail trade turnover declined from 57.3 percent to 53.8 percent—evidence that Karelians had 
increasing buying power and real wages as they bought more non-food durable goods. 
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Figure 5. Karelian Retail Gross Sales.  
Source: Karelkomstat 2004  (Russian Rubles—Millions) 
 
However, Karelia never really embraced privatization and the false hopes proffered by 
free market proponents to the degree that much of Russia did in the early 1990s.  To be sure, 
there were waves of euphoria, hope, and hype, but in the practical matters of owning the 
rights to natural resources and the facilities that processed and sold these resources, the 
government was much more circumspect and conservative than many of its counterparts.11  
For example, thanks in part to one influential and farsighted timber director; the Republic 
maintained shares in almost all of the timber logging, processing, and manufacturing facilities 
in the Republic.  The steady source of hard currency revenue from these enterprises helped 
maintain a strong central government in the Republic throughout the 1990s, and continues to 
have far-reaching consequences for private business owners.12  State ownership in 85 percent 
of the formerly state owned enterprises in Karelia that were privatized between 1992 and 
1997 has been a significant source of revenue for the Republic, which has in turn invested 
                                                 
11 Karelia holds the distinction of being one of the very last of the Russian regional governments to condemn the 
coup attempt against Gorbachev. 
12 For example see chapter 4 on the relative power of State to protect business owners from organized crime 
extortion and other rent seeking activities. 
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heavily back into road and infrastructure development.  Government investments have been 
one of the leading reasons Karelian investment growth in real assets grew by 46.7 percent in 
2001—the highest rate in Russia (Table 2). 
Table 2. Real Asset Investment 1999-2002 
Real Asset Investment 
(USD, Millions) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total Investment in Real Assets 2875 6703 10997 9292 
Annual  percent growth 40.2 68.4 46.7 6.3 
Investment Index (1990=100) 17 28.4 41 44.3 
Source:  Karelkomstat 2002 and  2004;  
 
The policies have also helped Karelian wage earners whose nominal wages are higher 
than the Russian average, even though real income has grown on average faster outside of 
Karelia.  
 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real income —percent change, Russia -14 9.1 8.7 9.9 
Real income —percent change, Karelia -10.5 8 1.2 18.6 
Figure 6. Income Growth Compared 1999-2002 
Source:  Goskomstat 2004, Karelkomstat 2004 
 
Although the Karelian state did not entirely divest itself of the Republic’s vast 
resources, there has been a steady degradation of what had been, in many Russians’ minds, a 
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fairly bright line between resources for public good versus that of private usage.  Local and 
regional elections can be seen as battles for control of state managed resources—everything 
from leasing government-owned retail space at official rates that are about three times below 
market value, to securing timber rights to vast tracts of forest through patronage networks that 
support incumbent politicians.  Many of the Russians I spoke with saw the profiteering, 
favoritism, and corruption as a relatively new phenomenon associated with the end of 
socialism.  Conversely, private individuals and enterprises have entered territory once 
reserved for the state by, for example, providing communal security doors to apartment 
buildings during elections, ensuring that students receive meals during school, and supporting 
sports and cultural clubs once funded by the government.  The significance of the blurring of 
lines between what is public and what is private—for both entrepreneurs and their 
employees—is a topic taken up in chapters 3 and 5, which deal with informal business groups 
and gender politics, respectively.   
If the current Karelian government’s politics weren’t entirely Western-oriented, their 
vision of the future certainly seemed to be. The Republic has positioned itself as the gateway 
to Europe.  Its westward-looking aspirations are symbolized by Petrozavodsk’s mile-long 
promenade at the shore of Lake Onega (Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
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Figure 7. Petrozavodsk’s Lake Onega Shoreline at Night 
 
 
Figure 8. City Day on the Lake Onega Shoreline 
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The beautiful Karelian-granite walkway is marked by a dozen or so pieces of public 
art, each given as gifts from Sister States/Cities from across the world. The first sculpture to 
grace the waterfront—two fishermen casting a gill net into the lake—is from the City of 
Duluth, Minnesota and is a favorite with locals, who like all Russians, have a good eye for the 
ironic (Figure 9).13  After the devastating ruble devaluation in 1998 the fishermen symbolized 
the snaring of Karelia in the net of ruthless capitalism.  More literally, the fishermen are 
throwing the same type gill nets that devastated Karelia’s fisheries when people were forced 
into subsistence fishing during the economic downturn in the 1990s.  
 
Figure 9. A Gift Sculpture from Duluth, Minnesota: Fellow Fishermen or Capitalism’s Ensnaring Net? 
                                                 
13 The connections between Minnesota and Karelia are highlighted by Mayme Sevander (1992 ) who chronicled 
the tragic return migration of ethnic Finns who moved from the United States and Canada to help build a 
worker’s state only to be caught later in Stalin-era purges.   
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To get a sense of the magnitude of changes in the intervening years since my last visit, 
it helps to review some simple statistics.  In 1992 the number of newly incorporated 
businesses in Karelia—both foreign and Russian—was around 35 (Abbott 1999).  However 
by the end of 1998 there were 437 foreign-owned enterprises from 40 different countries 
incorporated in Karelia alone investing almost $42 million in direct investments (Table 4).14  
About one-half of these firms were Finnish.  In the last three years, the rate of new 
incorporation has increased on average about 3.5 percent per year after accounting for 
corporate terminations.15  Twelve of the new firms in 2001 were wholly foreign owned and 
comprised 11 percent of the total investment in the Republic for 2001 (Table 4). In 1991, 
there was only one such foreign owned firm in Karelia. 
 
Table 3. Foreign Investment in Karelia 1998-2001 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Foreign investment USD million 3.5 15.5 2.2.2 41.7 
 Percent of Total Investment 2.6 9.3 13.4 11 
Source Karelkomstat 2002 
 
Table 4. Enterprises Registered in Karelia16 
Number of Registered Enterprises  1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total in Karelia 13,028 15,710 16,300 17,342 18,550 
Newly Registered 920 1358 1351 1392 1691 
Source: Karelkomstat 2004 
 
                                                 
14 Karelkomstat 1999. 
15 ibid 
16 This number is somewhat misleading because of the number of incorporations established to hide assets from 
tax police or similar motivations other then than engaging in actual commerce.   
 51 
 
By 2001, a 9.6 percent share of industrial output was attributable to small enterprises 
(versus 3.3 for all of Russia).  Stunningly, the total number of people employed in small 
business in Karelia (Figure 10) between 1998 and 2003 increased by 86 percent even as the 
total number of people employed has steadily declined in the past few years (Figure 11).17  
The job migration to the small business sector is significant in Karelia and in all of 
Russia.  The Karelian government had a more difficult time protecting the interests of larger 
firms at the smaller firms’ expense, and the small firms were becoming important political 
players by, for instance, creating organizations to advance their interests (see Chapter 3), 
generating revenue that could be cycled into election campaigns (see Chapter 5), and 
increasing the tax base for regional government and municipalities. 
 
 
Figure 10. Employment and Small Enterprises in Karelia 
Source:  Karelkomstat 2003 
 
                                                 
17 Karelkomstat (2003) in Biannual Review published by University  of  Joensuu – Karelian Science Centre. 
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Figure 11. Employees in the Karelian Economy 1997-2003 
Source:  2003 Karelian Science Centre, Bi-annual Review University of Joensuu 
 
 
Karelia’s ties to the West have also been supported through the Republic’s active 
participation in such multilateral organizations as the Barents Euro-Arctic Regional Council 
and the Council of Baltic Sea Countries, both of which focus on environmental issues and 
economic development, trade, and other commercially and culturally oriented activities across 
Europe.  
 Anecdotally, the surge in corporate interests in Karelia can be confirmed with a 
search for “Karelia” on the Internet, which reveals tens of thousands of e-mail addresses, Web 
sites, and Web-servers in the Republic that include everything from pagers, to dating service 
advertisements, to a database of Karelian laws and law reforms for small businesses 
sponsored by the local affiliate office of the Soros Foundation. 
The labor and production strategies in the enterprises I worked are best analyzed in the 
context of the specific features of the Karelian regional economy. The Republic is heavily 
dependent upon natural resource extraction with 60 percent of industrial output in 2002 
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coming from this sector18.  The Karelian government still controls a large subsection of this 
economy through stock ownership in the timber harvesting and processing sector.  When the 
ruble was devalued by almost 400 percent in 1998 (Manfred 2004), eviscerating the newly 
growing Russian economy, the Karelian economy actually benefited in 1999 and 2000 from 
the devaluation (Table 5, Figure 12).  The steady infusion of foreign currency from the newly 
inexpensive (for foreign buyers) lumber exports combined with the lower labor costs  fueled a 
construction and renovation boom (Table 6) that encouraged Russians to invest in new 
enterprises locally, rather than take their profits out of the country.  The economic activity 
resulted in steadily increasing wages and thus more consumer buying power.   
Table 5. Karelian GRP 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Karelian GPR (Rubles Billion) 9.9 11.4 20.2 28.5 32.5 
Karelian Real GPR (Rubles Billion) -5.8 -6.9 10.6 8 5 
Karelian GPR per Capita, (Rubles 1,000) 12.7 14.7 26.4 38 42.8 
Russian GPR per capita (Rubles 1,000) 16.8 18.4 31.6 48 61.9 
Source:  Karelkomstat 2002 
 
                                                 
18 Karelkomstat 2001. 
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Figure 12. Karelian Industrial Production 1997-2003 
Source:  2003 Karelian Science Centre, Bi-annual Review, University of Joensuu  
 
In 2001, the construction sector grew by over almost 40 percent led by a 25 percent 
increase in housing construction and large infusions of funds for road construction.  Notably, 
the contribution of small firms (under 20 employees) doubled in 2002, accounting for almost 
60 percent of the economic activity in the sector, which bolsters the case for the importance of 
small business in the economy. 
 
Table 6. Construction in Karelia 
Construction Indicators 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Construction Contracts—Value in RUR Million 586 1036 2030 4060 
Percent real growth -20.9 30 46 42.6 
Quantity—housing construction 1,000m2 65.6 70.5 56.1 70.5 
Source: Karelkomstat 2002 
 
As the Republic’s largest employer, the government is especially sensitive to 
unemployment rates.  This has created a bit of a dilemma for the government, which 
outwardly recognizes the enormous economic potential of small and medium sized 
businesses, but still needs to protect its direct and indirect interests in formerly state run 
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enterprises.  Protectionist tendencies generally prevail, which are marked by harsher 
inspections, limited access to raw materials, and problems with permitting, etc., for private 
(chastni) enterprises. 
The employment rate as linked to demographic trends in the republic is also an 
important variable for understanding the economic climate at the time of my research.19  Since 
1990, the population in Karelia has declined by five percent in just 12 years (Figure 13).  The 
loss of population can be attributed to a negative population growth rate with the current death 
rate of 16.9 being almost double the birthrate of 8.9 and the fact that many highly employable 
people were leaving the Republic in search of higher paying jobs elsewhere in Russia.20 
 
Figure 13. Karelia Population Over Time 
Source: 2002 All Russia Census; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Karelia#Demographics 
 
The loss of population coupled with the increase in industrial output and decreasing 
unemployment rate, which declined rapidly from 19 percent in 1998 for able-bodied workers 
                                                 
19 See Rivkin-Fish (2002) for a thorough analysis and critique of the way demographic data in contemporary 
Russia is interpreted to defend or decry neoliberal policies of the 1990’s that coincided with negative population 
growth in Russia. 
20 Source:  Karelkomstat (2002), Social and economic situation in the Republic of Karelia from January-June 
2003, Petrozavodsk: Karelkomstat. 
 56 
to 11.4 percent in 2000 (Table 7), has shrunk the available pool of local workers and forced 
many employees to rely on workers immigrating from the former Soviet Republics.  The tight 
labor supply does mitigate the power managers have to control and discipline workforce, but 
other factors such as long probation periods, lack of workplace protections for sexual 
harassment, and workplace safety, make most employees very reluctant to switch jobs. 
 
Table 7. Karelian Unemployment Rates 
Unemployment Rates  1998 1999 2000 2001 
Russia 11.8 12.6 10.5 9.4 
Karelia 18.9 15.1 11.4 12.3 
Source:  Goskomstat, Karelkomstat 2002 
 
The Karelian Branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB; formerly the KGB) also 
plays a significant role in the Karelian business climate.  The FSB itself now offers, for 
enterprises that can afford it, complete, steady protection from organized crime and rent 
seeking behavior associated with its activities.  In fact, locals call Karelia ‘the police state’ 
because of the direct protection (kryshas) provided to small business by FSBs.  Although 
these arrangements would probably be used by western scholars as evidence of deep 
institutional corruption, Russian entrepreneurs see these arrangements in a positive light and 
speak highly of the safety afforded by FSB protection.   
The geographic position of Karelia along the Finnish border is also significant.  The 
border economy, including a guest worker program that brings thousands of Russians to 
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Finland in the summer for seasonal agricultural work, has greatly accelerated the flows of 
technology and capital into this part of Russia.21 
Also important is the fact that the enterprises I investigated are not ‘spin-offs’ of state 
enterprises or joint ventures with foreign firms.  They were created in the last decade and are 
private (chastni) firms, which in this context translates to small/medium enterprises that are 
not joint-stock companies or previously state-owned enterprises.  They occupy what I 
describe in more detail later as ‘retrofit space’—from the decrepit buildings that have been 
ingeniously modified to house their operations, to the soviet–style systems of surveillance and 
discipline, to employee benefits and perks that have been strategically altered to meet the 
needs of the private firms.  
Small business in Karelia has done rather well from about 1999 forward, especially in 
comparison to small business throughout Russia.  An analysis by scholars at the University of 
Joensuu’s Karelian Science Centre in Finland found that the average worker in a small 
business in Karelia is considerably more productive than their counterparts in the rest of 
Russia (Figure 14). To an extent, this has to do with the nature of timber industry and small 
scale fishing and agricultural operations. Nonetheless, the differences are significant and 
illustrate the relatively favorable climate for small business in Karelia as well as the enormous 
potential small and medium sized companies have to be the engine that drives economic 
growth and capitalist accumulation strategies in Russia. 
 
                                                 
21 Conversely, Russian tourists have become increasingly important to Finland. In the 2007 tax-free purchases 
alone brought in more than 100 million euros to the Finnish economy (Barents Observer, Jan 2, 2008). 
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Figure 14. Labor Productivity in Small Enterprises in 2001 
Output per employee=1,000 Rubles 
Source: Karelkomstat 2003; Goskomstat 2003 
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3.0  RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORKS 
Having been out of contact with my Russian friends for sometime, and not wanting to appear 
presumptuous of our friendships, I returned to Petrozavodsk in 1999 unannounced to attend a 
summer language institute at Petrozavodsk State University and conduct some preliminary 
dissertation research.  When I somewhat sheepishly called an old friend after having been in 
town for a few days she exclaimed: 
No it can’t be…how is it you are here and didn’t call as soon as 
you arrived?  You remember our Tanya...she told me that she 
saw you standing on the street last week, but thought to herself 
‘no, it couldn’t be him, that man is much too short to be 
Mark…’ 
 
On the day Tanya likely spotted me I happened to be standing near a Russian 
acquaintance who is exceedingly tall.  Nonetheless, I suspect most things Western loomed 
larger for the Russians in 1992 than they did in 1999.  This is due not so much to the fact that 
notions such as democracy and capitalism had lost their luster (though they had for many) as 
it was to the bruising devaluation of the ruble in 1998.  The shock and arbitrariness of waking 
to find that ones’ savings were worthless and many staple goods were suddenly priced out of 
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reach at the stores had become the new reference point for the often-asked question ‘are 
things better before or after the changes?’ 22 
Still, I found among my old friends and associates an air of confidence and recognition 
that the business climate had improved in some important ways.  For the most part, they had 
survived the bruising ruble devaluation of 1998 with their livelihoods intact, though all had 
horror stories of overnight shortages, price gouging, and feelings of dread and panic that they 
relayed in great detail.  I spent the next few months re-establishing friendships, tapping into 
old networks, and setting the scope/range of my field site and research project. 
This chapter provides an introduction to those relationships and the organizational 
structures, decision making strategies, and internal workings of the enterprises and business 
groups that ‘own’ the enterprises I discuss in this ethnography.  The enterprises I investigated 
were all private (chastni) businesses incorporated since 1992 and owned by individuals or 
small groups of individuals with either formal or informal ties to the companies.  They are 
small/medium enterprises.23 
For Galya and her sister Anna the previous seven years had truly been a blur.  In the 
time since my last visit they had left their fledgling bookkeeping business and their largest 
client to start a series of businesses.  The split from their client’s business group (discussed 
below in detail) was both legal and normative.  The groups have separate autonomous 
command and control mechanisms.  Although, as this chapter will show, their continued 
collaboration was vital for the existence of both groups of businesses. 
                                                 
22 In addition to the Ruble devaluation there is also able anecdotal evidence that suggests manufactured shortages 
and price gouging took place on an unprecedented scale. 
23 Officially, a small business in Karelia must have 18 or less registered employees to qualify for certain local tax 
benefits. 
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3.1 GALYA’S EMPIRE 
By 1999, the sisters and their immediate families were proprietors of a spectacularly 
successful bar/café, a busy domestic tourist office catering to Russians and visiting Finns, and 
a bread bakery that had carved out a significant piece of market share in the Republic.  When 
I returned in 2001 to conduct a year of dissertation fieldwork, Galya and Anna had added two 
additional commercial bakeries to their stable businesses to provide hard to find, high quality 
pastries and desserts for her café.24  
 
Table 8. Enterprises Owned by Galya and her Extended Family 
Enterprise 
Name 
Primary 
Commercial 
Activity 
Founded Number of 
Employees 
Percent 
Female 
Mean Age 
Bakery #1 Bread 1993 30 10 28 
Central Café Restaurant/Bar 1996 125 80 22 
Travel Agency Domestic Tours 1997 3 100 NA 
Bakery #2 Cakes/Tarts 2000 46 90 23 
Bakery #3 Bread and Rolls 2001 20 90 26 
North Star Café Café/Bar 2002 15 50 NA 
Computer Club Computer Games 2002 6 0 18 
 
 
Galya’s group—I will refer to this network of businesses as such because she acted as 
a CEO and lead decision maker for the businesses—is composed primarily of Galya and 
Anna, their husbands, three older children, a cadre of trusted managers, and one outside 
associate who is no longer intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of the enterprises, 
but at one time was a director and equity holder in Bakery #1.   
                                                 
24 In 2007, using the same formula for success—a central location, new and creative offerings—Galya added a 
highly popular jazz club to their portfolio.  
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Most of the businesses I investigated were associated with a multitude of incorporated 
organizations that were vital to their survival. By the mid 1990s, entrepreneurs were creating 
and changing corporate structures at an alarming rate. In fact, an entirely new cadre of 
lawyers was being trained by the local universities and finding gainful employment providing 
these services.  The myriad of incorporations form interlocking networks of ‘sister 
companies’ that operate with varying degrees of cooperation—depending on the 
relationship—that create a number of commercial credit, marketing, sales, and tax advantages 
for the owners.    
For one of the groups I researched, I uncovered over 50 separate corporate 
registrations/incorporations over a five-year period associated with the same set of 
enterprises.  As one police investigator I spoke with described it:  “It’s impossible anymore to 
keep track of all of this…they do this to hide profits from us and it works pretty well.”  This is 
probably a true statement, though I never attempted to directly validate it by researching the 
legality of the many business strategies employed to reduce tax burden.  What is clear is that 
group relations were essential—in ways that went well beyond what I would consider purely 
commercial transaction relationships—for the survival of the businesses. 
The heart of Galya and Anna’s business group was the North Star Café, both because 
of its central location in town and because its revenues surpassed even the highly profitable 
bread Bakery #1.25  Galya’s inspiration for the North Star Café (NS café) came from a 
vacation in the mid-1990s to the Czech Republic where she was taken with the good food, 
friendly wait staff, and social atmosphere of the restaurants she visited.  The NS Café 
achieves her goal of creating a ‘democratic place’ to sit and have coffee with medium priced 
                                                 
25 All business names are fictitious. I have provided non-generic names that bear some resemblance to the actual 
name when there is some significance to the real name that might be gleaned from the pseudonym.   
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food and floor-to-ceiling windows that create an open, light-filled atmosphere—a notable 
departure from the typically dark and foreboding atmosphere of most Russian bars and private 
business clubs.   
The first-rate, ‘exotic’ food (most recently the menu featured a spoof on McDonalds 
with a variety of hamburgers—a food not sold anywhere else in Petrozavodsk), the famous 
musician and actor patrons who also lend their images to the café’s t-shirts and calendars, and 
the indie music piped through the stereo system, combine to make the café the place to be and 
be seen in Petrozavodsk.  The café’s popularity encourages university students (two 
universities are situated close by) not only to hang out at NS Café but to work there.  At any 
given time, 100 or more students are on the payroll working flexible schedules.  From this 
group of eager students, Galya profiles and culls likely candidates to work at the other 
enterprises owned by the group. 
The café also serves as the ‘nerve center’ for the commercial, political, and social 
projects that emanate from this group. The café’s geographic location helped give rise to 
Galya’s political campaign slogan ‘Always in the Center’ discussed in Chapter 5.  Much of 
the group’s business dealings are as seemingly open as the light-flooded restaurant.  At any 
given time, Galya and other family members can be found hunched over a table engaged in 
earnest conversation on everything from the day’s activities to planning for a visit from 
German factory representatives.  Additionally, the dozens of state inspectors, from fire, to 
sanitation, to alcohol control, that show up seemingly weekly are asked to present their 
reports over coffee and croissants at the restaurant, thus making public what is often 
conducted in private and resolved with the passing of ‘envelope money.’  This practice lends 
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credence to Galya’s emphatic claims that they go to great lengths to legitimately meet all 
government inspections and requirements. 
The basement of Central café was a maze of storage rooms and poorly lit hallways, 
each leading to a different office seemingly more cluttered than the previous one.  The floors 
were dirt in some places and uneven concrete in others.  The basement provided a cramped 
break room for employees, offices for Galya’s ill-fated run for city Duma (see Chapter 5) and 
eventually, once cleared and remodeled, a fledgling computer club that brought in surprising 
amounts of cash.  
The start-up of the computer club, a business conceived and managed by Galya’s 
teenage son, illustrates the importance of networked enterprises for successful entrepreneurs 
in Russia.  First, financing for capital projects—e.g. store remodeling and computers—was all 
done through revenue from sister companies.  This provides a mechanism for buying down 
tax obligations and access to low cost capital.  Also important is insurance, or the club’s roof 
(kresh), which in this case is covered by the café’s arrangement with the local police. Young 
Alexander relayed to me what he saw as a rather comical (I thought incredibly naïve) 
interaction with “a few big guys” sent to his club the first week it opened to arrange for 
protection services against theft and fire. When he explained that he was part of the above 
café, they didn’t believe him, but said they would be back after they checked out the story.  
They never came back. Galya has the finest protection money can buy—that of the Karelian 
FSB.  While not an issue for this fledging enterprise, it actually is for many that cannot afford 
the costs of engaging the police and are thus left to deal with local organized extortion rings.  
Finally, the marketing for the club relied heavily on a client base of the other businesses in the 
group, in this case drawing upon the café’s student clientele and more importantly younger 
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siblings and other youth as young as 10 years of age that were drawn to the central café’s 
atmosphere or vibe but were unable to afford it were or discouraged as patrons.  
The start-up phase of the club also illustrates how many critical decisions were made 
within Galya’s group.  Beyond exacting, if informal, business plans that included detailed 
revenue projections, the business strategy was done on the fly. For example chatting on the 
street about how to purchase a needed new computer for the club: “…yes, bakery #2 is due 
for one or two new computers…we will use that account…” or holding court at a table in the 
cafe where Galya and her sister conducted much of their business.  Finally, the club’s success 
is illustrative of the family’s knack for accumulating capital through innovation and business 
savvy. Open 24 hours a day, the club tracked its daily performance by looking at the 
percentage of time each of the 26 computers was rented.  In the first month of operation, they 
were rented out 86 percent of the time, which, at four rubles per hour, created revenue that 
exceeded $2,750, excluding food and beverages sold at the club, per month.  By comparison, 
the average monthly salary for one of the young adults working full-time upstairs in the café 
would rarely exceed $110 per month, which was the median wage in Karelia in 2002.26  
Providing pastries, cakes, breads, and desserts to the group’s Café, as well as area 
grocery stores, restaurants, cafeterias, and schools, are three additional enterprises owned by 
Galya and her family (in Figure 15 and Figure 16).  In all, about 170 wage earners (most café 
employees are part-time) work in these enterprises which have daily production capacities of 
up to 18,000 loaves of bread, five hundred sponge-cakes (biskvitii), and thousands of 
croissants, buns, and pastries. 
 
                                                 
26 Karelkomstat (2002), Social and economic situation in the Republic of Karelia from January-June 2003, 
Petrozavodsk.  
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Figure 15. Outside View of Bakery #1  
 
 
Figure 16. Outside View of Bakery #3  
 
Bakery #1 was the original enterprise started by the sisters and their husbands along 
with one family friend, who was the only non-relative in the group that was an owner.  This 
bakery, which can break even producing at about 40 percent capacity, was the source of most 
of the capital needed to launch the Café and weather the economic crisis of 1998.  Although 
they entered into baking more by accident than strategy, their ability to capture market share 
with new and quality bread products despite fierce competition from other artisan bakeries 
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and formerly state-owned bakeries made the bakery, until recently, a perennial moneymaker 
for the group.  
Bakery #1 was the only bakery owned by the group that used fully automated 
equipment for several sections of the production line.  With its three large-capacity, German-
made convection ovens and automated dough kneading machines, a brigade of six working a 
twelve-hour shift could produce eight to nine thousand loaves of bread in a number of 
varieties.  In addition to the bakers and assistants, this factory employed a half-dozen or so 
delivery drivers, a licensed technologist as required by sanitation and food handling 
regulations, a part time cook—brigade members are fed two hot meals per shift—the director, 
a dispatcher/bookkeeper responsible for the daily production order and quality control, and a 
night watchman.27  
The ovens in Bakery #1, though imported new (or least reconditioned) in 1992, were 
becoming quite unreliable as they wore out from continual use over the years.  As one brigade 
member scoffed, “ The only thing German about these ovens are the shells…we’ve replaced 
almost everything with Russian parts or bailing wire…which explains why they don’t work so 
well anymore.”  In fact, the large convection ovens did not circulate the heat evenly and faulty 
temperature sensors frequently scorched entire batches (250-300 loaves) of bread.  
The bakery, like all of the other enterprises owned by the group, occupy what I call 
‘retrofit space’—from the once and often still decrepit buildings that have been ingeniously 
modified to house their operations, to the soviet–style systems of surveillance and discipline 
as well as benefits and perks that have been strategically altered to meet the needs of this 
                                                 
27 This is not an insignificant benefit.  During the financial crisis of early 1990’s schools were able to get many 
teachers to come to work with no pay largely for the one hot meal that they would receive from the school’s 
cafeteria. 
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group of private firms.  The buildings that house the group’s enterprises embody both the 
group’s creativity and the challenges of doing business in Russia.  
 Bakery #1, for instance, used welded 2-inch thick steel plating for floors, converting 
what was a tractor repair station with dirt or at best broken concrete floors into a bakery that 
could meet the stringent sanitary inspections needed to get proper licenses.28 While the floor 
system was ingenious and probably the most inexpensive alternative to new cement and tile, it 
also created a number of workplace hazards.  The floor was painful to stand upon for the 12-
hours shifts, dreadfully slippery when wet, and the large welds that seamed the steel-plated 
floors made pushing the immense, top-heavy, baking racks into the red-hot walk-in ovens a 
difficult and extremely dangerous task. 
Bread selection at the bakery consisted of three main varieties—a dark round bread, 
typical white baguettes, and white ‘loaf’ bread that was unique in Karelia. The business made 
large inroads in its initial years of operation into the state-owned bakery’s monopoly market 
share which, while making typically good Russian bread, did not innovate or experiment with 
new product lines.  Beyond initial customer curiosity and sampling, the bakery established a 
loyal client base that allowed it to stay profitable while as many as a dozen other artisan 
bakeries began selling bread across the city in the late 1990s.    
The success and challenges associated with Bakery #1 illustrates some of the 
challenges and opportunities facing small businesses in Russia in the mid to late 1990s.  A 
significant challenge involves business financing. Opening Bakery #1 required significant 
capital investments from family and friends because at the time formal bank loans were 
                                                 
28 While there are ways to get around inspections, the stringent safety rules are keenly enforced by management 
as a means of controlling and disciplining the work force. See Chapter 4 for details. 
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simply not possible.29  For example, one entrepreneur outside Galya’s group, desperate for 
credit to launch his own cake bakery, explored bank financing and relayed the following: 
 
Yes, I could get credit from the banks because I, for example, 
have my own flat that I could offer as collateral.  When the 
bank told me they would bolt a giant padlock to my front 
door, which would be removed once principal and interest 
was repaid, I  laughed off this solution as absurd. Instead, I 
borrowed money from the kind of good friends that you really 
can’t let down. 
 
 Although this entrepreneur’s quest for start-up capital ended well and his business is 
thriving, he tells me there were several months when he did not know that the business would 
succeed and that the prospect of not being able to pay back the funds had given him an ulcer 
and many sleepless nights.  
 A second challenge comes again from the Karelian government which, while 
outwardly promoting development of small business, often mobilizes against small and 
private businesses either to protect the former state run facilities and the jobs they provided or 
to raise revenue through fines and other rent seeking behavior.  For example, private bakeries 
for a period of time faced political interference that limited the availability of flour, which 
would leave their bakeries idle or force them to import flour at significantly higher costs.   
Also challenging was the rent seeking by a myriad of local and state licensing bodies 
that would identify supposed violations and levy steep fines accordingly.  Bakery #1 was 
                                                 
29 This business is the only one in Galya’s group that had an outsider (i.e non-family member) who figured 
prominently in the start-up and management of its operations.  This person has a relative that worked for a 
Moscow bank, who was able to arrange financing for the German ovens. 
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fined for improper packaging of its product because several loaves of bread for sale at a retail 
outlet reportedly had torn packages or were missing the ingredient list. The fines for this type 
of infraction were usually a few rubles per incident, but, in this case, the firm was fined based 
on its production capacity for one month.  The fine was debited directly from the firm’s bank 
account without prior notice and had Galya not had revenue from her other businesses to 
make payroll and buy raw materials, she would have had significant cash flow problems.   
However, once business was underway there was the potential for large profit margins 
because the prices for goods produced domestically often reflected the inefficiencies in 
former state run production facilities. One entrepreneur and owner of a single bakery reported 
to me an annual profit rate of 146 percent. 
Most private businesses rely on the support and resources of differently arrayed 
‘groups’ to confront or cope with these types of challenges.  First, as illustrated with Bakery 
#1, entrepreneurs rely on their business networks and personal resources.  In this case, 
Galya’s considerable resources allowed her to go beyond simply paying the staggering fines.  
She fought back in court and won an unheard of reversal of the fines.  The protracted legal 
battle—about 6 months—was expensive and politically risky.  To buttress her aforementioned 
legal case and push for legislative reforms she turned to two very different types of groups.   
The first group, patterned directly after a Western style trade association was the 
Karelian League of Independent Bakers, which she helped to establish. The group would meet 
monthly over coffee and sweets at the café to discuss regulatory and political issues that affect 
these usually fierce competitors.  The League was particularly effective because each member 
brought to the table separate networks of influence within the government and private 
sector—one thing this group would never be able to do is endorse a slate of political 
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candidates—that could apply pressure where needed to protect the fledgling industry from the 
previously state-owned bakeries.   
The League also gave Galya credibility and a limited degree of protection for her 
outspoken criticism of laws and regulations governing everything from unfair tax policy to 
archaic food handling and production regulations.  At the top of her list of complaints were 
food regulations. According to Galya, the food certification requirements are a continual 
problem facing the food manufacturing sector in Karelia, which has shown dramatic growth 
despite this impediment (Table 9).  Per Soviet-era regulations, for example, the ingredients of 
each product sold must be individually tested and certified, even if they have been previously 
tested and certified for other products.  The regulation extends to new high-quality pre-mixed 
ingredients for bread dough, cake frosting and the like, which are imported from the West or 
Finland and have proven to be extremely popular and profitable despite their relative cost.  
So, for example, a food product that uses only ingredients from three other certified products 
must still have all of the ingredients re- certified before it can be sold.  The certification 
process is timely and expensive.   
 
Table 9. Percent Change in Karelian Domestic Production  
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Food stuffs* -13.5 6.6 11.4 7.6 31.6 
Timber Logging (for comparison) .2 24.1 -.9 2.7 -5.8 
*7 percent of total Karelian output in 2001 
Source: Karelkomstat; Social and economic situation in the Republic of Karelia from Jan.-Dec.  2002. 
 
While there are subtle and not so subtle ways (e.g. envelope money) to avoid these 
regulations and their associated fees, Galya, who is loath to pay bribes, believes that the 
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product certifications are causing her companies to lose market share to firms from St. 
Petersburg who ship new and interesting products into local stores from jurisdictions where 
certifications are much easier to gain (Figure 17).  She sees competition from St Petersburg as 
one of the greatest threats to her food production revenues.   
The second group she turned to is the informal business network run by Vasili her 
previous boss and now close collaborator (see description in next section).  Using a 
newspaper published by Vasili as a forum, Galya made her case directly to the public and to 
potential voters as she penned this opinion just prior the local Duma elections. 
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Figure 17. Opinion Editorial on Government Regulation 
Why is bread becoming more expensive? 
A Petrozavodsk business woman is sure that prices for bread can and must be stopped 
from rising 
My business is baking bread. The authorities and the public think about us only when bread disappears 
from the bakeries. It’s like health - when you’re healthy, you don’t think about it.  Only countless 
examiners and controlling organizations are interested in us. It looks like Russia is the wealthiest country in 
the world because our state can afford to keep such a powerful system of retail trade certification. If this 
army of highly-qualified [inspectors] would work and produce bread a wide assortment of cheaper bread of 
higher quality would appear in shops. 
Speaking about the prices. There are ways of lowering prices for bread, but only if the authorities want it. 
The elections are ahead, and the future executive and legislative authorities would have to solve the 
problem of bread supply. And this problem has to be solved. 
We, the enterprises that produce bread united in 1997 to solve the problems of production and the problems 
of people who work with us.  We signed a petition to the President and the State Duma asking for the 
abolition of the licensing for bread production .  On the 11th of February the event that the bakers were 
waiting for so long finally happened: one doesn’t need to have licenses for the production of bread, 
confectionery and macaroni. The struggle of the Russian guild of bakers for the abolition of an 
unreasonable regulation of a similar law that has been functioning for years is finally over. 
But even after the passing of a new Federal law the number of controlling official channels are trying to 
make the bakers follow the burdensome procedure during the next 6 months. This is continuing to kill our 
businesses. 
But what is it all done for? Licensing will not improve the quality or the selection of the bread. The license 
has become the lever for closing small bakeries. Sometimes licensing has been used as the means of unfair 
competitive activity, especially against small-scale bakeries.  At present there is a lot of official offices that 
are unfair to producers: the State Sanitary Epidemiological Control, Trade and Bread Inspections, the 
agencies of State Standard. No one but the consumer should comment on the quality of bread, loafs and 
rolls. The consumer will forget about bad bakers. This is how the relations between the seller and the 
consumer are carried out. The new law makes life easier for good producers. They got rid of one of the 
official barriers. I’m glad we’ve won this battle. 
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This opinion letter translated in Figure 17 is notable in several respects.  First, she 
attacks the state by suggesting that its onerous inspections and unfair systems of fines are the 
reason prices of bread are increasing in the Republic.  Second, she talks about the power of 
markets to regulate.  While not labeling this neoliberal or even attributing it to the policies of 
the early 1990s, she is using the language and arguments first used by proponents of ‘shock 
therapy’ in Russia to put pressure on the state to stop its rent seeking behavior. Galya’s use of 
terminology associated with markets and capitalism—both in the public sphere as she runs 
against a formidable communist opponent in the local Duma (Chapter 5) and privately as she 
seeks to motivate (or threaten) her employees (see Chapter 4)—is part of an arsenal of 
strategies she uses to mitigate threats and increase her own power in the workplace and in the 
community.   
While the league provided legitimacy to Galya’s and others’ complaints, the 
association and its members still would have struggled in anonymity had it not been for the 
political connections, financing, and media coverage provided by Vasili.  His newspapers are 
part of a much larger group of enterprises and ventures that provide, in Galya’s words, 
“something much better than advertising” for her businesses (Figure 18). (The next section 
discusses Vasili’s network in grater detail.)  She receives in-depth and unrelenting news 
coverage that highlights problems and rails against all real and perceived enemies.  The 
newspapers also do softer articles touting new store designs, new products, and other special 
or human-interest stories. The constant barrage of coverage, written by professional 
journalists and published in several high-quality publications, not only added teeth to the 
League’s and to Galya’s efforts, but provided Galya with what she believed was essential 
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added protection for her patchwork of political and economic cover (or kresha) needed to run 
a successful business. 
Bakery #2 was the first enterprise where I conducted long-term participant 
observation, joining-up as a full-time cake decorator and baker’s assistant on various brigades 
for a three-month tour (see related video clip). This bakery specialized in making Russian 
torts (biskviti), which are similar to American pound cake, and an assortment of pastries. The 
bakery was in operation 24 hours a day 364 days per year, which I later found was due 
overridingly to issues of security and not productivity—a building occupied all the time was a 
much harder target for robbery.  Situated in a Breznev-era building in one of the older outer 
suburbs of the city, the stand-alone building had seen many uses prior to becoming a bakery, 
including most recently serving as a nightclub and restaurant; but prior to that I am not 
certain.  The decrepit kitchens and decorating rooms in the building were framed by cracked 
cement walls held together with large bands of steel and floor-to-ceiling dirty windows that 
overlooked the alley that ran along one side of the building.  Yet, the workspace itself was 
kept spotlessly clean by the full-time cleaning staff, which ironically created one of the more 
dangerous aspects of working in the facility—continually mop-wet floors, which were as slick 
as ice and caused accidents on a regular basis. 
As in the Café, every square inch space of the workspace is used including a closet 
that substituted as the men’s locker room for the half-dozen or so delivery drivers and the 
occasional male cake decorator.  The building was located on a gentle hill and had two levels. 
Inventory offices, break rooms, and laboratory were in the basement.  The baking and 
decorating stations, kitchen, dispatch station, cold storage, and retail outlet were on the 
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ground floor, which emptied out into the back alley, allowing easy access for the delivery 
vans.   
The bakery department was located down a long hallway between the retail store front 
and the kreme otdel or decorating department where the chocolate and vanilla sponge cakes 
were dipped briefly in vanilla flavored syrup and decorated according to the daily order 
(zayafka).  The kreme otdel had three rooms, the smallest being about 8x10 and used for 
cleaning pots and pans, and two larger workrooms where brigade members decorated and 
assemble the cakes, torts, and small pastries produced each day.  While the building was 
arbitrarily broken-up by function, the space created by the designations was significant in that 
sanitation rules prohibited individuals from entering certain areas if they were not wearing 
proper clothing and head cover.30 
The location of each workstation was dictated by the building layout and available 
power and water supplies, which made for challenging workflow issues.  For example, the 
stove used to heat boiling syrup in five gallon vats was situated far from the decorating 
stations, requiring the women decorators to carry the boiling concoction across slippery floors 
and between scurrying members of the baking brigade. The situation’s danger was 
compounded by the slippers (topochki) that were the footwear of choice for brigade members. 
The result was frequent workplace accidents with one woman permanently disfiguring her 
arm when she fell into the vat of boiling syrup she was carrying.  Also problematic was the 
fact that cold storage for flour and sugar was located in the basement, which meant the 
                                                 
30 Designated space helps to equalize power differentials between workers and management as the latter were not  
able to enter the work spaces without taking time to change into specialized clothing and non-street shoes or 
without breaking their own rules and thus could not effectively monitor activities first-hand. 
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women brigade members had to drag up 50-kilo bags of sugar and flour several times per 
shift. 
The building that housed Bakery #3 was owned by Galya’s group and contrasted 
greatly with the other bakeries in that it was newer and well lit, and the space had been 
designed around the needs of the bakery. Anna and Galya characterized Bakery #3 as “on 
autopilot” due to its good manager and older workforce.  They rarely had to intervene in the 
daily business operations.  This bakery made small breads, rolls, and pastries with semi-
automated machines to mix, knead, and roll dough. Galya reported and in fact it turned out to 
be true that this was the ‘quietest’ enterprise in the group, with little labor strife and consistent 
quality and productivity. (Chapter 4 discusses some of the differences in the enterprise related 
to median age and gender of the work force.) 
3.2 AN ‘OLIGARCH’S’ NETWORK 
While Galya’s group of enterprises is linked by affines and run by dedicated and loyal 
managers, they also interact on a regular basis with a second, larger business network.  This 
network consists of commercial and retail enterprises and political organizations that are 
controlled by the relatively young Vasili I.  Vasili was Galya and Anna’s first (and eventually 
primary) client before a near bankruptcy forced him to liquidate property—including the 
prime location and building where Galya’s café now operates—which gave Galya an 
opportunity to venture out on her own.  
The next few sections of this chapter describe Vasili’s network and its interaction with 
Galya and her group in greater detail.  To understand how Vasili’s group operates, I also 
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outline research that has been conducted on informal business groups and practices in both 
contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe.  
It is important to note that anytime a Russian business conducts a transaction or works 
in any form with another company it is interacting to some degree with the network within 
which that company is situated.  However, Vasili’s group has a more precise and deeply 
connected relationship with Galya’s network and enterprises, which goes beyond the normal 
trust and cooperation levels associated with commercial transactions in Russia.  Besides 
having history and each other’s confidences, or perhaps because of this, the groups were also 
close political allies in opposition to the Head of the Karelian Republic and the political party 
United Russia. 
Vasili became a businessman in the early 1990s selling two commodities Karelia 
previously supplied to all of the Soviet Union: Paper bags and wooden flooring.  In the case 
of the paper bags, the paper factory he worked with as an outside broker had a tremendous 
production capacity, relatively modern equipment, and fairly high-quality products, but little 
experience in western markets.  Vasili was educated at a teacher’s college and employed as a 
police officer and eventually a fraud investigator before he left to start his own business when 
he was in his early 30s.  As a former colleague in the police force put it, sardonically:  
  
He was very frustrated in his job as a policemen…being one of 
many was not his style…he knew that he was something special 
and was frustrated by the fact that others did not know it as 
well.  
 
Vasili’s ability to organize sales and act as a middleman for the paper company made him a 
rich man; but, his many ventures were not always successful and an initial foray into retail 
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food sales—a chain of grocery stores—resulted in the loss of most of the money he had made 
earlier in the decade.  The story how of Vasili managed to rebuild his fortunes was relayed to 
me on separate occasions by several of his managers and associates.  While it has a bit of a 
‘founding myth’ feel to it, I was able to confirm and validate the key facts of the story. I am 
sharing it because it sets the stage for discussing the nature of Vasili’s group and the role it 
and other groups like it play in the Russian economy. 
 
In 1994 Karelia had no meat and as everybody knows Karelians 
love their sausage.  We still had not recovered from the 
recession [associated with ‘shock therapy’]…food production 
and distribution systems simply did not work.  The cattle farms 
and few meatpacking plants in the Republic produced only 
enough for employees or to trade for other needed goods.  
Vasili saw the opportunity and risked everything…taking all of 
his money, borrowing additional money and hiring a 
refrigerated truck to southern Russia to buy sausage. Two others 
did the same, but one truck was in a terrible accident that sent 
sausage spilling over the highway outside Petrozavodsk.  The 
second had a storage locker full of processed meat, but suffered 
repeated electrical outages that resulted in his stocks spoiling. 
 
Needless to say, the gamble paid off and, with no other competition, profits from the 
initial truckloads were able to finance more truckloads, which in turn Vasili used to finance 
the growth of his grocery store chain into the largest, best stocked chain of stores in the 
Republic.  This story was repeatedly told to me in a neutral fashion with no hints or innuendo 
of improper dealings, malice, or conspiracy, on the part of the players involved.  At times it 
seemed exaggerated; it was used in print media as a way to introduce and humanize a 
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relatively inexperienced but wealthy politician, and people enjoyed telling and retelling the 
story. 
By the end of 1999, Vasili claimed to have just over 700 employees working in a 
chain of grocery stores, a food distribution and catering firm, and at least two daily 
newspapers.  By 2001 he would add a large dairy production and processing plant and a fish 
product productions facility to the list. 
 
Figure 18. Vasili’s Informal Business Network 
 
Although Vasili refers to these enterprises aggregately as his “organization” and 
interviews with employees and enterprise directors confirm him as their boss (hozien), he has 
no formal connection to these organizations.  That is to say Vasili’s name does not show up 
on the tax records or incorporation documents of any of these enterprises.  Vasili 
acknowledged this fact in one of our early exchanges as I wrestled with his assertion that he 
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was one of richest businessmen in the Republic, but did not have a single business registered 
in his name.  His response:   
Well, that’s right, officially I am the owner of none of these 
enterprises.  This question of ownership is now difficult and I 
am not even sure who owns what or how much officially. They 
are all owned by others, that’s how they were registered.  At 
present my directors are not even owners they only have salary.  
At the time we formed the corporations they were not at all 
interested in being an owner they were looking for a good place 
to work and a good salary. …   
 
Vasili concluded, with some bemusement, during the interview that his managers did actually 
‘own’ his stores that he needed to ‘normalize operations’ in the near future.  As he put it: 
I don’t own these companies, but it would not be a problem to 
take them back if I needed to…. I am afraid to have this 
conversation with current managers because I am too nice I do 
not have the heart of a business man (like politics) and I fear I 
will give away too much. 
 
However, while ownership might have been an increasing concern for Vasili in 2001-2002, it 
was not the front and center issue for his most senior managers who recognized Vasili’s 
nominal status as the enterprise owner.  As one of his Directors lamented:   
I could have easily remodeled all of our shops if it were not 
for the silly campaign…it takes every penny of profits that 
should go towards making our stores more attractive…  
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This director’s complaints bring into relief two important issues.  First, Vasili clearly is the 
nominal head of these enterprises, setting strategic direction for the group and controlling 
capital expenditures, while delegating daily operations to his directors and their managers.  
And second, while the businesses—especially the grocery chain—were accumulating 
substantial amounts of capital, the money was not being invested back into the businesses.  
The revenue instead was being poured into newspaper publishing, the development of a new 
political party, and supporting Vasili and a slate of other candidates in an upcoming election.   
Vasili was first elected to public office in 1998 when he became the Mayor of one of 
10 administrative regions that made up the Republic.  Although a somewhat backwater locale, 
the region did have a significant industrial base and was located strategically between the 
Karelian capital and St. Petersburg.  The position gave Vasili a platform from which to 
criticize the Karelian government, develop his own political allegiances with municipal 
authorities and the mayors of other regions, and further develop his own commercial 
ties/investments in the region. Given Vasili’s meteoric rise in the business and political circles 
in Karelia, and judging from my interviews with him, he is very self confident and he has 
shown a tremendous knack for marketing and selling—or at least, as Chapter 5 discusses, 
finding and employing people that have those skills.   
Galya and Anna’s association with Vasili began when they were hired as bookkeepers 
and eventually business consultants for this policeman-cum-businessman.  According to 
Galya, it was during their tenure with Vasili that they perfected their bookkeeping 
methodology, which has withstood the scrutiny of a number of government audits and 
investigations.  Anna refers to her techniques—she was trained as a bookkeeper—as 
proprietary secrets.  She also maintains that Vasili owes much of his success to their good 
 83 
work and counsel, a claim that he confirms and extends to a number of key managers within 
his network that have day-to day decision making authority. 
It is important to understand the specific evolution and nature of the relationship 
between Galya and Vasili and their respective networks.  Both maintain that their enterprises’ 
networks are now entirely autonomous, but that that they enjoy close collaboration.  If, 
however, this were not the case and Galya and her network are within Vasili’s direct sphere of 
influence and are normatively controlled by him, the implications for my dissertation would 
be significant.  
The truthfulness of their proclamations of independence has a direct bearing on 
Galya’s identity as the matriarch of her family’s business network and an independent, 
woman entrepreneur.  Although impossible to definitively state that Galya and her group act 
autonomously, I did set up a research methodology that gives ample opportunity to discredit 
her claim of independence. The challenge is that it is difficult to prove the claim, and, 
likewise, disproving it is challenging because cooperation or collaboration amongst firms or 
networks lies along a continuum of relative autonomy.  
Uncovering the relationships between Vasili’s ‘sister companies’ and the other 
overlapping networks or groups was challenging but possible owing to several factors. 
Foremost, I had access and the trust of the principles involved, so I was able to learn a great 
deal about structure, parties, and relationships through direct interviews and observations.  
I took a multi-fold approach to ferreting out a better understanding of Galya and 
Vasili’s relationship.  First, I developed a timeline of the development of their relationship 
(Table 10), which allowed me to ask more precise questions about the nature and timing of 
their association. Second, I closely reviewed how Vasili, Galya, and others spoke about the 
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enterprises in their respective networks, and importantly, the normative practices around day-
to-day business financing and management. For example, within Vasili’s network, daily 
operations are left to competent management teams that have a great degree of autonomy.  
However, major areas of decision making such as capital investments and business finance 
were noted by each of the directors I interviewed as being within Vasili’s domain. Finally, I 
triangulated my observations and initial conclusions with outside sources—individuals that I 
believe with a high degree of certainly can provide an independent and unbiased view of how 
the firms are linked.   
Table 10. Partnership Timeline 
 
1991    Ben and Jerry’s first client   
1992    Begin working for Vasili as bookkeepers 
1993    Vasili makes first fortune and invests in grocery chain 
1995    Vasili’s business near bankruptcy; 
1996  Galya and group start first Bakery #1—proposed project 
to Vasili who refused to help with financing—they 
eventually turn to a Moscow contact for financing for 
ovens 
 
1996   Vasili liquidates some holdings and gives up a lease for 
space in the city center; lease is renegotiated by Galya 
with the city and eventually turns into her Cafe 
 
1998   Vasili runs for regional elected office and wins 
 
Since the first time I interviewed Galya in 1999, she has maintained that her 
enterprises belong to her and her family with no outsiders owning or controlling the 
companies.  I continually attempted to validate this assertion because most bars in Russia 
have to pay for protection and have ‘silent investors’ which are often associated with ‘mafia’ 
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type groups to which protection must be paid. However, Galya maintains that her protection 
comes from the Karelian branch of the Russian Security Service, or FSB.  In Galya’s case 
there were rumors of ‘Investors from St. Petersburg,’ but I was never able to confirm this 
information.   
Both Galya and Anna cite Vasili’s reluctance to accept their counsel, which they 
maintain resulted in him losing his first fortune and teetering on the brink of bankruptcy 
numerous times, as their reason for venturing on their own.  A second factor in the split was 
Vasili’s calling to public service.  While almost all current Russian entrepreneurs will agree 
that being in government or closely associated with those who are fundamentally important to 
the success of their enterprises, Vasili’s perpetual opposition to the individuals in power 
within the Karelian government made him and his associates lightening rods for state tax 
police and other taxing and regulating bodies.   
Vasili himself is very clear in describing Galya’s group as independent, whereas he is 
quick to claim ‘ownership’ of a dozen other businesses within his network. The motivation to 
not be forthright about this relationship might be that Vasili wanted to protect a hugely 
lucrative investment in the café, which makes enormous profits from the sale of alcohol and 
food.  However, I found no evidence that this was the case. Galya’s latitude in decision-
making and re-investment of accumulated capital demonstrate significant differences between 
her position vis-à-vis Vasili’s managers (See Chapter 5 for further analysis of political 
campaigns).  
I was also able to confirm the separate, yet interdependent, nature of the two networks 
with two other sources who worked as employees in 1996 for Bakery #1 prior to it becoming 
a bakery.  The Bakery #1 was incorporated under the name as ‘Goodtrade’ to import 
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foodstuffs—mostly cheese—from Scandinavian countries.  Galya and her husband initially 
approached Vasili about providing start-up capital and retail outlets through his stores. He 
was not interested, deeming the project risky with low potential returns.  
Another distinction between Galya and Vasili’s business groups is scale, but also 
important is the decision making and command and control functions of the two groups.  
Vasili has a range of different relationships with enterprise owners and directors, politicians, 
investor, and others.  Vasili’s control of the enterprises in his direct sphere of influence is 
formidable, but completely informal.  While Vasili does make final decisions on how to 
invest money accumulated by his enterprises—cycling between a focus in reinvestment in the 
enterprises and investments in political activities—he leaves operations management to his 
trusted staff and his name does not appear on either tax roles or in corporate registration 
papers of the many enterprises. 
 In contrast, Galya and Anna are officially associated with their enterprises and 
maintain close oversight over all aspects of operation.  In terms of major decisions, such as 
personnel actions or capital investments, the decision-making is, as Anna puts it:  “…by 
consensus, but it is possible to veto projects, with the last resort simply being ‘go ahead and 
do it, but with your own money…I don’t want to use any of my money’…”   
Anna’s example of disagreement was opening a nightclub in the underutilized space in 
Bakery #2.  She says there was much debate about opening the establishment because of the 
fear of it being frequented by ‘not very likable people.’  They agreed to open it on a trial 
basis, but one of the sisters (I never learned which) vetoed the project by being unwilling to 
continue supporting the staffing and management of the facility.  The rationale given was that 
the nightclub drew a lot of unwanted attention from owners of other night clubs, which are 
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widely known to be controlled by criminal elements.  Another area where I witnessed major 
disagreement was when it came to Galya’s bid for a seat on the local duma.  In this case, both 
Galya’s husband and her brother-in-law resisted her attempts to spend the group’s money on 
her efforts. (Chapter 5 discusses the dynamics of Galya’s campaign in greater detail.) 
3.3 DEFINING INFORMAL GROUPS 
Before continuing with the analysis of Vasili’s group, it will be helpful to place his group and 
his role within the group in the context of how similar groups have been analyzed and 
discussed.  Building upon Soviet-era networks and practices, individuals like Vasili have 
gained access and control of both capitalist markets and government institutions in post-
socialist countries through what are considered by many outside observers to be informal 
channels.  In the last fifteen years, anthropologists and others have dedicated an increasing 
amount of attention to these individuals and their groups by identifying, labeling, and showing 
how they contribute and often corrupt indigenous forms of capitalism and current government 
regimes.   
These groups are often portrayed as ‘legacies of communism’ and as having a 
profound effect on the reorganization of the state and market institutions in transitioning 
countries.  The complicated and interdependent relationship between Vasili and Galya and a 
myriad of local and regional politicians and state bodies underscores the influence, 
importance, and variability of these groups.    
As I have shown through a close inspection of Galya’s and Vasili’s networks, it is 
impossible to research private business in Russia without detailed understanding of the groups 
 88 
and relationships that extend beyond the formal corporate structures of the enterprises being 
studied.  The structural changes to the Russian economy associated with neoliberal reform 
(e.g. privatization, price liberalization, trade, etc.) beginning in the early 1990s have been 
mediated through informal relationships and groups like Galya’s, which in turn are being 
shaped by history and politics.     
While scholars have been able to associate an array of seemingly unique formations 
and characteristics with informal groups, the groups also have much in common, including: 1) 
blurring state and private interests and responsibilities; 2) operating both inside and outside of 
formal corporate and institutional structures; 3) being based on trust, but incorporated as legal 
entities that embrace the use of state sanctioned institutions and processes to protect their 
interests; and, 4) being an intimate part of the economy while at the same time working 
against the economic/social structures in fundamental ways (i.e. tax avoidance). Studying 
informal groups with these characteristics presents several theoretical and methodological 
challenges.  The first of which is to show causal significance of particular characteristics or 
structures (Blim 2000).  In the context of my work, I look for the effects informal groups have 
on wage earners in the small enterprises controlled by Vasili and Galya’s respective groups.  
It is also a challenge to understand the legitimacy or legality of these groups using 
western models as reference points, because many of the groups have characteristics that fall 
between or overlap with our conventional ways of understanding actors and institutions in a 
capitalist-based economy.  There has also been an over-reliance on the part of some scholars 
working within the transition studies on implicit understandings of how the institutions in 
capitalist democracy function. As Mary Douglass (1975) notes, what is left implicit is often 
treated as self-evident or, “too true to warrant discussion and relegated to the background 
 89 
where it provides the necessary unexamined assumptions upon which ordinary discourse takes 
place” (1975:3).  Douglass warned that the play between the implicit and explicit set up 
precariously established “perceived-to-be-universus” that shift, topple, and are built again. I 
believe that the role of business in politics and the blurring of western distinctions of the 
public and private sectors in Russia, as well as the true nature of relationships and linkages 
between sectors must be analyzed and discussed with a nod to all that can be left implicit in 
these conversations.  
An acknowledgement and questioning of the implicit allows a type of ‘reset’ of the 
calculus that might, for example, tell us if Vasili and others like him are ‘bad actors’ or 
impediments to the development of a certain kind of capitalism.  For the same reason, I refer 
to Vasili and Galya’s respective organizations as simply ‘business groups,’ avoiding the 
negative imagery associated with informal groups as they are contrasted to implicit reference 
points of how business is conducted in the West.  In truth, Vasili and Galya’s groups track in 
a number of ways with the characteristics of groups labeled cliques, clans, hordes, and 
institutional nomads described in the anthropological literature on capitalism in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union that bourgeoned in the late 1990s.  The naming of these 
new or reconstituted groups highlights unique characteristics and facilitates discussion and 
comparison across cultures.  However, much of this research tends to focus on the negative 
aspects—vis-à-vis western models—of these groups, characterizing them as impediments to 
legitimate commercial activity and as having ‘captured the state’ for personal gain.  (See for 
example, Dinello [2000]; Kryshtanovskaya [1997]; Sampson [1998].)  
While the descriptions provided by these scholars may be accurate, they could also be 
considered ‘orientalist’ in that they are produced and understood in essentialized terms and 
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describe the groups as ‘penetrating,’ ‘proliferating,’ ‘subverting,’ or becoming ‘entrenched’ in 
pursuit of their individual/group interests—all negative imagery commonly associated with 
arms sales or organized crime.   
Related and also in play within analysis of informal groups is the ‘essentialist 
rendering of the west by the west’ or what Carrier calls Occidentalism (1992:199), which in 
this case helps make “exotic” and perhaps corrupt organic social processes associated with the 
waves of capitalism or at least capitalist spirit that swept through the Former Soviet Union in 
the 1990’s.  To the extent the newly uncovered categories and representations of capitalism 
and how they function are only as good as the ones they are being compared to, I describe the 
characteristics and tendencies of the groups, but am careful not to confuse their uniqueness 
with efficacy or influence.   
I turn to academic research covering business management to illustrate how an 
alternative discourse and subject matter with a similar research cohort—family-owned 
businesses—results, not surprisingly, in an entirely different and in this case positive, set of 
conclusions.  This particular example also nicely illustrates the danger in ignoring the 
implicit. 
Gudmundson, et al (2003) reviewed the management literature on the relationship 
between ownership structure and innovation in small businesses in the U.S. and concluded 
that explicit research in the area was non-existent and that the effect of ownership was largely 
subsumed within the catch-all category of ‘culture’.  Their statistical analysis of surveys 
administered to small businesses (under 500 employees) and found that: 
 
Family businesses implemented more innovations than 
non-family businesses, even when customer type and 
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culture were controlled. They also initiated more 
innovations, but that appears to have occurred because 
they create a culture that is more supportive and 
empowering. 
 
Gudmundson et al’s conclusion that family businesses initiate and implement more 
new ideas than non-family businesses runs contrary to conventional thinking about family 
businesses, which is probably why the topic was unexplored prior to this research.  Of course 
the same survey and analysis would have to be duplicated in Russia to do an actual cross-
cultural comparison. Nonetheless, the research raises two important questions for the body of 
literature on business groups in Russia:  What determinant variables are being subsumed in 
the larger category of ‘crimminalization’ and what implicit assumptions or biases are western 
scholars using to understand Russia’s emerging business culture?  The next few sections of 
this chapter address these questions. 
3.4 SOCIALIST BEGINNINGS 
Precursors to the current research on informal groups can be traced to a few anthropologists 
studying the role of different groups in mediating and shaping state policies under socialism 
including (Hann 1985; Kideckel 1982; Wedel 1991).  Socialist-era research is important for 
understanding the practices and processes associated with Russia’s capitalist economy and 
provides for ideal-type comparisons for the groups I investigated.  Sampson (Sampson 1988), 
for instance,  described three types of horizontal and one type of vertical formation in the 
Romanian unplanned economy, including: 1) Family and kinship groups—e.g. sending food 
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to the city, helping out on the farm, getting employment for relatives; 2) common ethnicity 
/territory that share similar interests 3) ties of friendship—social clubs, vacation spots, old 
school friends.  The vertical relationships took place between patrons, brokers and clients.  All 
of these groups served as a means of securing and allocating scarce resources in a planned 
economy.31   
Sampson notes that informal institutions and networks are found everywhere, but Russia 
and most countries of the former Soviet Union differ primarily because of the sheer 
scale/amount of activity that is placed in the hands of the state, which did a terrible job of 
meeting people’s needs.  He suggests that the U.S. operates along a continuum of informal 
practices that run from ‘having connections’, to nepotism, to bribery (creating a market out of 
favors).   
Galya’s group can be categorized as a horizontal formation that uses ties of both affinity 
and consanguinity to best meet its needs.  However Galya’s relationship with Vasili’s group is 
not as easily defined.  There are clearly ties of friendship between the principals of the two 
groups, which has created the trust necessary to do business informally.  The relationship is 
not as horizontal as those described by Sampson, yet it would not be accurate to label Vasili 
as a patron because he is not using state property or resources exclusively or even 
predominately as a means of expanding his influence or currying favor with Galya.  In fact, 
both Galya and Vasili are, at least at the regional government level, in the tenuous situation of 
supporting opposition candidates, which has meant they have restricted official influence to 
peddle or favors to provide.   
                                                 
31 See Kornai (1990) and Verdery (1996) for descriptions of how Socialist government used the shortage 
economy and controlling access to resources as a means of maintaining power. 
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Further, the levers that officials under an informal patronage system might have pulled 
are more curtailed under post-socialism as the coffers are leaner and the ability to direct 
energy credits or police protection are limited by the fact that institutions have either been 
privatized or have their own, independent systems of informal payment or patronage. Rather, 
the groups work together to create commercial opportunities and mitigate the risk associated 
with state rent seeking and other forms of state meddling in their activities.   Despite this, 
however, the best defense against the most powerful weapon in the government’s arsenal—
the regional tax police—is to engage directly in politics by seeking elected office or 
supporting a slate of candidates for Republic, regional and local elections that would afford 
them some degree of protection.  As Anna puts it: 
You see we have to be involved in politics…our lives and business 
are at stake. If XX wins for mayor, it may well be the end of our 
business.  He has strong ties to Moscow (which means big money) 
and would think nothing of selling as many buildings as possible.  
To advance his own political career and fortune he would sell us 
out without a second thought. 
 
Anna’s fears are well founded.  The sisters have a 10-year lease directly with the city 
for their café space, which means the terms of their lease are about three times cheaper than 
the current market rate. Evicting them so that the space can be leased to a political supporter 
or business associate of the Mayor would be highly desirable, as would selling the entire 
building to a political supporter. Many buildings situated in desirable locals have also been 
privatized to facilitate eviction of this nature. Needless to say, this type of environment has 
made local elections extremely important to the protection of business interests; with 
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entrepreneurs and first- time candidates spending large sums of money to support particular 
candidates or run for office themselves. 
When Vasili was elected as a regional mayor (The position is now called head of region—
Glava Municipalnova Rajona), he still was unable to develop or operate anything that 
resembled a traditional patronage system due primarily to the relative scarcity of resources at 
his disposal in his formal capacity.  The position did, however, allow him to use his personal 
resources in a different capacity—where Vasili the mayor couldn’t help, Vasili the 
entrepreneur could.  He provided financing, distribution channels for products, and technical 
assistance for failing businesses.  For example, he describes the evolution of a fish processing 
plant that he now includes in his list of assets under his control thusly: 
 
They visited me when I was mayor and asked for space to 
start a small business making processed fish products.  I 
gave them the space and after a few years they came to me 
and said unless you help we will go bankrupt.  I instructed 
[my firm] to purchase the enterprise, leaving the same 
director in charge, but it is now managed by a woman, who 
is a very strong and tough manager.  They are now 
productive and profitable and we own them. 
 
Vasili’s ability to successfully merge the officialdom of being mayor with his private 
resources and expertise allowed him a degree of effectiveness that neither role individually 
would have afforded him.   
After his election to regional office, Vasili’s role did shift to more closely align with how 
Thomas Graham (1999) describes Russian oligarchies. Graham maintains that it is the close 
intertwining between property and power that has allowed these oligarchies to exist both 
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historically and today in Russia.  He describes Oligarchies as political-economic coalitions 
built around control of key government positions, significant financial and industrial assets, 
information gathering agencies and instruments of coercion that are active in setting the 
political agenda, limiting policy choices, and, most importantly, making decisions of which 
the product or outcome seems to come from a formal institution.  In other words, much like 
the United States at various places and at different times—say Louisiana under Huey Long or 
more contemporary state and municipal level corruption, which are well documented in places 
such as Mississippi, Connecticut and New Jersey32.   
Graham suggests that the classic notion of an Oligarchy in Russia started after the 
death of Stalin when a collective leadership arose through the hierarchical structure of the 
CPSU to compete for power by leveraging resources from major portions of the economy 
such as industry, power and defense.  Graham also sees the fall of the Soviet Union as a 
reshuffling of political power away from industrial-based networks to that of the financial and 
banking coalitions, which fits well with Johnson’s (1997) observations about the role of 
banking and financial power in the late 1990’s discussed below. 
Stark (1996) describes the ethnographic literature focused on Socialist Eastern Europe 
as showing “a social world where domains were not integrated coherently…a second 
economy where the mix of social relations did not conform to officially prescribed 
hierarchical patterns...” 1996:36) The description holds true today though official institutions 
and representations of the post-socialist world are different.  He argues that “organizational 
innovation is not replacement but recombination of routine practices, organizational forms 
and social ties that have now become the basis for coordinated action in post-socialist times” 
                                                 
32 Source: Corporate Crime Reporter, 2004. 
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(1996:36).  Stark’s conclusion that actors were creating ‘multiple futures’ not on but from the 
ruins of socialism fits well with my observations about the innovative and entrepreneurial 
nature of the groups I studied, and the practical ideologies used by Galya, Vasili and their 
managers.   
In Hungary, Stark (1999) found mixes of ownership by the state, private firms, and 
private individuals, with different social actors holding different bundles of rights, and the 
definition of the status of property being blurred and ambiguous. He suggests, like the success 
and dynamism of light industry in Chinese villages, that success comes not from privatization 
of property, but from clarification of property rights (Walder 1994 in Stark 1997:57)  
In Russia, entrepreneurs I spoke with about property rights described three distinct 
phases of individuals’ outlook towards property. The first phase occurred as enterprises were 
privatized under Boris Yeltsin. The combination of neoliberal rhetoric and the fact that the 
state was in essence giving away its assets put a premium on outright ownership of real and 
personal property.  However, the imploding economy, vast production inefficiencies and the 
large social obligations built in to the enterprises that were acquired led to a massive sell-off 
of assets and what Burawoy calls Merchant Capitalism—seeking profit only through trade not 
through a reorganization of production (Burawoy and Krotov 1992).  
As local and regional governments reclaimed or were simply left with decimated 
property, the second phase was borne.  Entrepreneurs turned to leasing the space and 
buildings they needed.  Leases are often negotiated between politically connected 
entrepreneurs and the government at the ‘official’ lease rate—well-below market rates as 
described above—and  seen as low-cost alternatives to ownership.  Space was often carved 
out of larger enterprises or unused basements in apartment and commercial buildings.  Lease 
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arrangements also usually have none of the carrying costs associated with ownership of 
former state enterprises such as providing utilities and social services to the population 
surrounding the facilities.   
The third distinct phase from about 1999 on again placed a premium again on property 
ownership.  As capital flight out of Russia slowed by the early 2000’s, and Russia’s business 
elite found themselves in a mini-crisis of over accumulation, they turned inward, capitalizing 
on difficult access to credit and a booming economy, to begin a round of native investing.  
This time, however the emphasis has been placed on productive capacities, with owners 
seeking foreign and native investment for capital improvements or equipment leases to 
increase production.  The emphasis on production has had a significant impact on the Karelian 
labor market, driving real wage increases well above the inflation rate, at a real growth rate of 
10 percent in 200233 and production and GDP increasing steadily over the last eight years.   
Wedel’s (1992) research in Poland during the late 1980’s provides an important look 
into the social processes that were in place prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  In 
particular, she studied social circles (srodowisk) of Polish citizens, which she characterized as 
a “…mechanism of social organization which enable informal economic activities and a 
shadow bureaucracy w/in the state that allows things to get done very quickly…”(Wedel 
1992:14).  Social circles were used to exchange goods and services and provide mutual 
benefit; the circles were able to better circumvent, connect, and even reorganize political and 
economic institutions.  Her work is instructive because she documented rules and rituals that 
guided the development and survival of these groups and points the way to focusing on 
normative practices under socialism that still play an important role in the current economy. 
                                                 
33 Source: Karelkomstat 2002. 
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In Russia, a corollary process to the circles described by Wedel might be the use of 
blat to procure goods and accomplish tasks.  Ledeneva’s (1998) ethnography of blat is helpful 
for understanding the function and ‘informal’ nature of transactions and business formations 
in contemporary Russia.  She outlines how blat developed during the Soviet era into an 
‘economy of favors’ which represented the reaction of citizens to the social constraints they 
faced.  Importantly, she characterizes blat as not being used with an eye towards creating 
debt/or being compensated (like gift exchange) but with an eye towards further developing 
trust.  In other words substituting compensation for risk, which, I would add, is still a form of 
exchange.   
Blat worked in the areas of goods, services and income, which were rationed by the 
state, but distributed by informal means during Soviet times.  She argues that the Soviet 
economy had a powerful inner logica and language of its own that included strongly 
internalized rules, methods and unwritten codes that were internalized over two generations of 
Soviet Citizens (1998: 212).  When goods and services became available in the market, even 
if costly, the role of blat was diminished in these two realms (1998: 206).  She shows how the 
‘greening’ of blat has made favors and access actually cost money and suggests that this 
might be the root of much of the corruption and bribery that is now commonplace in Russia.  
Yet, beyond corruption, she is able to document several areas of adopted continuity—
practices that have been modified to fit the specialized needs of a market economy, including 
how procedures have been rationalized in private firms around areas of employment and 
education.  Both Galya and Vasili, for instance, hire through word of mouth and prefer 
relatives of current employees or children of friends and acquaintances.  They have also 
developed contacts at trade schools to offer internships to the most able students.  The 
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arrangements continue a tradition the schools once had with formerly state-owned facilities 
that no longer hire at the same levels or rates; bringing new workers into trusted circles and 
further cementing the relationships with the schools needed for finding dependable employees 
in a job market that is competitive for high-quality workers. 
3.5 CONTEMPORARY GROUPS 
Verdery describes what she calls “unruly coalitions” comprised of large clusterings of former 
party member elites in Romania.  She contrasts these groups to political parties as being “less 
institutionalized, less visible, less legitimate and less stable” (Verdery1996:194).  She is able 
to draw a connection between these groups and the disastrous proliferation of pyramid 
schemes in the early 1990s.  David Stark (1996) looks closely at groups involved in property 
rights he calls clans and says that transformation in Romania is from ‘plan to clan.’  However, 
he puts a positive spin on these groups saying that capitalization of these pre-existing 
networks is the most effective way to transform the economy.  He likens these groups 
positively to the economic networks that control the function of the Japanese economy 
(Stark1996 in Verdery 1996).  Kryshtanovskaya describes groups of elites in Russia that are 
headed by a politician that controls either a territory or a major government function.  She 
characterizes these groups as a product of “political space where three persons fought for 
power: the governor, speaker of the local [regional parliament] or the mayor” 
(Kryshtanovskaya, 1997:2). She says that in most regions the main battle was between the 
mayor and the governor “...for they had the power and enjoyed the support of financial 
industrial groups” (1997:4).  She contrasts these groups to clan structures, which “…have no 
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registered structure...[and]...are united by a community of views and loyalty to an idea or 
leader” (1997:2).  She cites the “Chubias group” as an example.   
Kryshtanovskaya’s analysis makes the important point that all of these groups operate 
within contested elections, which means their power can be (and often is) challenged by 
competing or contrary interests in the region. 
The work by Juliet Johnson to document and understand the rise and significance of 
financial industrial groups (FIGs) in the Russian economy during the late 1990s provides an 
excellent background and knowledgebase from which to understand Vasili’s operations.34  
The first distinction she makes is between registered and unregistered FIGS.  Registered FIGs 
are authorized under federal statute and come with certain rights, responsibilities and 
limitations such as banks being prohibited from participating in more than one group.  There 
could also be no more than 20 enterprises in a group and the group could not employ more 
than 25,000 workers (Johnson 1997).   
The restrictions forced many FIGs, especially ones that were ‘dynamic’ or bank led to 
simply not register with the State.  The FIGS ostensibly served two primary purposes during 
the 1990s:  1) allow managers to maintain control of enterprises after they were privatized; 
and, 2) mitigate some of the risks associated with the economic instability of the time by 
“…creating vertically integrated, closed production cycles, centralizing contract enforcement, 
[and] facilitating barter arrangements (Hendley 1997) in (Johnson 1997).  Johnson found that 
among both registered and unregistered FIGs, bank led FIGS were often best positioned to 
lobby the government and conduct reforms within enterprises, whereas the industry-led FIGS 
                                                 
34 In Russia these groups are referred to as FPG or finansovo-promyshlenyye gruppy. 
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often represented attempts to prop up failing, uncompetitive, socialist-era enterprises that 
were not able to reform (1997:335). 
Johnson’s analysis does not include the conglomerates in the energy sector led by 
Gazprom or bank holding companies that unite financial institutions, but which do not 
directly invest in enterprises.  She also did not include industry-led non-registered FIGs, 
which Johnson described as either in the process of registering or more informal groups that 
were based on Soviet-era ties and did not plan to register (1997:334).  Vasili’s group is 
probably most closely associated with this latter group described by Johnson with two 
differences.  His group is much smaller in scale than the groups described by Johnson and 
focuses primarily on newly created entities, not previously state-run enterprises.  Nonetheless, 
the motivations for establishing a FIG are similar. Vasili’s diversified holdings allow him to 
create supply chains (e.g. from the dairy to his stores or from Galya’s bakeries to his catering 
business), and create accounting opportunities to reduce tax burden, mitigate cash flow 
challenges and provide access to expansion capital in Russia’s tight credit climate.  It should 
be noted that by 2001, the problems with contract enforcement had been solved primarily 
through the market, which punished non-performance and fraud by withholding future 
business.35 
FIGS—registered or not—are probably most recognizable through the rise of the 
Russian billionaires, or ‘oligarchs’ in the 1990s.  The term oligarch in Russian has become 
shorthand for a rich and dishonest businessperson.  In the Western press, the term is most 
often associated with the ultra wealthy that came into their money and power through the 
                                                 
35 See Hendley, et al 1999 for a detailed analysis of the challenges in the mid 1990’s of enforcing contacts.  
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theft, or at least the unfair acquisition of State property through rigged auctions, or perhaps 
dealings with the ‘Mafia’.   
In Petrozavodsk,  ‘state sponsored’ or state-friendly newspapers—those that either 
editorially support office holders or are directly controlled and financed by individuals or 
groups aligned with government officials—refer to Vasili as an “oligarch.”  Figure 19 is a 
news article from one of the newspapers aligned with government. I have included a sizable 
excerpt from the article as it illustrates a number of important points relevant to understanding 
business and politics in Russia.  First, is the obvious attempt to align Vasili with the 
unpopular Berezovskii, even though there is no connection made between the two in the 
article.  Second, the notion of incriminating documents—in this case a sales agreement to sell 
a certain brand of vodka exclusively—is painted as somehow nefarious.  Finally, the bottom 
paragraph suggests that because the distillery is state-run, it should not do business with 
private individuals or companies (the challenge and confusion around what constitutes public 
and private is discussed below).   
Vasili refers to himself as an ‘entrepreneur’ (predprinimatel), which has a more 
positive connotation for Russians in comparison to oligarch or biznesman..  Which is a more 
accurate signifier is not easy to discern, and depends a good deal upon one’s vantage point 
and predispositions.  I would note that I was not able to uncover any evidence that Vasili 
received ownership or equity shares from any privatization schemes or shady transfer of 
government assets commonly associated in the western press with the Russian Oligarchs who 
rose to prominence in the late 1990s.  The below examples of his management style and 
informal control over several enterprises also highlight an indeterminacy in property rights 
that Vasili was able to exploit using his extensive social capital and sphere of influence. 
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Figure 19. Sample News Article on a Karelian Oligarch 
Deputies of "Moctorg" empire are financed by money got 
from alcoholic beverage industry. 
    An election is a expensive process. The oligarch and the forefather of the 
commercial purchasing empire (the empire that trades and purchases goods) 
"Moctorg" Vasili X understands this well. That is why he tries to find as much 
money as possible for his pre-election campaign. He believes that all means are 
suitable for gaining victory and leaves no stone unturned. This is also because he 
takes part in the election not alone – he tries to help his associates to take up the 
post of the mayor of Petrozavodsk and get into the Legislative Assembly. The 
surnames of his associates are known: I. Pxxx, E. Sxxx, B. Txxxx, I. Gxxxx and 
others.  
   People say that cash resources of Boris Berezovskii are used in the pre-election 
campaign of the oligarch Vasili X. But as it turned out not only these cash 
resources are used. A document fell into the hands of our editorial staff and it 
claimed that the pre-election campaign of these people might be supported by the 
money of the state enterprise, distillery "Petrovskyii", got from alcoholic beverage 
industry. The document is the contract for co-operation between "Petrovskyii" 
and the restricted liability society "Firm Moctorg", concluded on November 23, 
2001 for a term of one year. Some articles of the treaty arouse bewilderment and 
suggest an idea that cash resources of a state enterprise are used in the interests of 
a private person; and you have probably guessed who the person is. 
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Vasili also does not fit the stereotypical image of an oligarch or even a “New 
Russian.”  Although his public image is carefully scripted, and he acknowledged being ‘one 
of the 10 wealthiest individuals in Karelia in 1999’ his private life is not extravagant.  He has 
a nice flat, but it has not been remodeled to ‘euro-standard’.  He’s proud of the fact he does 
not even own a car, let alone a Mercedes.  He can often be spotted strolling on the sidewalk 
with his wife and children.   
Vasili’s sense of why he wanted to be an entrepreneur and politician are similar.  
Whether speaking about ‘his people’—the citizens of the region where he was mayor (1999-
200136) or the people that were employed in his stores and other enterprises— he often spoke 
of his obligation and responsibility to look after people.  His paternalistic tendencies and the 
language he used to describe his role are reminiscent of soviet–style management practices 
and sentiments.  In short, Vasili’s paternalistic orientation seemed to blur his role as 
businessperson and public servant.  On a walking tour of a small town that was the 
administrative center of Vasili’s region where he was Mayor, which consisted of only a few 
buildings, a church and a mostly open air market, Vasili remarked:  “We will soon have to 
enforce regulations on these stores…this is an unsanitary way for people to buy meat and 
produce.” 37  When I observed that this appeared to be the only market (renak) in town (Figure 
20), Vasili retorted “soon we will have a real grocery store in town with freshest products and 
consistent quality.”  The store that would open a year later was one of his, and with most of 
the kiosk venders out of business, the store had a thriving business and no competition.   
                                                 
36 Vasili stepped down in 2001 as Mayor of one of the administrative regions of Karelia to focus on his 
campaign to be the Prime Minister of the Republic in 2002.  
37 Karelia has 18 administrative regions including three major cities that have mayors and city/municipal 
councils. 
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Figure 20. Outdoor Market 
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Similarly, when the previously state-owned dairy—one of the larger employers in the 
region—came to Vasili in his capacity as Mayor looking for capital and tax relief to 
modernize its packaging and better market its products, it was Vasili the businessperson that 
was able to help. As Mayor, he could offer little in the way of resources, but as head of a large 
grocery store chain, funds and a product distribution channel were arranged.  Four years after 
Vasili left the Mayor’s office, newspaper articles describe Vasili’s profession as general 
director of the dairy. 
Other examples make Vasili’s motives seem possibly more altruistic.  For instance, 
when the regional school districts went insolvent in 2002, barely able to pay salaries and not 
able to provide a hot, nutritious lunch for the students and teachers, Vasili’s catering and 
wholesale businesses stepped in with free meals for children and teachers for the duration of 
the school year.  This humanitarian overture was most certainly tactical—the recipients of this 
largess were potential voters and there is always the possibility that the schools may someday 
be in a position to pay for the services being provided by Vasili.  According to several retired 
teachers I spoke with, many of the teachers themselves relied on the hot meal provided by the 
school as their primary source of sustenance; often choosing not to retire or to work for the 
low wages paid by the schools because of the meal. 
Returning to Vasili’s sausage story, the issue of how this story is represented is an 
important one.  I argue that the story should be taken at face value with no nefarious 
inferences as to Vasili’s complicity in his competitors’ demise.  By avoiding implicit 
understandings and thus judgments about what Vasili’s group is and how it should function—
specifically its role within traditional definitions of the public and private sectors—and 
presenting the sausage story from an emic perspective, my analysis is not forced immediately 
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down a path of proving or disproving the deleterious impact of Vasili’s actions.  Instead, I 
focus on understanding the role and function of these groups within the political economy of 
the burgeoning sphere of small and medium-sized businesses in Russia.    
3.6 WHAT’S PUBLIC AND WHAT’S PRIVATE 
In order to better understand the role that Vasili’s and Galya’s groups play in Russian life and 
more specifically the role small business entrepreneurs are playing in the development of an 
emerging capitalist economy, it will be helpful to step back and examine the ‘space’ in which 
they are operating. Common wisdom sees the ‘sectors’ of our society as bounded entities 
associated with clearly defined activities and responsibilities.  Gal (2002) offers a 
conceptualization that places Vasili’s group and actions in a different light.  She points out 
that 
"public" and "private" are not particular places, domains, 
spheres of activity, or even types of interaction. Even less are 
they distinctive institutions or practices….they are also, and 
equally importantly, indexical signs that are always relative: 
dependent for part of their referential meaning on the 
interactional context in which they are used (2002:78). 
 
The context in which public and the private are discussed in contemporary Russia was 
shaped by socialist planners and cemented in cold-war dichotomies that sought to paint and 
maintain differences between state socialism and capitalism (Kideckle 1992).  For their part 
socialist planners, as it is well known, sought to extend state control into the private sector; 
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eliminating the “private” in favor of socialization of production and commerce38.  More 
recently, some anthropologists, using common wisdom definitions for public and private have 
labeled groups or individuals operating across these bounded spaces with terms that have 
negative connotations, such as clans and cliques where the term ‘family-owned’ might be 
substituted  (cf. Coulloudon 1997, 1998; Dinello 2000; Glinkina 1998; Graham 1999; 
Humphrey 1991;  Kryshtanovskaya 1997).   
The context and sector in which Vasili and Galya operate should not be bound by 
reifications—“the tendency to convert abstract concepts into entities” (Gould 1981:25).  The 
Russian business world that has shaped and been shaped by their experiences is a combination 
of socialist-era paternalistic state policies/tendencies, unrelenting markets and a wide array of 
resources, relationships and practices upon which to draw to make their businesses successful 
and ensure the safety and well-being of their families. 
 
                                                 
38 See Fraser (1990) for a discussion of the ‘public sphere’, based on Jŭrgen Hobermas’ 1962 ‘The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere” and in particular the ways socialist planners conflated the state apparatus 
doing the citizen’s bidding with true public discourse and association. 
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4.0   LABOR AND PRODUCTION STRATEGIES  
The previous chapter dealt with the composition and function of business groups—mostly 
natural extensions of individual and family ‘circles’ of friends—that support business activity.  
However, the groups are only part of the equation when it comes to setting-up and running a 
business venture that is actually successful.   
The shop floor, or in this case, the bakery floor, is a rich and multifaceted field site for 
understanding implications for and of labor in a quickly emerging capitalist economy.  The 
argument I put forth initially was that the road to a capitalist mode of accumulation in Russia 
was far shorter and less problematic than much of the published research in the 1990s seems 
to indicate.  The caveat to this blanket statement is that capitalist development is never even in 
any give space or time. While small business in certain sectors may have the ingredient to 
rapidly emerge, other industries and sectors could experience much slower growth or 
transformations.  See Sewell (2005:278) for a discussion of uneven and combined capitalist 
development and Raphael Samuel’s (1977) documentation of these concepts in the Victorian 
textile industry.  The bakery floor, as the nexus of entrepreneurs’ strategies for seeking ever 
increasing efficiencies in search of even greater profits and the workers’ responses to these 
strategies, and their circumstances more generally as they make their way in the world, is an 
ideal place to test just how challenging the shift to capitalism has been.  
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Early in the dissertation I referred to the space in which these entrepreneurs reside as 
retrofit—both literally in terms of the buildings they now occupy and figuratively as they mix 
norms, rules and strategies of Soviet-era workplace with the latest in management techniques 
including those exposed by the One-Minute Manager/odnominutnij menedxher za rabotoj 
(Blanchard and Johnson 1981) and Marketing for Dummies/Marketing Dlja “Chajnikov” 
(Hiam 1997), which enjoyed immense popularity as bootlegged translations and now appear 
in bookstores under legitimate license.   
This chapter discusses a wide variety of efforts to control labor, which differs for 
hourly employees and managers, but includes everything from elaborate payment plans and 
inventory systems to promises or friendship and appeals to employees to adopt a ‘competitive 
spirit’ for the firms and thus their own success.   
How labor and production strategies are enforced gets to a critical issue in Marxist labor 
theory that deals with the mechanisms used by capitalists to extract surplus labor from workers.  
For a capitalist economy to function effectively it must be able to exert enough influence over 
the workforce to ensure a continued addition of value in the production process —i.e. a good or 
commodity produced must be worth more than the labor and materials needed to make it.  Marx 
called this ‘surplus-value’ (Marx 1972).  
The Russian entrepreneurs I investigated well understood the concept of surplus value 
and how to achieve it.  One bakery had a daily production output of about 16,000 loaves, but 
made a respectable profit by recording between 40-50 percent of its sales.  In other words, the 
firm paid all overhead—payroll, taxes, fuel and electricity—and still cleared a profit using 
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revenue from about 50 percent of its actual sales.39  The other half of its daily sales—off-the-
books cash transactions—were entirely profit for both the producer and likely the retailer, 
whom in a similar fashion never records the purchase or the sale.  This is a great example of 
how ties to a larger network, such as Vasili’s with his dozens of retail grocery stores, can be 
extremely beneficial to an enterprise. 
I should note that while I have confidence in the accuracy of the production levels I have 
reported for this particular bakery, accurate information on production rates is some of the most 
difficult data to obtain from a Russian enterprise.  As one bookkeeper put it: 
 
I have no problem giving you the information on salaries, fines 
and bonuses, the big problem is talking about production levels. 
You see, this information is a commercial secret.  You 
understand we have white clients and black clients—[meaning 
some clients are on the books and some are off the books]  
Sharing real production levels equals real revenues which is our 
secret… 
 
The independent bakeries in Petrozavodsk—by the end of 2002 there were probably a 
dozen—were exploiting a historical lack of competition in the industry, which had led to 
inefficiencies at formerly state run bakeries and consequently, artificially high consumer prices 
for bread.  As a result the independent firms had a relatively high profit margin on the bread 
they sold and were consequently accumulating capital at astonishing rates.  I should also note 
that I found the same techniques—related to tracking production and the cost-of-goods sold—in 
                                                 
39 I do not name specific bakeries or enterprises, following a general principle that I do not attribute any 
documented activity that could be construed as illegal to any specific source.  I would also add that this 
particular firm’s books have been thoroughly audited on several occasions and have passed muster each time.   
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1992 when I was reviewing the ledgers of wood processing firms in an attempt to develop firm 
valuations for the American investment company.  The Soviet-era bookkeepers kept two sets of 
books in order to successfully manage and track the machinations associated with trying to 
please the State and satisfy customers, suppliers and employees—not much different than the 
current objectives of the bakeries.  However, exploiting market inefficiencies, finding 
protection and support within their business networks, as outlined earlier, and resorting to 
variations on past bookkeeping practices are only effective in conjunction with a well trained, 
productive workforce. 
This chapter uses ‘labor control’ as a lens to explore the political-economic 
transformations in the Russian workplace that make capitalist accumulation possible.  Harvey 
(1990) describes labor control as “…an intricate affair [that] entails …some mix of repression, 
habituation, co-option, co-operation…” (1990:122).  Labor control can be seen as a societal-
wide basket of strategies, laws, norms, and policies aimed at socializing or re-socializing the 
individuals to the rigors and expectations of working in a capitalist system.   
Beginning in the 1980’s anthropologists focused on several aspects of wage labor 
including international division of labor, new forms of production and generally the ways in 
which control over labor processes is managed (Ortiz 2002).  Anthropologists and others 
working in formerly socialist countries have also shown that the power Russian workers once 
shared in the workplace was eroded throughout the 1990’s (cf. Burawoy and Krotov 1993; 
Clarke 1993; Kideckel 2000; Lampland 1995; Silverman and Yanowitch 2000; Szalai 2000).  I 
argue that in Russia’s case the new, asymmetrical power relations are a product of the adoption 
and manipulation of technologies, ideas, and images associated with capitalism, and of vestiges 
of the former socialist order that were well suited to supporting capitalist accumulation.   
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In a review article Ortiz (2002) maintains that while anthropologists have been very 
concerned about social and labor relations on the shop floor (cf. Holzberg 1981) and have 
more recently paid a good deal of attention to control and development of ‘flexible’ labor and 
production processes, “…they have often disregarded an intermediate level of analysis:  the 
relationship of producers and industries to relevant actors in their respective regional markets” 
(Ortiz 2002: 396).  I discuss composition and activities of the wage-earner teams or brigades 
(brigadii) in the face of managements’ strategies.  In particular, I focus on the development of 
brigade solidarity and the ritualized responses to the more coercive strategies employed by 
certain entrepreneurs.  I want to note upfront that brigade solidarity appears to have little 
ultimate influence on management’s ability to control productivity, efficiency and quality in 
the bakeries, and in fact the close relationships with brigades might work to the management’s 
advantage.  What is also apparent, despite the wide spectrum of labor control strategies 
resulting from managements’ ability to control its workforce is that the end results were often 
identical—management was able to create significant surplus-value in production.  Burawoy 
(1979) suggests that managers’ efforts to manufacture consent to increase production and 
efficiencies are aided in large part by workers’ social relations that contribute to the 
invisibility of the exploitation (in Ortiz 2002: 408).  Well documented examples of this 
phenomenon are scarce, but include Chomsky (1998), De Neve (2001) and Fernández-Kelly 
(1985).   
The wide-ranging, yet mostly successful, approaches for managing the workforce 
suggests that labor control strategies and the underlying regime of accumulation are setting 
the direction and nature of capitalism in Russia, and that workers’ response to the new 
environment is mostly one of accommodation—both intentional and unintentional. To 
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understand the efficacies and antecedents of the labor control strategies in the enterprises I 
researched, I follow Harvey (Harvey 1990)  in borrowing language and concepts from the 
French Regulation School.   
4.1 SOCIALIST-ERA LABOR CONTROL STRATEGIES 
One challenge I faced when exploring current Russian labor practices was determining what 
practices were ‘new’ and which ones were socialist holdovers or some mix of the two.  I have 
worked through this challenge partially with analysis of the language used in describing 
particular policies and rules in the workplace (discussed below).  I also conducted a series of 
retrospective interviews with retired employees of the former state-owned bread factory, 
many of whom were the parents and grandparents of the brigade members I was working 
beside.   
However, it wasn’t until I recently read Miklos Haraszti’s (1978) A Worker in a 
Worker’s State that I realized the extent to which socialist-era practices influenced current 
configurations and workplace norms within enterprises that hadn’t existed even seven years 
prior.  Haraszt documents first-hand the physical and mental strain it takes to work in a 
machine shop against an unrelenting schedule and shop floor rules perversely designed to 
keep workers racing to simply attain a living wage. Two things stand out in reading his 
account:  First is how similar many of the production and labor management practices in the 
machine shop are to Galya’s bakeries.  And second is that the workers’ attitude of  “when you 
work you earn” (1978:39), in relation to a complex and exploitive system of piece rate pay 
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that set unrealistic production expectations, is remarkably similar to the attitude of the 
brigades in two of Galya’s bakeries.  Haraszt writes: 
A lot of piece workers go along with the idea: very few think it 
is because of the system of payment, rather than through a fault 
of their own that they make nothing for the minutes spent 
studying the blue print, drinking a glass of water, blowing their 
noses, resting a little or their changing tools (1978:49). 
 
The parallels between Galya’s electronic inventory management system (described 
below), and the daily ‘work-sheets’ in the Hungarian factory that dictate the number of pieces 
to be made as well as safety protocols and cutting speeds that are impossible to follow and 
still meet the quota are striking. Figure 21, for instance, shows the maximum production 
levels required in Galya’s Bakery #2 in ideal circumstances.40  The levels are so high for 
individual employees that they could not be realistically met, even if all breaks and 
safety/sanitary rules were ignored, yet the policy sets the expectations for what should be 
accomplished each day by the brigades. 
                                                 
40 Source: Corporate policy document from Bakery #2; September 4, 2001. 
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Figure 21. Maximum Production Levels—Bakery #2 
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The retrospective interviews also helped me better understand current practices by 
elucidating socialist-era production and labor management strategies, such as harsh, 
collective-wide fines, loss of bonuses for poor quality work, and direct surveillance 
techniques such as physically patting down employees at the end of the shift.  These 
conversations also confirmed that working in collective, industrialized positions altered 
people’s experience of work, which laid important groundwork for shifting the ways in which 
collectives are now managed on the shop floor (Lampland 1995).  
The interviews also confirmed what is legion about socialist era workers: They had an 
arsenal of tools for neutralizing or mitigating management attempts to increase labor 
productivity (Kahan, et al. 1979).  Practices included shirking, absenteeism, ‘storming the 
plan’, and looting, which in most shop floor usages of the word meant producing over what 
was called for and thus making more money (Haraszti 1978:40). The workers’ strategies were 
effective because they shared power in the workplace.  Socialist managers were dependent on 
workers’ tacit agreements to work at a certain level of productivity, because the soviet system 
rewarded firms for maintaining high numbers of employees while punishing enterprises for 
not ‘meeting the plan.’  Attempts at changing labor and production practices ran the danger of 
upsetting the status quo and invoking the above-mentioned tactics.  I would note, however, as 
Haraszt experienced and Ward (Ward 1990) documents, the parameters for what is acceptable 
in the workplace rules and production levels are set by management.   
Interviews with the mother of the staff biologist/manager of Bakery #2, who was 
herself a retired worker from a state bread bakery, were illustrative.  The two often compared 
notes and shared stories about differences between working in a state-owned socialist-era 
bakery and her daughter’s experience within a private bakery.  The older woman described 
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much harsher work conditions in terms of the employee discipline and surveillance including 
being physically searched as they left their shifts.  In contrast, Maya (the daughter) who works 
as a manager and technologist at Bakery #2 sees herself as a mother figure, referring to the 
employees as her girls and enforcing strict workplace rules with materialistic overtones that 
endeared most employees to her, but helped her keep tight control over the day-to-day 
production.  
Labor control strategies in any type of industrialized economy can be characterized as 
running along a continuum from overtly authoritarian to fully hegemonic (Burawoy 1979) on 
one end.  The Contested Exchange model (Bowles and Gintis 1988) highlights combinations 
of employment rents, surveillance, and overt threats of firing as the primary mechanisms for 
enforcing a general contract between labor and capitalists.  In contrast, fully hegemonic 
control strategies reconcile the conflicting interests of workers and capitalists in such a way 
that workers consent and support the enforcement of the management-labor contract.  
Within the enterprises I investigated, I found enormous complexity and variation 
along the continuum presented above.  The reality for many of the enterprises I investigated is 
that the level of coercion depends on the level/type of employee as well as which factory is 
being discussed.  Nonetheless, for those entrepreneurs who tended to fall on the ends of the 
continuum there are some major philosophical and strategic differences for dealing with 
employees.   
This section provides some background on two entrepreneurs with very different 
approaches to labor management. First is Galya, and second is Victor, a 40-something-year-
old who was once a director at one of Galya’s bakeries, who has worked in food production 
his entire life, and now owns his own bakery.  
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I asked Galya what she thought the most difficult issues were for business owners in 
Russia.  Her responses were hardly surprising: 
 
“…It’s a dangerous time for us and our families; the government has a 
lot of power and they can shut us down now…there is little we can do 
because our people are not in office…and of course theft, they [the 
workers] would take everything if they could…” 
 
Galya’s management practices reflected these concerns.  Stopping theft and forcing 
increases in productivity had seemingly become an obsession and I was confronted with a 
complex and authoritative system of workplace rules, remote and direct surveillance, and 
harsh fines when I began my participant observation in her enterprises.  Figure 22 illustrates 
level of fines that could be levied against workers in #2.  
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Figure 22. Factory Fines Policy—Bakery #2 
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Galya’s bakeries provide pastries, cakes, breads and deserts to her cafe as well as area 
grocery stores, restaurants, cafeterias and schools associated with the informal business group 
with which Galya is affiliated.  Up to 175 full and part-time wage earners are employed by 
Galya’s enterprises, which have a daily production capacity of approximately 18,000 loaves 
of bread, 500 sponge-cakes (biskvity) and thousands of croissants, buns, and pastries. Long 
hours, cramped, ill-designed workspaces and strenuous activities are common to all three 
enterprises, while the gender, age, and brigade composition vary significantly from enterprise 
to enterprise. 
Victor, on the other hand, owns a single bakery that specializes in made-to-order cakes 
for special occasions. The price-points for his products are 50-75 percent higher than Galya’s, 
making his product a true luxury item and status symbol.  He “brands” all of his cakes with 
bright red boxes and has an on-line ordering system that lets “business executives” order over 
the internet (Figure 23). 
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Figure 23. Color Slide of Cake Varieties 
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Victor is not engaged in politics the way that Galya is, and is not directly associated 
with a formal or informal group of businesses, though he is a member of the League of 
Private Bakers and an outspoken advocate for small business reform.  He was trained in 
bakery management and worked his way up to middle management positions at a state-run 
bakery before losing his job to downsizing in the mid 1990’s.  He is a voracious reader and 
has a particular taste for American marketing and business management texts that have been 
translated into Russian.  Figure 24 is an opinion editorial penned by Victor and published in a 
Karelian Government-sponsored newspaper.  The article is important because it shows how 
he frames the issues confronting small business and reveals Victor’s main tactic in trying to 
effect change—basically making an economic argument that smarter policies will lead to 
more tax revenue for the city, which is in marked contrast to Galya and Vasili’s attempts to 
affect change through direct political action. 
Victor does not have, nor is he directly linked, to a network of other companies the 
way Galya is.  He received loan financing from a newly rich married couple with connections 
to one of the largest industrial enterprises in the Republic to capitalize his start-up.  He 
characterized the couple as “friends that you can’t let down,” but never really specified what 
that meant.  The loan he received was backed by his word as collateral.  His ability to get 
private financing highlights a growing issue of over accumulation in some segments of the 
Russian economy.  While capital flight was the problem in the 1990’s many newly wealthy 
Russians prefer to find quality domestic investment opportunities.  Victor also penned several 
editorial pieces for various newspapers—both aligned and opposed to the current government 
administration—which in a way demonstrates his neutrality.  The articles call for tax breaks 
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for small business, government sponsored credit programs for business expansion and a 
reduction in government regulation.   
Figure 24. Victor’s Op Ed Article on Small Business Financing 
 
When I started my own business three years ago, I needed money. But back then it 
was easier to take credit from a private person. I paid the money back in one and a 
half years. At present 15 employees work in our company, and every quarter we pay 
taxes that are about 120,000 rubles. Our enterprise is developing, people get high 
wages, almost the highest when compared to the wages of other confectioners. 
During the past two years we managed to increase the money deducted for taxes by 
10 times. Right now we need money for further growth but we cannot get bank 
credit. We are forced to stand still although we have all the preconditions for further 
growth. Our enterprise, actually founded on nothing, managed to find a niche of our 
own, forced out part of the St-Petersburg's production and gave jobs for the city. I 
fully agree that today we need a clear policy of the city's authorities; we need a 
special unified program for supporting and crediting small-scale enterprises. It must 
be not only be a proposal, there are loads of those floating around. We need a 
program that will really work. At present those who risked starting a business of 
his/her own and were successful, manage to receive good results in spite of 
everything. The state has no strongly pronounced interest in the development of 
production and service sectors. But no one knows why that is as a policy is 
undoubtedly necessary. I personally see only one real problem. There must be no 
private motivations by members on the committee that will make decisions on 
giving credits to enterprises. It's not a secret that the majority of our deputies who 
are businessmen, the ones who actively defend their interests, do not care much 
about the problems of the city.  Economists, scientists, city mayors – those who are 
interested in the development of the city’s economics and the replenishment of the 
budget—must determine the fate of the policy. Look, if our enterprise could get 
additional resources for development, I guarantee, that in a year and one-half we 
could increase our sales and therefore the deductions for taxes could increase a 
minimum by 2 times, maybe even more. And this is only concerning our enterprise. 
Just imagine the results if a right small business loan program on a city-wide scale. 
If we talk about it generally, I believe that the future is in our small-scale and 
middle-scale enterprises. Our industry giants will not be getting out of the crisis 
they are in for a long time. 
 
 125 
Victor actually worked for Galya before venturing out on his own.  According to both, 
they currently enjoy friendly relations because they are not direct competitors.  Because he 
once worked for her, Victor continually contrasted his style of leadership and strategies for 
managing his enterprise with hers during our conversations.  The differences between their 
approaches are striking and central to the arguments in this chapter. 
My earlier contention that workplace power has shifted away from workers would 
intuitively make it seem more likely that worker strategies for mitigating efforts to force 
productivity would be less effective in the face of a stronger hand by management. This was 
certainly true in Galya’s enterprises.  However, Victor and others have moved away from 
harsh tactics in favor of creating what they call “good collectives,’ which encourage employee 
responsibility and the development of partnerships with management.  As Victor puts it:  
“…my main job is to build-up my employees...I work on creating an environment of trust…”  
In contrast, Galya has implemented an ever-escalating set of tactics and policies designed to, 
as she says, “…keep them [the employees] under my thumb.”   
Victor offers two points of evidence for the efficacy of his approach.  First is his 
monthly profit margin, which he uses to measure productivity and efficiency, and infers raw 
material usage (and thus employee theft) respectively.  He notes “…I imagine a bit [of 
inventory] goes missing every month, but this is the cost of doing business…I do not mind if 
the girls have some small perks…”.  With unofficial monthly profit margins approaching 170 
percent, he probably does not need to worry about petty theft. 
Second, Victor proudly notes that brigade members have no qualms about reporting 
theft by other brigade members, with several workers justifying what is considered by Galya’s 
employees as the most serious breech of workplace etiquette by saying “ …not telling was 
 126 
like stealing from myself.”  This type of overt breech of brigade solidarity is perhaps the 
greatest difference between Victor’s and Galya’s brigades’ normative shop floor rules. 
So why do Galya and Victor fall on opposite ends of the labor control spectrum when 
it comes to managing hourly wage earners?  How differently do the brigades respond to the 
strategies in place?  And most importantly, which approach is most effective?  To answer 
these questions it is first necessary to look closely at the philosophies and strategies employed 
by Galya and Victor.  
I conducted research at Galya and Victor’s bakeries with the usual ethnographic 
methods:  interviews, workplace observations, informal conversations and working as a full-
fledged brigade member in three different enterprises.  I also used an employee satisfaction 
survey to capture demographic and attitudinal information, future plans and consumer habits; 
the survey had over a 90 percent response rate in both firms.    
Briefly, Galya’s management strategies, born of soviet-era practices, trial and error, and 
translations of several popular ‘western’ management books including: 1) A computerized 
inventory and production management system; 2) modified Soviet-era systems of financial 
rewards and fines; 3) recruitment and hiring strategies that play to the popular appeal of Galya’s 
‘western’ café; 4) systematic training and advancement opportunities; 5) invocation of 
‘capitalism’ and the ‘private’ status of the firm as justification for workplace rules, fines and 
demands on productivity.  Less overt but important practices include the use of her identity as a 
mother, primary provider for her family, and entrepreneur, a word that has a positive 
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connotation in contemporary Russia, as opposed to ‘businessman’ and the generation and use of 
images of consumption, glamorous life, community activism, etc.41   
Victor’s management strategies are simpler in contrast. He eschews highly centralized 
and coercive management and production/inventory controls and manages by what he calls 
his ‘three golden rules:’ “…If you steal you’re fired without discussion, if you drink on the 
job you’re fired without discussion, if you’re late or absent without calling you are fired with 
discussion…” Beyond these expectations, which the employees agreed were very reasonable, 
there are no bulletin boards filled with rules and mandates or threats and fines for missing 
production.  Instead, he offers work-place perks and incentives including what he calls an 
“autonomous work environment where no one is looking over your shoulder,’ free rides home 
after the late shift ends, discounts on product, as well as more nostalgic overtures such as 
access to a vacation resort in the summer.  He follows in many respects the classic Russian 
patriarch-manager—a fatherly figure who masks toughness with concern for his mostly 
female employees. 
On the basis of job satisfaction, which I measure by the level of worker agreement 
with the two questions:  I like to work in this place,’ (Figure 25) and This is a good place to 
work in comparison with other places where I could work (Figure 26) it appears that Victor’s 
approach creates a much higher job satisfaction rate amongst the staff.  His employees are 
almost 2.5 times more likely than Galya’s to answer positively to the first question and only 8 
percent of them (versus 40 percent for Galya’s employees) disagreed with the second 
question. 
 
                                                 
41 I take up many of the less direct control strategies in the next chapter that focuses on Galya’s role as a woman 
entrepreneur. 
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Figure 25. Employee Satisfaction 
(Percentage of employees who agree with the statement: “I like to work at this place.”) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Relative Employee Satisfaction 
(Percentage of employees who agree with the statement: “This is a good place  
to work in comparison with other places where I could work.”) 
 
Table 11 shows Galya’s employees were twice as likely to say they intended to look 
for a new job in the upcoming year.  Table 12 provides a proxy for allegiance by showing the 
level of financial incentive it would take to get employees to take a new job.  The majority of 
Galya’s employees at bakery #2 would take a new position if offered an additional 700 rubles 
or less (about a 20 percent increase over average wages at that bakery) and the remainder 
would leave if offered an average increase of about 1,500 rubles per month.  In contrast, all 
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but one of Victor’s employees would require an additional 4,400—almost double their current 
salaries and 2.5 times more than Galya’s employees would need to leave for a new position.  
 
Table 11. Employee Loyalty  
 Victor's Bakery Galya’s Bakery #2 
Agree (fully & partially) 33 67 
Neutral 33 17 
Disagree (fully and partially 17 11 t 
Percentage of employees who agree with the statement:  ‘In the next year I  
plan to look for a new job.” 
 
 
Table 12. Employment Retention 
Bakery  300r more  
per month 
 
500r 700r Other 
(avg. in rubles) 
Galya’s Bakery #3 8 25 0 66  (1,125r) 
Galya’s Bakery #1 12.5 0 12.5 75 (1,438r) 
Victor’s Bakery  0 9 0 91 (4,400r) 
Galya’s Bakery #2 6.25 6.25 50 37.5 (2,388r) 
Percentage of employees who agree with the statement: “I would take a new job if 
I could make 300 rubles more per month, 500r more per month, etc.  
 
However, as the next section on brigade solidarity illustrates, allegiance to the 
employer is not the only or even the most important measure of employee satisfaction.  Figure 
27 shows employees’ opinions about the quality of their kolectiv.42  Over 80 percent of 
Galya’s employees agree that their collective is healthy, while only 58 percent of Victor’s 
employees feel the same way.  I added the question about the kolectiv to the survey because it 
was cited by employees often in interviews and conversations as one of the best aspects of 
working at Galya’s Bakery #2.  The notion of worker solidarity takes on special, arguably 
causal significance in the context of employee control and productivity in the workplace.  
                                                 
42 The Russian word kolektiv best translates in English to the common usage of ‘office culture’ or ‘work 
environment.’ 
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Figure 27. Employee Satisfaction—the Collective 
(Percentage of employees who agree with the statement: 
“The collective here is healthy.”) 
4.2 PAY AND BENEFITS: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS 
One of the most significant differences between Galya and Victor bakeries is how workers are 
paid.  Both employers use a simple ‘Fordist’ classification, or ‘payment per rate,’ system that 
puts employees into three basic categories:  Young workers doing practicum for almost no 
wages as part of their degree requirements for school; 1st year employees who are on 
probationary status and receive about 50 percent in salary of regular employees; and those 
that have been employed over a year.  Galya tracks and pays for performance at the brigade 
level, but proportionally fines each brigade member based on their salary level.  She also 
tracks employees on an individual basis by insisting on worker production quotas and testing 
brigade members separately using a quality and productivity test.  Workers in both bakeries 
have bifurcated salaries with one-half of a worker’s official salary coming in the form of a 
monthly standard bonus (premiya).  While most employees consider the bonus  as part of their 
base pay, the funds are paid in cash and no taxes or benefits are paid in this portion of 
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employees’ earning.  In additional, employees receive occasional bonuses, based on 
individual member performance (Figure 28), which  are not part of this  equation.   
Figure 28. Sample Employee Bonus Announcement 
 
Victor pays bonuses and gives raises based on individual performance and merit only 
and does not have a system for levying fines against the entire brigade.  The contrasting 
methods reinforce the respective general management strategies of the two entrepreneurs.  
Despite the fact that employees of both enterprises are about equally likely to agree with the 
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statement that “my pay corresponds to the work,” Victor’s employees are less likely to report 
they want to leave and generally have a much higher satisfaction with their place of 
employment. Galya’s employees are more likely to want to look for another job and report 
being willing to leave for relatively small pay enticements.  Her brigades, however, are much 
happier with their work kolektiv—the environment and  social relations the brigades create on 
the bakery floor—in this case,  in response to Galya’s management style.   
 Victor and Galya clearly approach management of their enterprises differently and 
their efforts produce significantly different opinions on (and different criteria for) job 
satisfaction and employee allegiance.  However, by other criterion the enterprise are not 
distinctly different—both pay about the same wage rates, have high productivity rates, make 
consistently high-quality products (albeit to different market segments) and have about the 
same rate of staff turnover—less then three percent annually. What is the significance of these 
divergences and similarities?  The next section discusses in greater detail Victor and Galya’s 
management strategies and the implications for their respective firms and employees. 
4.3 BRIGADE SOLIDARITY 
Victor enjoys what he calls allegiance to his firm.  He treats his “girls” like extended family 
and his paternalistic style in how he speaks to them and reacts to issues that arise on the shop 
floor are readily apparent. On several levels the strategy is paying off.  Productivity and 
product quality are consistently excellent, employee job satisfaction measures are positive and 
his work force is by and large self-directed. 
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In contrast, the first thing that comes to Galya’s mind about her employees is that they 
steal too much.  To the extent she does act maternally towards the staff, most employees 
would agree they would not want her as their mom.  However, Galya’s employees truly enjoy 
working together, just not necessarily for Galya’s bakery.  Victor’s employees on the other 
hand, express their aforementioned allegiance to him and his company seemingly at the 
expense of their collective environment and brigade relations. 
There is an interesting twist related to Galya and Victor’s contrasting management 
approaches.  As I mentioned earlier, Victor had at one time worked for Galya and held the 
title of director of Bakery #2.  Although I was never able to glean direct criticism from 
brigade members and managers about Victor, I got the impression that he was not much liked 
by the most of the women that had worked at the bakery during his tenure, with one notable 
exception:  One of the bookkeepers lamented to me about how much better the business ran 
under Victor:  “…this place ran much better under Victor….we had much less game playing 
and silliness. Now it is like a kindergarten around here…”  She made the observation to me 
while we watched a brigade leader successfully negotiate down the size the baking order 
(zayavka) for the upcoming shift.   
While the irony of the statement was probably lost on the young bookkeeper, it’s easy 
to see within the context of this analysis. Galya saw Victor too trusting and easygoing as a 
manager and changed her management systems to be much more coercive.  The result has 
been, at least from the bookkeeper’s perspective, less control in the workplace.   
To understand this inversion and provide useful distinctions for discussing the 
solidarity and allegiances of the brigades at Galya and Victor’s bakeries, it’s helpful to think 
about Durkheim’s (1997) two basic types of social cohesion—mechanical and organic 
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solidarity.  Mechanical solidarity describes the "collective type" of society which is 
characterized by an interdependency that rests on a similarity of strongly formed sentiments 
and values, shared activities common to all the members of the group, and ties of kinship and 
cooperation.  Giddens suggests that within this type of social cohesion there is little scope for 
differentiation between individuals: each individual is a microcosm of the whole (Giddens 
1971:143). 
Conversely, societies characterized by organic solidarity establish social cohesion not 
through shared beliefs but through the interdependence created within the increasing division 
of labor.  In this case solidarity depends on individualized consciousness.  This kind of 
solidarity is more abstract and may be weakened when people fail to comprehend the ties that 
bind them to others. 
Without taking the analogy too far, Galya’s brigades have formed a mechanical 
solidarity based upon a confluence of how they are hired, trained and controlled in the 
workplace.  By way of evidence, I offer a description and analysis of Galya’s inventory 
control system and the ways in which workers both accommodate and attempt to circumvent 
its intent.  At one level the system does control inventory and stop theft by ensuring that 
workers pay for what is taken. At another level the system supports inter- and intra-brigade 
social relations, which are already focused on supporting friendships and families because of 
the way employees are recruited and hired, placed, and managed on specific brigades. 
In contrast, solidarity at Victor’s bakery seems directed towards the firm and the 
benefits the workers can get from having the bakery be successful.  Because Victor does not 
have the byzantine rules and coercive practices that require close cooperation on the shop 
floor, solidarity rests on how individuals interpret and respond to the values and ideals of the 
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enterprise, which have been introduced and are reinforced by Victor through his management 
philosophies and personnel policies.   
Birgit Muller (2007) documents socialist-era brigade solidarity and communal life that 
at first blush appears to have been an inversion of what is occurring at Galya’s enterprises.  
Through retrospective interviews she documents that “the obligation to stay together 
destroyed the joy of being together…” when it came to brigades being forced to participate in 
socialist competition and other activities or rituals meant to reinforce party ideology in the 
workplace (2007:71). Workers described themselves as becoming withdrawn from their 
colleagues’ lives once they were forced to “fight for the cause of the famous socialist 
collective (2007:70).  However, in documenting the extreme lengths workers would go to 
pretend to participate—for example reproducing the same periodic newsletter, but craftily and 
with great effort taking care never to introduce new information or writing into the 
newsletter—she documents brigade solidarity and communal life that is analogous to the 
brigades’ response to Galya’s inventory system, which I describe below.   
4.4 INVENTORY MANAGEMENT: CONTROL AND SOLIDARITY 
The heart of Galya’s efforts to manage inventory and control theft is a computerized, just-in-
time production and inventory-tracking system that calculates needed raw material inputs 
(flour, sugar, frosting, etc.) and matches daily output to demand.  The central purposes of the 
system is to track raw ingredients down to the gram—for the type and quantity of product 
made so that fines can be levied against the brigades either for missing daily production 
quotas or surpassing the norm for the amount of raw materials needed to meet the daily order.    
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From a management perspective, the system seems to make little outward sense as it is 
inefficient and expensive to implement in terms of lost production time.  From a brigade 
member’s perspective, accommodation of the onerous, demeaning and overtly coercive 
inventory system allows them reason to develop inter- and intra- brigade relationships that, 
unknowingly to them, ultimately masks the level of exploitation to which they are subjected.   
In order to understand the subtleties of the activities engaged in by the employees related 
to inventory control, it is necessary to understand how Galya’s system is designed to work. Each 
day at Galya’s cake bakery the dispatcher takes phone orders for cakes and pastries until 
8:00pm. Based on these phone orders, standing orders from major clients, and projected sales at 
the bakery’s own store, the dispatcher generates a list of ingredients and the exact amounts 
(norma) needed to prepare some 30 different varieties of cakes (torti) and 30 or so varieties of 
pastries that make up each shift’s production order (zayavka).  Each brigade in the bakery is 
responsible for managing and accounting for the amount of ingredients they use.  The system 
works like a checkbook that must be balanced at the end of each shift.  When there are ‘shorts’ 
in the inventory—either in the final product or in raw ingredients—the brigade members must 
make up the differences through docked pay.   
On average, 20 percent of a brigade’s day is devoted to this tracking of raw material.  
At the onset of each shift the Brigade leader transfers the information on the daily order to a 
paper ledger that tracks all ingredients against the products made that day. This is a detailed 
list that tracks the dozens of ingredients and supplies a brigade will use in a shift down to the 
gram.  At the end of each shift, the brigade leader or her designee will add up all ingredients 
used and attempt to reconcile them against what was called for in the order.  To do this, each 
brigade carefully weighs all of the remaining ingredients—down to the last slice of 
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pineapple—and records this information on the ledger. The incoming brigade starts the cycle 
over by adding the residual supplies weighed by the outgoing brigade to their ledger along 
with the ingredients brought up from the storeroom to get a beginning balance for their shift.   
Each ingredient is listed on the ledger and has a predetermined price. For every gram 
that the ledger is short (difference between what was used in production and what is called for 
on the Zayavka a fine (straf) is levied against the brigade.  The bookkeeper makes surprise 
inspections on the daily inventory to make sure that there are no discrepancies between what 
the girls say was being held in inventory and what is recorded on the ledgers.   
These inspections result in brigade members from different parts of the bakery 
scuttling around behind the bookkeeper hiding pails of flour, sugar or other ingredients or 
giving them to other brigades for temporary safe keeping.  Several brigade leaders said these 
were just insurances against being short.  Others confided that these were goods intended for 
home use.  
At the end of the month, the daily ledgers are added together by the bookkeeper and 
matched against an aggregate list of ingredients checked out from the storeroom for that 
month.  Where there are ‘shorts’ fines are levied on a brigade-wide basis.  When these fines 
are added to fines for tardiness, sanitary conditions, and poor product quality, the totals can be 
quite steep.  For example, when a baker ‘tears’ cakes because her pans were not sufficiently 
greased, the fine is 25 rubles per incident.  One bad batch of cakes—there are 100 cakes per 
oven—can easily erase the day’s wages and sometimes much more. A typical month’s worth 
of fines levied for inventory shorts alone can be as high as 700 per month, or almost 30 
percent of a typical brigade member’s net monthly salary.  
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Somewhat ironically, but perhaps intentionally, the system does little to alleviate theft.  
It does reduce the cost of theft, but because there is no direct surveillance—-bags are not 
checked as women leave, for example—taking things is part of the normative rules of 
working at the factory.  Outwardly, the system seems to reduce large-scale theft or at least 
mitigate inventory shrinkage by collecting fines, but the system does not work entirely the 
way management believes it does.  Because incoming brigades never weigh the ingredients 
on-hand at the beginning of their shift, and because doing so would be a major breech of 
workplace decorum, brigades never know if their starting balance is accurate or not.  So every 
time a worker takes home raw material or a brigade treats itself to a cake at break time, it is 
the next brigade that will pay the fines for those thefts.   
If the inventory system creates a type of balanced reciprocity between the brigades and 
if economic utility is its primary purpose, the system should function as long as no one 
individual or brigade takes too much and tips the scales of what any one brigade pays in fines 
versus what they get to take home.  However analysis of the monthly inventory logs shows 
that fines levied by brigades for inventory shorts could differ by as much as 40 percent, 
suggesting an unequal distribution of reciprocity across the system.  The level of true 
consternation expressed by brigade members that receive high fines or the intimation that a 
few brigade leaders need ‘new glasses’ or should stop drinking in order to calculate the 
inventory correctly (outright fabrication of the ledger is never mentioned directly as a 
possibility) lends credence to the fact that balanced reciprocity is not always apparent.  So 
why is the system so resilient and why doesn’t the practice change among the brigades that 
are continually shorted in the exchange?  I believe the answer to this question may lay in the 
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maintenance of relationships created between the workers—mostly female and in their early 
20’s—as they are put through Galya’s exacting training regime.  
As a mechanism to control inventory shrinkage and manage production, the system 
seems inefficient and stands in marked contrast to most of the business decisions and market 
savvy that have made Galya and her extended family so successful.  For example, in one 
month 21,000 ruble fines were levied against the brigade members.  The fines amounted to 8 
percent of that month’s payroll (excluding taxes and benefits), yet these nine workers spent 
almost 80 hours at an average rate of 17 rubles per hour entering information into the ledgers, 
which put labor costs for maintaining the system at 1,360 rubles plus 80 hours of lost 
productivity, which translates, using a conservative production cost estimate, to almost 20,000 
rubles in lost revenue43.  
Two key questions to consider about Galya’s inventory management system are:  
What purposes does the system serve if not implemented for outwardly economic reasons; 
and  What are the unintended consequences of this system’s implementation?   First, there is a 
practical security matter.  According to Galya, Bakery #2 has to be staffed 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, because of the threats of break-ins and theft. Evidently, full-time guards, 
which are hard to come by and not very reliable, are no substitute for a building full of 
bustling women.  The other practical reality was that once the trams and buses stopped 
running, it would be hard for employees on the second shift to make their way home in the 
middle of the night; thus, the twelve-hour shift.  This seemingly pedestrian answer makes a 
good deal of sense, but leaves the factory with more production capacity than it needs, or with 
idle hands, which for a group of mostly 20-something-year-old employees can mean all sorts 
                                                 
43 Calculations based on the bakery’s daily production per worker as a guide using an average wholesale cost of 
the most popular products.   
 140 
of trouble.  Thus, the time-consuming and expensive inventory system, which stresses 
management’s concern for theft and kills some excess time each shift.   
Another explanation is that the management doesn’t mind that the girls steal small 
amounts—as long as they get the level of production and quality they need—but can’t 
condone the practice because of the loss of control it would imply. The inventory system 
allows energy to be focused on skimming and brigade members will continue to ‘bring stuff 
home’ as long they feel like what they pay in fines is less than the value of goods they bring 
home.  I should note that the verb ‘to steal’ is never used and it is clear the girls draw a bright 
line between taking some sugar for the table or a few pastries for the kids, over, say, stealing 
an entire day’s worth of cake boxes. 
This second explanation, while seemingly implausible does have an analogous 
precedent.  Returning to Haraszti’s experience, he notes that: 
The only satisfaction the piece rate worker has is the belief that 
ultimately he is going to squeeze good money out of the 
company.  [to do this] He has to surpass 100 percent production 
(against the norm) in order to obtain, for himself and his family 
just enough to live, so he can start the next day over again. 
(1978:62). 
 
To bypass the required production quotas is called ‘looting,’ (again not in any way 
associated with stealing) which is the act of increasing one’s daily pay rate by increasing the 
number of parts you make above the required level.  Too much looting and thus too much 
money going to the wage earners causes management to lower the piece rate paid to the 
workers.  This perverse loop has workers working harder and harder just to make the barely 
adequate living wage.  The system works for the managers because they get the productivity 
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they need while insisting that all safety rules and production standards be met, even though 
the rules and standards have to be ignored by the workers to make the daily rate, much less 
some extra money for looting.  Like skimming the inventory in Galya’s bakery, the risks of 
looting are known as are the costs, depending on how much you can get away with, but the 
practice continues and in the process takes the focus off more troublesome, but harder to solve 
issues such as work conditions, actual pay rates, production requirements, etc. 
The contention that Galya’s brigades have formed an organic solidarity around 
attempting to accommodate and circumvent inventory control is important for several 
reasons.  First, it may be why the brigades tolerate a system of unequal reciprocity.  The act 
of accommodating the time-consuming and demeaning system, as well as attempting to 
circumvent it,  serve to solidify and maintain important social relations even at the cost of 
having to pay for those relations when certain individuals or brigades take advantage of the 
system. 
Second, it provides a rationale for management to keep implementing the system, 
despite its modest cost recovery and its high cost in terms of lost productivity.  By keeping so 
much of the brigade members’ attention focused on a perversely controlling inventory 
system, workers never question or even focus on the amount of product they are required to 
produce, or the poor and often dangerous work conditions.  
This solidarity also makes for a high quality, team-based approach to the immense 
amount of hard and dangerous work required of the women. Heavy lifting includes moving 
up to four 80 kilo sacks of flour and sugar up from storage in the basement to the bakery 
floor each shift.  It also requires that boiling-hot syrup in brimming 5-gallon vats be hand-
carried across slippery floors at least four times during each shift—one brigade member had 
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burn scar that disfigures one entire hand and arm from a fall while carrying the syrup. The 
cake decorating itself requires meticulous, fast work while standing on hard floors and in 
uncomfortable positions throughout the 12-hour shifts.  During peak times of the year, 
brigades actually double-up using the floors as work tables to as much as triple production on 
a given shift. 
Galya’s bakery has a reputation for high-quality, exquisite cakes that are expensive, 
but affordable for special occasions.  The prices are reasonably competitive with the formerly 
state-owned bakeries and ingredients are of the highest quality and often imported.  In other 
words, productivity and quality does not seem to be diminished (and I would argue the 
opposite) by the solidarity formed to circumvent or resist Galya’s labor control strategies.  In 
this way, Galya’s mode of regulation, while not outwardly hegemonic in the same way as 
Victor’s style seems to be a successful and stable model of labor control in that it ensures 
high levels of productivity 
But the rituals of solidarity performed by the employees, who do not inform on each 
other even when it would be economically rational to do so, reinforce this economic system.  
From a shop floor perspective, it appears that the way workers go about both implementing 
and attempting to circumvent Galya’s system has created, or at least supports, an informal and 
unacknowledged system analogous to what Malinowski (Malinowski 1922) saw in the Kula—
an elaborate system of circular gift giving in the Trobriand Islands that was the subject of his 
classic ethnography. At Galya’s bakery the inventory system seems to support a form of 
balanced reciprocity by redistributing the fines associated with taking supplies and cakes to 
the brigade that works the next shift.   
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Malinowski’s initial inference about the Kula was that it created social obligations that 
helped establish friendly relations with trading partners, maintain contact over distance and 
enhance prestige at home (Malinowski 1922; White 2002).  Mauss enhanced this view by 
showing that the gift giving was part of a total system of giving that has a specific economic 
utility (Mauss 1990). In Galya’s bakery, the economic utility may be illusionary.   
In contrast, Victor’s mode of regulation is designed to be more hegemonic and seems 
to be successful to the extent that his workforce has not developed solidarity in opposition or 
response to his efforts.  One of Victor’s control strategies is the paternalistic way he manages 
his employees.  This holdover from Soviet management practices stands in contrast to his 
more ‘western’ management philosophies on product branding and ‘guerilla’ marketing.  The 
combination suggests that behind many of his progressive management practices (free rides 
home from the late shift, paid vacations, relatively high wages), and much of the rhetoric of 
supporting and nurturing his ‘family,’ lies at least the threat of more coercive strategy for 
labor control.   
A case in point is when two brigades convened an unusual meeting to discuss the 
employee satisfaction survey that I have administered.  The survey, evidently, got the women 
thinking collectively about some things they didn’t like about their work environment.  
Collective discussion or action associated with the survey is not what Victor had in mind 
when he allowed his bookkeeper to pass it out and collect it, but his response to me, anyway, 
was one of chagrin with a small amount of bemusement.  His response to the brigade 
members, their complaints and the fact that the women were citing the newly published 
Russian Labor Code—a document that garnered a fair amount of interest amongst employees 
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when it was published in 2002—was to matter-of-factly point out he was more flexible than 
the code and that he had their true interests at heart.   
To make his point, when one young woman failed to call in after deciding to stay 
home sick he told her, per the labor code (but quite uncharacteristically) that she was fired.44  
The seemingly harsh and arbitrary dismissal (she was later rehired) drove home a two-
pronged message:  maybe it is not so bad to work for Victor on his terms; and he has all of the 
power despite his somewhat relaxed management style.  This interaction is an excellent 
example of semi-autonomous social fields (Moore 1973) discussed earlier work in practice. 
In contrast to Galya’s employees, Victor’s brigades are, however, fairly self-directed 
and self-disciplined.  They work hard not only for the pay, but also for the success of the 
bakery.  In this way Victor structures his enterprise and controls his employees quite 
differently from Galya, yet enjoys much of the same result—a productive workforce 
producing high-quality merchandise in an efficient and highly profitable way.   
4.5  LABOR AND PRODUCTION STATEGIES 
To guide my analysis and make some general statements about labor processes in the 
enterprises where I conducted my research, I have modified a schema (Table 13) originally 
developed by Swyngedouw (1986) to illustrate the discontinuities between Fordism and 
Flexible Accumulation (in Harvey 1990: 177).  Swyngedouw argued that all of the 
characteristics were in transition towards flexibility, but this does not seem to hold true in 
                                                 
44 It’s arguable as to whether his interpretation of the codex was accurate, but it did illustrate his point nicely. 
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Russian labor markets and commercial sectors where I conducted my research.  I have 
modified the charts by adding arrows in a new center column to show the direction of change 
in the enterprises I investigated.  An arrow in both directions denotes that both regimes are 
operating at the same time.  A second arrow for an individual characteristic denotes the 
direction of the transition where discernable.   
 
Table 13. Fordist V. Flexible Labor Management  
Fordist Production Karelia Just-in Time (Flexible) Production 
Single task performed by worker → Multiple tasks 
Payment per rate (based on job 
classification) 
↔ 
→ 
Personal payment (detailed 
bonus system) 
High degree job specialization → Elimination of job demarcation 
No or little on the job training → Long on-the-job training 
Vertical labor organization → More horizontal labor organization 
No learning experience  →  Learning on the job  
Emphasis on diminishing worker’s 
responsibility (disciplining of work 
force) 
↔    Emphasis on worker co-responsibility 
 No job security ↔ 
→ 
High Job security for Core workers.  
No job security for temp. workers 
Source:  Swyngedouw (1986) in Harvey (1989) 
 
There are two important general observations from this table. First, is that elements of 
both regimes of accumulation exist side-by-side in the enterprises I investigated, suggesting 
that the strategies may run along a continuum. Second, is that the ‘Fordist’ system has not 
gone away and is deeply imbedded in the Russian economy.  Clearly many of the regime-
specific characteristics of accumulation shown here are less relevant for food production than 
industrial production.  For example, the issue of stocks and inventory, while important for a 
bakery—balancing inventory against financial outlays and spoilage, etc.—is not nearly as 
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complex as managing suppliers and stocks for an automobile assembly line moving to a just-
in-time production.  Nonetheless, a number of the characteristics/practices are helpful for 
understanding labor management strategies in these enterprises. 
 
Table 14.  Fordist V. Flexible Production 
Fordist Production RU Just-in Time (Flexible) 
Mass production Homogenous 
Goods 
→ Small batch production 
Uniformity & Standardization ↔ 
→ 
Flexible/small batch production 
variety of product types 
Large buffer stocks & inventory ↔ 
→ 
No stocks 
Testing quality Ex-post (rejects & 
Errors detected late) 
↔ 
→ 
Quality control part of process 
(immediate error detection) 
Rejects are concealed in Inventory ↔    Immediate rejection of defective parts
   
Loss of production time b/c of long 
set-up, defective parts, inventory 
bottlenecks 
↔ 
← 
Reduction of lost time, less ‘porosity’ of the 
working day 
Resource driven ↔ 
→ 
Demand driven 
Vertical (and sometimes) Horizontal 
Integration 
← (Quasi-) Vertical Integration 
Sub-contracting 
Source:  Swyngedoum (1986) in Harvey (1989); modified by Author 
 
Areas where we see more flexible approaches to labor and production include 
long ‘on-the-job’ training, emphasis on worker co-responsibility, and a move to batch 
production with immediate rejection of bad product.  The long ‘on-the-job’ training 
period corresponds to the long probation period, which is used by both Galya and 
Victor for several reasons.  First, probationary employees are ‘unofficial’ in that they 
do not show up on the roster of employees and thus there is no payroll tax for these 
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employees. Their employment also does not count on the official headcount that gives 
small businesses with under a certain number of employees special tax breaks.  
The shift to demand driven production levels also has implications for the 
workers. In Galya’s Bakery #2, because the production norms—what is required 
ideally by each brigade member—are so high the only real chance a brigade has to 
reduce the daily workload and not be threatened with fines is to reduce the daily order.  
I call this negotiating the daily order, and many of the brigade leaders had it down to 
an art form—citing lack of certain materials, inferior dough that has to be prepared 
days beforehand, lack of help on a given shift, etc. to get the manager to lower the 
order before the shift starts.  Because the brigade members are not paid piece rate in 
the cake bakery—the men that work in bread Bakery #1 are paid on a piece rate, which 
changes the pressures and dynamics of the factory significantly—any lowing of the 
order means less work, but not less pay.  This is the most significant difference 
between Galya’s system and Soviet-era production plans that compensated at the 
brigade, not the individual level.  In most cases the response from the manager, after 
going though a ritualized argument with the brigade leader where each has points and 
counterpoints, was simply  ‘we have orders for these cakes, and we can’t let our 
customers down.’  Victor, on the other hand does not have this argument with his 
employees—because he rarely sells on spec to other retail stores, his daily production 
is closely tied to actual orders. 
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4.6 EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
An essential aspect of an effective mode of regulation is an education system that provides 
adequate pipeline of new, well-educated employees for a growing economy. The Soviet-era 
education system produced high-quality job candidates for every sector in the command 
economy—from much-heralded scientists and engineers to vocationally trained bakers and 
foresters.  In Karelia in the early 1990s there were four universities, 15 technical colleges and 
20 vocational schools and 10 branches or affiliates of universities from outside Karelia 
providing educational services in accordance with the rigorous Russian state standards.45  The 
linkages between employers and the education system were well established with internship 
programs providing real-life experiences and a high degree of certainty around employment 
upon graduation. 
In the early 1990s the education sector suffered along with the rest of the Russian 
economy with the standard of living for teachers and instructors falling precipitously and 
municipalities faced with the daunting challenge of equipping classrooms and feeding 
children and staff with empty coffers.  However, the education system remained intact with 
student enrollments and the number of schools staying constant throughout the 1990s (Figure 
29).  From about the year 2000 onward, the number of institutions increased sharply—
especially institutions of higher education.   
                                                 
45 Karelkomstat 2002. 
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As of 2006 there are 30 branches of universities, with over 80 specialties, in operation 
in Karelia, in addition to the secondary and primary professional schools, which have 
remained constant in number.46 
 
 
Figure 29. Karelian Student Enrollment Levels 
 
However, one thing that did fall significantly in the late 1990s and continued into 2002 
were the opportunities for graduates to find work in the field in which they were trained.  
While some professions, such as legal and accounting, saw an explosion in demand, most 
vocational or technical positions, which traditionally placed graduates with state-run facilities, 
found that their former clients had either been privatized (and downsized) or gone bankrupt.   
The student enrollment numbers and decrease in employers highlight several subtle 
trends that are important when thinking about the education system as a component of 
Russia’s mode of regulation.  First, the level of students enrolling at the university is 
increasing even as new tuition requirements for non-scholarship students (the majority of 
students enrolled at the university level) have made higher education in Karelia relatively 
expensive for most families.  The upward trend suggests an increase in demand for higher-
                                                 
46 Source:  “Passport of the Republic of Karelia”  2006.  A briefing published by the Karelian Republic 
government. 
 150 
skilled jobs.  Second, the portion of students enrolled in vocational or professional schools 
combined has remained fairly constant despite the decrease in employment opportunities with 
Karelia’s medium- and large-firms (Figure 30).  This trend has created a population of new 
workers without opportunities in the sectors or enterprises where they would traditionally 
seek work.  In effect, it has created a labor pool in an overall tight labor market that is helping 
to fuel expansion of the Karelian small business sector, which has grown significantly in the 
last decade.  Small businesses—under 17 employees, but not including sole proprietors such 
as kiosk owners—made up a relatively insignificant share of the employment base in the early 
1990s.  However, by 2006 more than 53,000 people, or 16 percent of the labor force, worked 
for small business, up from only 7,000 employees a year earlier and a 1.5 times increase of 
over 2002 levels.47 
 
Figure 30. Number of Employees in Karelia’s large- and Medium-sized Enterprises  
 
 
                                                 
47 Karelkomstat 2006. 
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Galya and her managers in Bakeries #2 and #3 have set up relationships with several 
vocational schools to identify new bakers and cake decorators and send current staff back for 
company-paid continuing education classes and advanced certifications.  Taking and passing 
the certification courses, which often include theoretical information and a good deal of 
applied math, is an expectation of working and advancing in Galya’s enterprises.  
Announcements about who passed certification tests are made not at the school, but on the 
shop floor, and are often accompanied by small award ceremonies and also tied to cash 
bonuses. 
The public ceremonies put a good deal of pressure on the girls to do well.  As one of 
the managers puts it “…it gives the girls a chance to better themselves... I do want them to 
give them more money and to have a future in this work.”  This particular manager, Maya, 
was a product of vocational training herself and an employee of a formerly state-run bakery 
who seemed nostalgic for the old system.  
The practical outcomes of building a relationship with the vocation schools are 
numerous.  First, the schools are a good source of flexible, inexpensive labor as students are 
required to do an unpaid practicum as part of their degree requirements. During busy seasons 
(e.g. the New Year holiday), when production can be increased 10- fold over the normal daily 
output, the extra sets of hands are very helpful.   
The trial runs in the bakery also helped managers select only the individuals they 
thought would best fit into the existing brigades. Second, the schools provide a pipeline for 
new, ‘uninfluenced’ workers for their growing businesses. And finally, the continuing 
education and certification courses offered by the schools provided outside validation for the 
firm’s promotion and awards strategies.  It also let the mostly young employees (first time in 
 152 
the job market, and or under 30 years of age) work towards something other than the their 
next paycheck. 
Maya says that Galya is very intentional about brigade composition and training.  She 
describes the brigades as made up of girls of different skill levels: 
The most advanced of each brigade is our ‘master’48;…our 
collectives are not about friendships….they should have similar 
interests in working, this helps for the collective…of course 
friendships in the collective are welcome if the friendships are 
directed towards productive ends49…Their personal demands 
and issues should be similar and they should grow as they are in 
the job together…it take about four to five years to build the 
skeleton of a good brigade. 
 
Also important is how workers are identified. Maya lists three sources for new 
recruits:  They arrive on their own, perhaps having seen an ad in the paper; the 
unemployment office sends them; or their friends tell them about the position.  Maya 
insists the last category produces few new hires, but 8 of the 32 members of the cake 
decorating brigades heard about the jobs through a friend employed by Galya.  This is 
pretty typical for most businesses in that they rely on blat, or family connections to 
help identify quality employees. Additionally, at least a third of the employees had 
previously worked in Galya’s café, where in the words of the bakery’s bookkeeper, 
“the girls learn how to run [work fast] in the café and then they are sent here to do real 
                                                 
48 Salaries for master brigade leaders approach 7,000 rubles (base plus bonus) and are double what a typical 
brigade member makes.  The ages of the master bakers and decorators vary, but some are as young as 23.  
49 This comment was in context of a recent firing of a brigade leader who was romantically involved with one of 
her female brigade members though the reason for being fired was based on negligence of duty—something I did 
observe on numerous occasions. 
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work.” This sentiment alludes to a second part of Galya’s control strategy—promotion 
of a certain lifestyle—but for this portion of the chapter it’s important to note that 
recruitment strategies allow brigade members to bring friends and relatives into the 
workplace.   
Once on board, new hires go through a three-month probation period where 
they are trained by one of the ‘best brigades’.  During probation period employees are 
‘off the books,’ working for 1,000-rubles-per-month stipends, or ‘envelope money,’ 
(under the table with no taxes deducted) and having none of the benefits afforded their 
colleagues.  When the probation period ends, the jump in salary to 2,500 to 3,000 
rubles per month provides a very real incentive for workers to stay.  However, there is 
no guarantee of a job after the probationary period, because each employee must 
undergo a rigorous and stressful shift-long examination where she must perform every 
duty that might be required of a brigade member.  The employees are tested against the 
official production levels (norma) and are required to complete all aspects of cake and 
pastry production, and the other brigade members are not allowed to help.  Workers 
who do not pass the test are told that day not to report to work again.  The exam has its 
purposes beyond just selecting new brigade members. As Maya put it: 
I have to be hard, even if I want to be their mom.  If they 
feel like they have really accomplished something with 
passing they will feel good about themselves and they will 
stay with us longer.  
 
The reality is that most new hires pass the test and are then sent to other 
brigades.  The switch to a new brigade is intentional as it breaks up new friendships 
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and encourages better communication/cooperation across shifts, which is important 
during shift changes when the kitchens have to be cleaned and put in order prior to the 
next shift beginning work.   
As my participant-observation in the bakery coincided with that of two new 
hires, we went through the training period together.  Beyond learning the vast set of 
workplace rules—many mandated by Russian state standards for food preparation and 
hygiene—this period was where we were socialized to the ins and outs of brigade and 
collective life.  What was striking for me as a true outsider was the number of daily 
rituals— many seemingly trivial –such as always taking smoke breaks together, saying 
good bye personally to all brigade members of the incoming shift before departing for 
home or ‘out’) and others, like completing the inventory sheets every day with the 
utmost care even though there is no guarantee of accuracy, are a major aspect of life in 
the brigade.  All of the rituals, I argue, have the effect of solidifying and reinforcing 
brigade solidarity. 
As a postscript to my experience at the bakery, I probably would not have 
passed the probation ending exam as I worked too slowly and my frosting roses left 
more than a little to be desired.  One of the women who started at the same time as me 
was actually slower and less talented than I, so it was not a big surprise when she was 
asked to leave after she took her exam.  The reaction of her brigade mates was 
interesting. All expressed empathy and discomfort with the fact she had not passed the 
exam—making excuses for her and suggesting the exam was unfair. However, this 
same person was often rebuked by her brigade leader and sometimes-grumpy 
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teammates for being too slow.  So despite some uncomfortable moments at the end of 
her last shift, I suspect most were glad she did not pass the exam.   
4.7 MANAGING THE MANAGERS 
Strategies for managing the non-hourly staff—senior bookkeepers, staff biologist and 
especially the bakery directors—are noticeably different from the strategies for managing the 
workforce.  At this level, Galya’s managers take an enormous personal stake in how the 
companies run and the products are produced.  Their relationship to the owners and the 
success of the company is more analogous to how Victor treats his wage staff.  This strategy 
is tried and true in Corporate America, as Smith describes in an American bank: 
 
Rather than monitoring middle managers, top managers organized an effective 
system of self-surveillance and self discipline…This process was all couched in 
the terms of an elaborate corporate culture that emphasized the responsibility and 
autonomy of managers.  Here we see the operation of a powerful hegemonic 
system supported by norms of responsibility and fairness (Smith 1990). 
 
This same strategy pays off in several ways for Galya’s and also Vasili’s enterprises.  
First, giving responsibility and encouraging professional development creates loyal, 
hardworking managers and second it offers managers role models for a different way to 
manage wage labor employees.  (Chapter 5 discusses how managers are identified and 
recruited.)  However in general terms, Galya hires smart, well-educated, underemployed 
women and lets them work up to positions of significant responsibility over time. In the case 
of her most senior manager, who is a role model for other managers working for Galya, the 
benefits go well beyond standard compensation to include loans to funds to purchase a house 
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for the most senior manager to development of a personal friendships that includes going on a 
European vacation (photos of the two women on a beach were published in one of Vasili’s 
newspapers—broadcasting unambiguously the benefits of hard work).  Still, as one manager, 
Natasha D. makes clear, her position within the corporate structure is that of employee: 
 
In the end I am just an employee…none of this is mine.  Sure I 
work hard , maybe even harder than Galya, but I have a lot to 
show for it….you have to understand she’s the boss and on her 
word I could be gone tomorrow—of course I hope that doesn’t 
happen and I don’t think it will because we work so well 
together. 
 
The practical result of these more hegemonic (Burawoy 1979) management strategies 
is that on the bakery floors, often acting as a counter balance to the surveillance and harsher 
control strategies, managers work to nurture, or coach new employees. A case in point is how 
Natasha interacted with Lena a 23-year-old cake decorator on my brigade.  About the time 
that Natasha took over as Director of Bakery #2—there had been no director for the first two 
months I worked there—I asked Lena if she thought she would be getting raise this year.  She 
told me that she had not spoken to anyone about it for sometime.  I asked her is she planned to 
speak to Natasha who was due to start the next week.  She replied: 
 
No, I don’t want to sit down and talk with her…if she were a 
man it would be no problem…we could talk easily. I would do 
a little hey..hey..hey [hip wiggle] smile and probably get my 
raise…or at least we could talk at the same level.  With a 
woman director it’s different….this director feels above us...she 
will talk down her nose to me.  I don’t think she would 
listen…you remember at the staff meeting she asked what are 
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your problems and nobody said anything.  That’s just how it 
is… 
 
Clearly Natasha was starting out with a reputation (she was the director at Galya’s 
café prior to coming over to the bakery), and most of the brigade members I spoke with had 
formed early, negative opinions about her.  However, about a month after I spoke with Lena 
she stopped to chat with me during the shift change and even though she was coming off 12 
hours on her feet, she was rather excited. 
 
Mark! I though it would be very difficult to talk with her… 
remember I said that she would probably talk down her nose … 
but actually she was really nice to me.  She said ‘Lena, lets talk 
for a minute’.  My first thought when she asked “Did you do the 
sunset cakes?’ was that I had done something wrong and my 
stomach sank.  When I said yes, she said ‘they were 
spectacular— new and very interesting…just the type of new 
design they were looking for to sell in the stores’.  She told me 
that that everyone would be instructed on how to make this 
cake.  Mark, on the next zayafka there was a note instructing 
Lena to make a special order cake as she wanted to.  They 
almost never write this on the zayafka and usually it is the 
brigade leader who does all special orders.  Of course I felt a bit 
bad at getting such attention…some girls were probably jealous, 
but I have been working and learning how to do this for almost 
two years … 
 
Needless to say, Lena was a convert and someone that could be counted on in that 
brigade to always be dependable. In fact she helped her brigade leader, who had a serious 
alcohol abuse problem, by calling her and reminding her about her shift start times, helping 
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her with inventory ledger, and trying to coax her into not drinking too much.  Natasha 
confided in me that within a year Lena would probably be made a brigade leader.   
4.8 LABOR AND THE BIG PICTURE 
This chapter outlined a number of important structural components of the mode of regulation 
that included a job market that is pushing employees into new firms, government policies and 
normative work rules and traditions that help to socialize new entrants into the workforce.  
The differences between how Victor and Galya’s enterprises operate probably represent 
different styles of management rather than different structural positions of workers within the 
emerging capitalist order in Russia.  The significance of the differences in their approach lies 
in the parity of their effectiveness. Although, arguably, Victor will achieve more sustainable 
results with a wage labor force that is more self-motivated and disciplined, the fact remains 
that both styles of management produce, by the standards of a capitalist economy, exceptional 
results.  The implication is that a mode of regulation for Russia’s version of capitalism is 
rapidly stabilizing, locking in place a regime of accumulation under which a range of 
management styles will be effective.  The next chapter deals more with how Galya, Vasili and 
other owners of capital interact with the institutions and structure outside of the bakeries and 
how those interactions help them achieve the results they desire.   
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5.0  THE BUSINESS AND POLITICS OF GENDER 
I’m against discrimination, the best cooks are men, best confectioners are men, 
best bartenders and waiters are men, so let them stay in their places… 
Galya 2002 
 
Galya made this joke in one of her first interviews as candidate for the local Duma, 
representing the district where her café is situated.  The quip—an inversion of the gender that 
usually does this kind of work—was intended to win over women voters in the upcoming 
local election in which Galya was running for an open Duma seat.  By lightly playing up her 
role as a woman entrepreneur and business owner as part of a three-month campaign to 
educate and win over several key voter blocks in her district, Galya was venturing into not 
only local politics, but gender politics.   
The political campaign, like all of Galya’s endeavors, was creative and meticulously 
planned. Her ‘team’ consisted of her family members and like-minded politicians and 
business people that worked on an informal ticket with Vasili as he attempted to secure his 
own election win as the head of the Republic.  Her unsuccessful campaign illustrates the 
double-edged sword that gender and changing gender roles and identities play in the lives and 
livelihoods of the entrepreneurs on which this research focuses.   
Galya, as evidenced from my interviews with her and the public dialog she 
orchestrates around the development of a public persona, is acutely sensitive to her precarious 
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position as a ‘strong’ woman in an overwhelmingly male sector of the economy.  On one hand 
her crafted image as a working mother plays very well with her workforce, as is an aspect of 
her control regiment.  On the other hand, her acceptance by the general public is another 
matter entirely. 
This chapter focuses on changing gender relations and subject-constitution of the 
owners, managers and workers in the enterprises discussed throughout this dissertation.  
Although gender was originally not an explicit part of my dissertation, my informants made it 
an issue either in the context of describing the difficulties of ‘doing business’ as women and 
more implicitly in the form of jokes, or as strategies for reinforcing their authority in the 
workplace or overcoming obstacles of public perception.  I was also confronted with the 
simple fact that well over 90 percent of my informants—the people who work, own, and 
manage the enterprises I investigated— were women.   
Addressing gender also strengthens the Regulation School’s stylized framework as it 
injects agency into a structural orientation that otherwise leaves it susceptible to the critique 
that it is too materialist or, as Ortner lamented, “…assumes that human action and historical 
process are almost entirely structurally or systematically determined" (Ortner 1994: 387). This 
chapter positions gender as both an area of inquiry and an analytical tool for understanding 
accumulation strategies and the shifting gender hierarchies and power relations that support 
them. 
Building off a robust and diverse body of literature that has shown how the discourses 
and practices of gender have shaped Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since 1989,  
(cf Einhorn 1993; Gal 1994; Verdery 1994; Bridger et al 1996a, 1996b; Block 2000; Gal and 
Kligman 2000a, 2000b; Lampland 2000; Szali 2000; Ashwin 2002; Helms 2003) this chapter 
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takes two little-explored paths of analysis for understanding the significance of gender in 
emerging Russian accumulation strategies.  The first focuses on the possibility and role of 
gendered capital, as opposed to gendered labor.  A good deal of research on gender and labor 
has focused on feminization of the labor force as an accumulation strategy for global capital, 
describing the ways capital (re)produces and maintains local gendered ideologies and 
hierarchical relations to recruit and discipline workers and cheapen labor costs (Enloe 1989; 
Safa 1995)  The process shifts the “…control of women from male relatives to alien male 
authorities—the factory supervisor the employment agent, the government bureaucrat…” 
(Ong 1991:295).  The juxtaposition of female labor and male authority implicitly genders 
capital as male. However, when women are the owners, directors and managers, as is the case 
of the enterprises I worked with, I was led to the question: Can capital be gendered, and if so, 
what is the impact on both labor and capital in Russia’s emerging regime of accumulation?  
This line of inquiry also necessarily examines male gender roles, which are particularly 
salient in the Russian context given Soviet efforts to replace the male as the head of the 
Russian household (Gal and Kligman 2000b). 
The second path undertakes what amounts to ethnography of a political campaign.  In 
contemporary Russia, where notions of the public and private do not fit the common western 
understandings of these spheres as separate, bounded entities, the act of running for and 
holding public office is inherently a private sector or business decision.  The political 
campaign season for local and regional elections and in particular Galya’s strategy for 
winning a seat on the local Duma, provides context for examining a host of issues and 
tensions surrounding the emerging role of woman as entrepreneurs and heads of households.  
Galya framed her campaign, in part, as a referendum on lifestyles, attitudes and women who 
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work.  Journeys down both of these paths require an understanding of the Soviet State’s 
policies towards women and gender in the labor force. 
5.1 HISTORICAL LEGACIES 
Russia holds the dubious honor of having undergone two interrelated processes that bookend 
the lifespan of the Soviet state and that stand alone in the 20th century in their scale and scope: 
forced industrialization and state divestiture.  The structure and consequences of the policies 
supporting these processes have significant implications for post-socialist accumulation 
strategies.  To conduct an analysis of power configurations associated with gender relations 
and identities in the workplace, it is necessary to closely look at the structural changes that 
girded these processes. 
Women’s role in the Soviet workforce is a much-researched topic (Ashwin 2002; 
Buckley 1996; Gal and Kligman 2000b; Hellbeck 2001; Ingham and Hilary 2002).  The 
subject has drawn particular interest from feminist scholars exploring the effects the 
Communist Party’s emphasis on the ‘women’s issue,’ had on women’s equality.  There are 
essentially two interpretations for how women fared in this early period of the Soviet Union.  
One suggests that the revolution liberated women, even in the face of backlashes that sought 
to re-establish their traditional subordination.  The second argues that the Bolsheviks never 
really intended to liberate women; that legal and policy reforms decreased women’s 
subordination within the family, but increased their subordination to the state. 
While the historical record supports both conclusions, it is clear that the Bolshevik 
emphasis on development of the collective translated into an extraordinary role for women in 
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the Soviet economy during the rapid industrialization associated with the first and second of 
Russia’s five year plans.  In 1930, 472,000 women entered the Russian workforce, and a year 
later another one-half million women joined them.  In all, four million women entered the 
workforce between 1929 and 1935.50 By 1935, 42 percent of the industrial jobs in Russia 
belonged to women (Goldman 2002).  This emphasis on engaging more women in the work 
force was not a new phenomenon in Russia, but would continue and be compounded by the 
loss of male lives in Word War two.  However, looking back, as early as 1885 women already 
comprised 22 percent of the factory workforce and industrialists were seeking women to 
replace outlawed child labor and as a source of cheap, docile labor in a manner that very 
much resembles the processes associated with today’s global capital (Goldman 2002: 268). 
Why did women go to work in such numbers?  And how do Soviet-era employment 
patterns affect women in contemporary Russia? The first question has a straightforward 
answer.  Women both went to work and were encouraged to work out of necessity.  The 
structural changes in the Russian economy that coincided with the first 5-year plan were 
massive, resulting in new opportunities as the industrial base rapidly expanded, and new 
imperatives as skyrocketing prices made adding income to households an economic necessity.  
For its part, the state desperately needed a female labor supply to provide much 
needed help to backup labor so that the harsh labor laws and standards associated with the 
second five-year plan could be enforced (Goldman 2002: 279).  Women and their role in 
society were also an integral part of the Bolshevik ideology, which “…centered on creating 
revolutionary selves, on making Soviet citizens think of themselves and act as conscious 
historical subjects" (Hellbeck 2001:341).  This translated into state policies aimed at 
                                                 
50 Trud v SSSR statisticheskii spravochnik (Moscow TsUNKhU Gosplana 1936) 10-11.  Figures include all 
women in industry in Goldman (2002:1). 
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“eliminating housewives from the working class” (Goldman 2002: 211) that many scholars 
argue allowed women to adopt a duel identity of mother and worker.51 
What is the significance of the double track for Soviet women?  One argument goes 
that women under socialism were able to adopt multiple ideas of self—ways of measuring 
worth that have helped women cope better than men with the post-socialist social and 
economic environment (Gal and Kligman 2000b).  They did this in large measure because of 
Soviet social engineering efforts that sought to construct, as Ashwin succinctly explains: 
…a triangular set of [gender] relations in which the primary 
relationship of individual men and women was to the state 
rather than to each other.  Women were to serve the state in 
their role as mothers and workers, while men were prescribed a 
far more limited role in the Soviet polity. They were expected 
to serve as soldiers, workers, and managers, while their role as 
household heads was rendered politically suspect and, 
ultimately, redundant.  
 
These policies had the twofold effect of giving women more resiliency in the face of 
hardships associated with neoliberal reforms that marked the transition away from State 
socialism and further dis-empowering men whose diminished role in the home had already 
been usurped by the state.   
A second perspective, however, suggests that the Soviet’s efforts on women’s behalf 
did little more than “emancipate women to subordination” (Liljestrom 1995 in Katz 2001:13).  
An analysis of wage labor in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia shows significant Soviet-era 
wage disparities that have continued throughout the Post-Soviet period (Katz 2001).  Soviet 
                                                 
51 GARF, f. 15, d. 358  stenogramma vsesoiuznogo soveshchaniia po rabote sredi Zhenshchin Vol 2, p. 15. 
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industry was also sharply gendered, both vertically by branch, and horizontally by skill, with 
women primarily in secondary, lower prestige positions.  This gender segregation created 
situations where women were significantly under-employed vis-à-vis their skills, abilities and 
potential in the workforce.  The constriction of the workforce associated with privatization 
and the ensuing economic collapse left many of these women eager to find other 
opportunities.   
These two perspectives and outcomes are not mutually exclusive and there is ample 
ethnographic evidence that both are contributing to the shifting of gender roles and identities 
for women that are changing power hierarchies in contemporary Russia.  For matriarchs such 
as Galya, their role or responsibility as head of the family, and their frustration with being 
underemployed, or at least underpaid, are clearly motivators and tension creators.  However, 
women not in positions to be entrepreneurs—those hired by Galya to be their managers or 
agents of capital, for example—seem to be providing a deep talent pool for selecting and 
training managers that are highly competent, fiercely loyal individuals that excel at being 
managers and relating to the women they oversee.  These women find themselves with 
authority/power in the workplace and at home due to increased earnings and contributions to 
their family’s economic well-being. 
5.2 GENDERED CAPITAL 
The ‘shock therapy’ model implemented in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
yielded results that have been called mostly ‘shock’ with very little therapy.  Rising 
unemployment, unprecedented drops in production, destruction of social safety nets, and rapid 
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socio-economic differentiation are a well-documented part of the 1990s in post-socialist 
Russia.  The most striking consequence of economic reform in Russia has been the sharp rise 
of poverty and inequality.  In Russia’s case the GDP decreased by 50 percent, while the 
poverty rate increase soared to over 50 percent during the first 10 years of the ‘transition’ 
(Stigilitz & Ellerman, 2000: 2).  The ratio of the average per capita income of the richest 10 
percent of the population to that of the poorest 10 percent increased from 5.4 in 1991 to 11 by 
the end of 1993 (Remington 1999: 16).  With the exception of a few sectors of the economy 
that relied on export sales of raw material, growth has been negative for almost the entire 10 
years since reform efforts began. 
At the beginning of 1992 91 percent of Russian fixed-capital stock was owned by the 
state, which was responsible for nearly the entire gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
country.  By 1998, only 42 percent of that stock was still in state hands and the private sector 
accounted for 72 percent of Russian GDP (Remington 1999: 17).    
The trend was similar in Karelia, though the Karelian government takes an activist 
role in managing in some sectors, such as machine building, 80 percent of businesses were 
privatized.52  The net result for women in this situation was that their overall proportion in the 
formal workforce between 1991 and 2000 fell from 48 to 38 percent53. This was due not only 
to low-level positions associated with women becoming redundant, but the grinding halt of 
Russian secondary processing industries, which were unable to accumulate through 
production due to hyperinflation, collapse of domestic markets, lack of working credit, and as 
the 1990’s progressed, an overvalued ruble (cf. Mandel 2004). The degradation of Russia’s 
social safety net, which by the year 2000 was only supporting 13 percent of the seven million 
                                                 
52 Goskomstat. 2001, p 305. 
53 Goskomstat 2001, p 141. 
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or so officially unemployed, compounded the problem.54  The scramble that resulted— 
exemplified most notably by theft of state property through shady privatization deals or just 
outright theft as thousands of factories and enterprises were stripped bare by hungry 
employees—left people to their own devices.   
Extensive research on this period has focused on the withering impact these changes 
had on ordinary citizens, and in particular how men and women experienced the impacts 
differently (Bridger 1996b). These wrenching changes can be attributed to the dismantling—
in the name of a capitalist jumpstart—of the socialist regime of accumulation that linked 
reciprocal relations between labor, government and the Communist Party in seemingly fixed 
configurations of power.  Here too the Soviet mode of regulation provided legitimate career 
and vocational pathways and a measure of economic protection and stability to the average 
Russian citizen.  As the system imploded the state’s system of training and education pre-set 
career tracks in large part went away.  As a result, both men and women found themselves 
unable to work in the industries for which they had trained. This was especially the case in 
heavy industry and agriculture where the better paying jobs were dominated by men, (Ashwin 
2003). Both people with entrepreneurial drive and others simply looking for work, found 
themselves in the emerging private sector of small- and medium-sized private businesses.  
Gal and Kligman (2000) argue that the ‘practice of gender’ can be used as an 
alternative theoretical construct for understanding the turbulent times in post-socialist Europe.  
They suggest two important questions for framing the research that takes this approach: How 
are gender relations and ideas about gender shaping political and economic change in the 
region and what forms of gender inequality are being shaped as a result (Gal and Kligman 
                                                 
54 EIU Country profile 2003, p 17. 
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2000a)?  One finding within the work that attempts to answer these questions is that the 
power relations and attitudes towards women that were pushed from public discourse by 
communist ideology have exerted themselves to an even greater degree (Kay 2006) and 
continue to work to women’s disadvantage.   
This chapter asks a slightly different question by focusing on the power implicit in the 
ownership of capital.  Taking a cue from Abu-Lughod’s critique of resistance studies, which 
she says is “…ultimately more interested in finding [and romanticizing] resistors…than 
examining power and its implications for the forms of resistance they locate” (Abu-Lughgod 
1990: 35), the central questions for this chapter are: What is the role of gender in tearing 
down power configurations in Russian society, and how does this impact Russia’s new regime 
of accumulation, and, in turn, emerging gender roles?   
I argue here that some women (and men) are recognizing and exploiting new 
indeterminacies in gender roles and power relations to their advantage through the ownership 
of capital.  The social upheavals that devastated the lives of many have created opportunity 
for women to use their skill sets, dispositions, and connections to become either owners of 
capital or willing stewards of that capital that has given them unprecedented power in the 
workplace and at home.  The important distinction being that I am discussing women such as 
Galya, who owns capital or Sasha, who is an agent of capital.  The issue of how women’s 
entrance into the labor force changes the dynamics is a separate and well-documented area of 
research. 
Galya uses gender as an important advantage in the construction of an effective post-
socialist regime of accumulation.  While Chapter 4 outlined some gendered labor control and 
production strategies, this chapter looks at the role of power in situating these efforts and 
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explores in greater detail the tensions and struggles associated with (re)defining the roles for 
some women within Russian society. 
Galya has a reputation for being a tireless worker, a tough boss and a constant 
innovator. Like all of the principals and most of the managers in her business group, she does 
not have a background in business, or an elite Soviet pedigree. Galya was an underpaid 
physician until one day in 1991, when she says:   
A neighbor phoned me and asked for a ride 
somewhere…she offered to give me a little money…in the 
next five hours I earned more money working as a private 
taxi than I could make in a month as a doctor.  I knew on 
that day that I would need to make a change if I wanted to 
provide for my family... 
 
Galya first relayed this story to me in 1999, but I heard the story told and retold in 
interviews with local television and print media during her political campaign for a local 
Duma seat.55  The vignette provides a glimpse of two themes that are important for 
understanding her ability to wield power in the workplace.  First, everything Galya does is 
ostensibly for the benefit of her family and she is acutely aware of hurdles she faces as a 
woman in business.  She states: 
It is difficult here being a woman in business…I feel real 
personal tension.  There are job security issues...the tax 
police…the possibility of failure...and not being able to provide 
for my family. 
 
                                                 
55 Galya and most of her family members and business associates ran on opposition tickets in the local and 
regional elections, which is discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter. 
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In her interactions with her managers, employees and even the public, Galya positions 
herself as the head of the household.  This is an important and well-understood role for the 
mother in a Russian household, although the mother is not usually considered the principal 
breadwinner, which is a not an insignificant point of public and personal tension for Galya 
and professional women in general in Russia.   
In both her public and private conversations, Galya holds fast to the attitude that “we 
will do what it takes to have a normal life”, which translates directly to a management 
philosophy that “anyone can be replaced”.  This notion that no one has job security is a 
mantra and not-so-veiled threat uttered by Galya and repeated endlessly, both in writing and 
verbally by her managers.  For example, a hand written note posted by the director on door of 
the employee locker room after the theft of 500 plastic torti container lids in middle of the day 
(speculation on how this might have been was accomplished and why was the source of much 
speculation and amusement with the leading theory being someone would use them to start 
their tomato plants indoors) read in part: 
 “…the stealing of these lids is a serious offense and could 
cause a small firm like this one to close down [we had to stop 
production because there was no way to store cakes without 
lids]…this is also a private firm and the owners are under no 
obligation to keep you working…”  
 
The note went on to ask employees to be more diligent to keep theft from happening in the 
future.  The accusatory tone of the letter and the not-so-veiled threat definitely got employees’ 
attention, but they brushed off the notion that the bakery would close, saying that they made 
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plenty of money.  Even Galya’s most senior and trusted manager and friend—a person whom 
Galya vacations with in Europe and described by Galya as ‘like family’ is quick to point out: 
“….I am paid a salary like everybody else and can be asked to leave like anybody else.”   
The easy-to-empathize-with desire to take care of her family gives legitimacy to 
Galya’s hard-nosed managerial style that makes most employees thankful that she is not their 
real mother.  Galya’s role as mother allows her to leverage enormous moral power that 
emanates from the workplace into the community as well as into her personal life, but it is not 
without its dangers as well. As the below section on the politics of business demonstrates, 
Galya consciously downplays her role vis-à-vis her husband.   
This tension between male and female roles and power in the home and workplace 
brings us to a second theme from Galya’s taxi story, which is the idea that she was forced into 
this profession—that it was not free will, but a choice she had to make given the economic 
circumstances with which she was faced.  This observation is important for several reasons. 
First, it mirrors the sentiments of Galya’s husband (and others) who often complained bitterly 
about their job displacement: “Would an engineer in America be forced to manage a bakery to 
make a living?” but with different results.  Both Galya’s and Anna’s husbands had long 
stretches of unemployment, offered only sporadic and uneven participation in managing the 
family enterprises, and at critical times would simply not be around or seemingly be working 
in opposition to the families’ interests.   
Perhaps the inattentive husbands are just products of bad marriages, but their behavior, 
as contrasted to Galya and Anna’s attitudes and work ethic, do provide compelling 
ethnographic validation for the notion that men, having had their power/role in the household 
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usurped by Soviet policies, were further disenfranchised by economic dislocations associated 
with socialism’s collapse.  
Second, being forced into entrepreneurship also allows Galya to deflect personal 
responsibility for being a hardnosed businessperson.  Galya’s response to the continued poor 
performance of the bread bakery was to ‘clean house;’ suggesting on numerous occasions that 
brigades should be sacked and they should simply start fresh with new people that did not 
have such bad habits.  This was a source of real tension between Galya and her husband as he 
would defend the workers—despite all evidence to the contrary—both as individuals with 
families and on a more general moral ground of this being a bourgeois tactic that was simply 
inappropriate:  
 
Galya:  I understand that it is very hard to get through [literally, 
punch (probutz)] to a brigade that has worked its entire existence 
without a technologist.56  But, if it were up to me, I would simply 
change out half of the brigade, I would take more responsibility [to 
hire] serious people that are dependable and efficient and will listen 
to what the technologist says. …and Leonid protects these brigades. 
 
Leonid: I do not defend. People have worked here for five years. 
 
Galya:  But for manufacturing, unfortunately, this is not good, because 
the technologist cannot get through to them… But I will tell you, if it 
were I who was running this enterprise, I would hold on to the 
technologist and change the brigade. This may be an unpleasant 
                                                 
56 This person works as a floor supervisor; responsible for all production, quality control, sanitation, and meeting 
of government standard. 
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technique, but it is simplest and I know how to do it; you dismiss two-
three persons and all others will at least listen much better… 
 
 Leonid’s very simple observation says a great deal about his outlook towards the 
wage earners at the bread bakery.  He admits they do not work as they should and that their 
actions are not defensible, but makes note of how long they have worked there.  In his book 
tenure should count for something.  In this case, female capital relies more directly on 
coercive strategies as contrasted to a male director’s more paternalistic style, patterned after 
the normative role of Soviet enterprise directors as providing father figures.   
Bakery #3 needs, as Galya describes it, an ‘iron glove’—someone there on a day-to 
day basis always keeping ‘a thumb pressed hard’ on the wage earning staff.  Employee 
morale, staff turnover, and theft were all problems at Bakery #3; workers were being paid 
daily piece-meal wages and the largest motivation to work was the threat of fines for poorly 
baked bread that could reduce a day’s wages to a few rubles with just one mistimed retrieval 
of loaves from the large ovens. 
  Galya underscored her management style with a personnel action in Bakery #2—a 
bakery that she, not her husband, had the closest direct hand in running—in late January that 
reverberated throughout all of her enterprises.  Concerned about the quality of product being 
produced—cakes were being returned to the bakery at an increasing rate—and hearing rumors 
that a certain brigade leader and her team were shirking, she made a 3:00am visit to the 
bakery.  Typically from around 11:00pm until 6:00am the only people in the bakery are the 
brigade members with no director or manager providing any additional oversight. What she 
found, according to eyewitnesses from a second brigade in the building, was all four women 
of the decorating brigade and at least one, possibly two young men—mechanics and drivers 
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who probably stopped to get warm and socialize as they had done in the past—were crammed 
into the 5x8 men’s ‘locker room,’ which can best be described as a utility closet.  Her reaction 
was the talk of the bakery when I arrived the next morning for my shift.  Knowing Galya, and 
knowing what the scene was in the closet—I worked on this brigade and on numerous 
occasions found myself  wedged into the closet for smoking breaks—the description of her 
going into a rage that culminated with the entire brigade being fired was probably accurate.   
Of course firing an entire, highly skilled, if a bit undisciplined, brigade would have 
created a huge hole in the production cycle. In fact, despite being furious, Galya only the fired 
brigade leader. A second woman, who was dating the brigade leader,57 quit in solidarity and 
the other two women were told to go home and not come back until they wanted to work.  
The latter two were back at work the following week, allowing the bakery to cobble together 
another working brigade. 
That morning the bakery was abuzz with conversation about what had transpired a few 
hours earlier.  Although there was sympathy for the girls losing their job—the rumor was that 
all four had been fired —the general consensus was that the women were silly for playing 
around.  As one young woman put it, “What’s she going to do now besides sit at home all day 
or sell shoes down at the department store?” (The fired brigade leader did end up in a booth at 
the local market selling kitchen knives, and according to gossip was probably making only a 
third what she had been making at the bakery.) 
Galya is not at Bakery #2 on a daily basis so direct supervision fell to the Director or 
the technologist. In Bakery #2 the technologist/chemist (Maya, discussed earlier) was 
                                                 
57 The fact that the Brigade leader was a lesbian and had begun dating one of her co-workers was known by 
management, but only discussed in code or very obliquely.  I am unsure of the role her sexual orientation played 
in her being dismissed. 
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responsible for day-to-day supervision of the brigades and was the counter weight to the 
expectations and consequences set down by Galya. Although she could be tough in her own 
right, she characterized her role as being part mom and part manager.  Her authority to 
judiciously enforce the myriad of rules and orders that the brigades must follow on a daily 
basis helped ensure, as brigade members put it, ‘a good collective.’  Collective translates 
roughly into work environment or the climate that the workers associated closely with the 
quality of personal relationships and reasonableness of management in the factory.   
During my tenure at bakery #2 Natasha D became the new director.  Her arrival at the 
bakery was met with a fair amount of trepidation, as her reputation was similar to that of 
Galya’s.  She immediately began implementing plans to increase production and the 
quality/consistency of the baked goods by introducing a three-ring binder with color 
photographs of each type of product the bakery made.  Each cake coming off the floor was 
checked against the binder for quality. 
Natasha was truly a success story in that she had struggled in her personal life, prior to 
meeting and working with Galya, in ways that were familiar to many of the women at the 
bakeries. She was previously married to an alcoholic who was incarcerated, and she had 
struggled to parent her daughter alone and find a job.  Her biography was printed in one of 
Vasili’s newspapers, along with pictures of her on a European vacation with Galya. The 
image conveyed was one of friendship and reward for a job well done. 
Print media coverage of this nature was usually reserved for family members or the 
principals of the various interlocking networks. Galya and her associates often repeated the 
notion that truly successful businesswomen in Russia are rare.  Galya told me a story of her 
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attendance at a women-in-business conference in Moscow sponsored by a French 
philanthropic foundation:   
 
You could tell right away the women who had legitimate 
businesses by what they talked about.  The talk was not of 
kids, families and husbands, but of real (nastiashi) issues 
related to our businesses...the serious women also 
possessed masculine characteristics...we carried only a 
small suitcase and a brief case—we did not carry around 
the normal large bags like most Russian women. 
 
 
She confided that out of several hundred women she met at the conference she found 
only a handful that she considered to be actually running companies.  In the above passage, 
Galya seems to equivocate success in business with having masculine characteristics.  
However, when queried directly about women entrepreneurs, or leaders being cast in a 
feminist light Galya would often demur and say ‘that is not so….we are simply business 
people first’.58  In fact, the topic of feminism was of particular interest to my research 
assistant who had a Doctorate from Moscow State University focusing on women’s issues.  
She would often attempt to validate her observation that there was a ‘special sorority’ of 
powerful women that distinguished themselves from other women (and men) in their outlook 
and abilities, but found little willingness from any of the businesswomen to engage in this 
conversation.  
                                                 
58 This topic was of particular interest to my research assistant who has a doctorate focusing on women’s issues.  
She would often attempt to validate her observation that there was a ‘special sorority’ of powerful women that 
distinguished themselves from other women (and men) in their outlook and abilities. 
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However, a study of women business owners that belonged to business or women’s 
associations in 1996 suggested that women as entrepreneurs would be a formidable force in a 
growing economy.  The study received responses from 561 women from across Russia, 
including Karelia.  The respondents were highly educated with 80 percent having a college 
degree, the average age was 41 and 65 percent were married.  Ninety five percent of the 
respondents employed others, 68 percent of whom were women.  The women’s businesses 
spanned 16 industries led by retail, non-durable manufacturing and business services. 
Significantly, 23 percent of the women’s firms were goods producing, compared to 8 percent 
for women-owned businesses in the United States (Wells 2003).  
Still, Galya uses gender as an organizing principle or rallying point or strategy in a 
careful manner.  As my analysis of public interviews given by Galya during her political 
campaign highlights, the only group she will plainly acknowledge helping to form is a new 
middleclass in Russia. The contradiction between her daily practices and characterizations of 
women who actually ran enterprises, and her refusal to acknowledge any feminist 
sensibilities, is perhaps an acknowledgement of the difficulty in directly confronting existing 
gender hierarchies and attitudes.  However, while public discussion about gender in the 
workplace may be stifled,  the following vignette suggests that within various semi-
autonomous fields—in this case the private financing and collection of debt—the gender card 
has some cache—and Galya’s tactics are not the only way to consolidate power in the 
workplace as a woman. 
Sasha is the managing director of the retail grocery chain nominally owned by Vasili.  
The chain of stores and other affiliated enterprises can be considered a sister corporation to 
 178 
Galya’s enterprises, with the firms having close commercial and political ties59 with 
enterprises operating independently from each other.  Sasha’s experience and perspective as 
director contrasts in many ways to that of Galya’s.  The contrasts in style, outlook and 
strategy between these two are no different than the myriad of management approaches or 
career outlooks you would find in any market economy, but the differences suggest a number 
of strategies for wresting power from traditional gender hierarchies of the male-dominated 
world of Russian commerce. 
Sasha is a slender, blond woman who wears elegant, western-European clothing.  She 
has an easy laugh and a flirtatious personality; entertaining visitors from a sleek, well-
appointed office that belies the decrepit, Brezhnev-era building that houses it.  The day we 
first met, she wore a white silk pantsuit and her blond, bobbed haircut was carefully styled.  
At the time of our first interview she was running Vasili’s vast commercial empire and had 
developed what she called her ‘golden circle’ of loyal and highly competent managers that 
controlled their respective stores with a great deal of autonomy.   
Sasha had spent her entire professional career in the grocery business, working for a 
state-owned grocery store prior to joining Vasili’s team.  The food industry is one that 
employed primarily women.  Sasha, despite being only mid-career, had advanced to a position 
of considerable authority and responsibility under the Socialist system.  Still, the relative 
power she enjoyed as a technical expert in purchasing had little to do with why she was 
                                                 
59 Because formal ownership is still only a partial indicator of who actually owns a Russian company (see 
Chapter 2) the best way to determine whether and how companies are linked is by looking at command-control.  
In this case, Galya and Sasha (Vassili’s) firms are allies and cooperate closely. But decision making between the 
two groups is independent. 
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initially successful salvaging Vasili’s, by most accounts far flung and haphazardly managed, 
stores and businesses.60  She recounted her first week on the job as such: 
 
I had only been working a few days but it was easy to see 
that the stores were on the verge of bankruptcy. He [Vasili] 
owed everybody money and we did not have enough 
revenues to pay debt and keep our store stocked.  On my 
second day at work two thugs dropped by to see me.  They 
were menacing me and kept repeating themselves ‘you will 
give us the money now…’  Finally, I cut them off and said 
“or what, you break the legs of a 45 kilo woman?”  I think 
they really didn’t know what to think of me…I finally got 
all of our creditors to give us more time by showing them 
our plans for the stores…and look at us now. 
 
 
The story suggests that being a woman allowed her to speak with the representatives 
in more purely business terms—her gender helped remove a threat of violence—by 
explaining how it was in everyone’s best interest to keep the company going and that payment 
would be forthcoming. So being a businesswoman was the only way she was able to speak the 
language and logic of a legitimate ‘businessman’ at a time when credit enforcement in Russia 
was often taken care of informally and many times with at least the threat of violence. 
Sasha told another vignette to describe how she came to work for Vasili.  Her version 
of the story varied considerably from the version Vasili had relayed to me two years prior 
during a preliminary interview. According to Vasili, his entire business success is built upon 
                                                 
60 By one informant’s count, Vasili had incorporated or was affiliated with fifty different firms over a five year 
period.  The multiple incorporations were primarily for tax purposes, but also represented the multitude of actual 
enterprises employing over 700 individuals (see Chapter 2). 
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finding and hiring the ‘right people,’ which translates into hiring women exclusively for 
leadership positions in his companies.  In hiring Sasha, Vasili reports: 
 
I had to pursue her for months before she would work for me…I 
knew it would be good for everyone when she came to work 
with us….she knows everyone…[and]…gets the best produce 
and meat for our stores at the best prices.  Her success comes 
from her networks of colleagues and friends that she worked 
with at the state grocery store. 
 
Sasha’s recollection of how she came to work for Vasili paints less a picture of the 
savvy would-be business tycoon and more of the wide-eyed exuberance that epitomized the 
early years of Russia’s transition.  It also suggests that Sasha came to work for Vasili on her 
terms: 
A yes, Vasili…he bugged me for a long time before I 
agreed to work for him. He would cruise around town on a 
bicycle, wearing ridiculous shorts. [In the early 1990s 
Russian men did not and still really do not wear shorts]  I 
thought he was cute and he was very persistent….  Besides, 
I could already see there would not be much of a future 
where I was working, so I agreed.  
 
One of Sasha’s colleagues that worked with her described her as a ‘small, blond 
firecracker’ and recounted the time she threw herself in front of a brigade of tax police that, in 
addition to confiscating her books (for auditing) were cleaning out the safe as well (to pay for 
impending fines).  From that point on Sasha and her employees kept the day’s earnings 
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stuffed in their pockets to avoid seizure during the numerous surprise raids.  This was in the 
mid 1990s and the businesses, in their current incarnation, were still in their formative years. 
I have included Sasha in this section on gendered capital even though the Mostorg 
chain is ‘owned’ by Vasili’.  As Chapter 2 describes, enterprise ownership in Russia is not 
clear-cut in that it does not fit the liberal paradigm of private ownership.  In this case, the 
agents of capital (Sasha and her managers) have full control over the management of the 
enterprises up until the point of deciding how to re-invest accumulated capital.  During 2001-
02 most of capital accumulated, which normally would be reinvested in the enterprise, was 
being funneled to political campaigns and the ancillary organizations (e.g. newspapers) used 
to support those campaigns. 
Sasha’s management style contrasts with that of Galya’s—perhaps in part due to scale 
as Mostorg, which has dozens of stores, and a wholesale food and catering business—in that 
she allows her managers a great deal of autonomy in managing their respective work forces 
and rarely intervenes into what she calls her ‘golden circle’ of senior store managers. Each of 
her store directors runs the stores as if they were their own, and in fact, at least legally, many 
of these women do indeed ‘own’ the business in that they are the registered owners of the 
enterprises.  Of course I would hasten to add that they might not even be aware of how the 
stores are registered and they certainly do not see themselves as owners.  By Vasili’s own 
admission, these arrangements, while once necessary to be able to conduct business in the 
mid-1990’s was something that had to be dealt with in the future. 
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5.3 FAMILY RELATIONS 
For Galya and her sister Anna, non-traditional gender roles in the workplace and at home are 
the norm.  Both women have three children, and one has around 13 years between the second 
oldest and the youngest.  Both husbands are underemployed and at times have worked in the 
family enterprises.  Both women have been estranged and living apart from their husbands at 
various times, though they are together presently.  In a 1999 interview with me Galya hints at 
these tensions while describing her husband’s role as Director of the Bakery #1… “The 
bakery is a perfect place for our husbands…better there then sitting at our bar drinking the 
profits.”  However, getting the men to keep a sustained interest in the bakery—a business that 
they helped start and whose initial success and profitability provided the seed money for the 
café —proved to be difficult.  After five years in business Leonid showed only passing 
interest in the enterprise and his partner, the only non-family member in the business group, 
left the business altogether to start a new venture.  When I queried Leonid about the long-term 
plans for Goodtrade he demurred, preferring instead to talk about being outside his chosen 
profession.   In contrast, when I interviewed him in 1999 he had proudly given me a tour of 
the enterprise noting the large German ovens and the productive, stable workforce.  
Elsewhere, I have described the effects a lack of attention had on productivity and product 
quality as well.   
On certain days Bakery #1 (Goodtrade) could not muster enough brigade members to 
operate even a single shift.  When problems reached this crisis point, Galya interjected herself 
back into the daily operations of Goodtrade bakery by sending over an up-and-coming 
manager to take control of sales, payroll and other daily functions of the enterprise.  She also 
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made a few inspections herself to the plant, one of which resulted in, according to employees, 
monumental yelling session and a few summary firings.  
 In this case, inserting a woman director into the bakery made little difference in the 
day-to-day operation because she was not knowledgeable about bread baking and did not have 
the ability to institute a type of inventory and quality-control regimen as discussed in Chapter 
3.  What Galya needed was a competent technologist—the person who manages the baking 
processes and does needed tests on bread and dough to satisfy rigorous health and food laws 
(codecs) that the enterprise followed.  The bakery had been without a person in this position 
for some time and had been relying on its brigade leaders to ensure quality production.   
Galya found Elena Victorova, a 68-year-old retiree who had spent her entire working 
life in one of the Republic’s largest commercial bakery (hlebcabinat) to fill the position of 
technologist. Elena, who looked much older than her age, had such painful arthritis that I could 
almost hear her bones rubbing together as I would watch her move across the cold steel and 
cement floors of the retrofit bakery (it used to be a machine shop). Still, while the long shifts 
were difficult, she told me she loved working again.  She also confided that they were paying 
her almost 10 times her meager pension and the money was a great thing to have for groceries 
and grandkids. Beyond the fact that a person with her skill sets and experience is almost 
impossible to find, Galya’s decision to hire this babushka to manage brigades of 20-something 
year-old-males was intentional.  Efforts to add security guards (who often drank at work as 
well) or male supervisors to ‘push’ the brigades ended several times in physical confrontations 
and didn’t seem to be very effective.  Even if they were rude to ‘the babushka’ behind her back, 
the brigade members did show some deference to her and her abilities.  
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Elena’s personal history is remarkable. She reminisced about surviving the aftermath 
of the Leningrad siege by living in a hole in the ground for almost two years with such detail 
that it brought tears to the eyes of everyone sitting in on our interview.  She was also tough 
and could scold in a way only a Russian grandmother can.  The combination of being a 
babushka, knowledgeable about bread baking, and a no-nonsense personality was an effective 
one.  In this bakery it would be difficult for any manager to make changes short of firing 
brigade members and starting over as Galya would have preferred to do.  The week prior to 
Elena’s arrival there had even been a physical altercation between a shift supervisor and a 
worker who got caught engaging in what he had told me was his own ‘little business,’ which 
was absconding 80 kilo bags of flour and shuttling them to a friend’s car for sale later by the 
kilo at a local market.  
In general, there was a fair amount of other behavior such as taking long breaks, 
sneaking beer in the back room, or taking unnecessary chances with entire batches of bread by 
not closely monitoring the ovens, for which I could find no rationale explanation.  Mostly 
workers would blame it on uneven temperatures in the ovens or make comments like “why 
should we do real work when they don’t pay us real money”?  This, of course, was not every 
employee’s attitude.  There were some brigade leaders who earnest and considered 
themselves artisan bakers (the original vision for the bakery) and some older workers that 
were very happy to be employed.  It was the workers in the middle—mostly young and not 
well trained—that seemed to have the hardest time working at the bakery. Because I was a 
brigade member in Bakery #1 at the time Elena started, I can attest to the fact that a good deal 
of the worst behaviors decreased after her tenure began, and there was a noticeable decrease 
in ruined bread, better quality, and higher production rates for the brigades.  However, brigade 
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leaders gave her only begrudging respect, which was mixed with a fair amount of resentment 
at being ordered around and made to do much of the maintenance, cleaning and organizing 
work that had gone undone for many months. Behind her back they referred to her as the 
‘crazy old babushka.’   
The employee satisfaction survey revealed that of Galya’s four enterprises and the two 
enterprises in the control group, Bakery #1 (Goodtrade) employees had the highest number of 
unsatisfied workers and were the most likely to leave in the near future.  Interestingly, this all-
male brigade factory (it used to be mixed-gender) also had the highest percentage of 
employees who were opposed to Galya’s involvement with politics.  Though I was not able to 
pinpoint any particular reason for this, it may have been simple unhappiness with everything 
the owners did. 
Galya is also very intentional about introducing her children—two in college and a 
third much younger—to the general public in background articles about her and her political 
campaign.  She talks about how she loves her children how proud she is that they are 
ambitious and motivated and how proud she is that they have “never been without”.  She is 
also careful to introduce her husband as a full partner in the business, a sportsman, athlete and 
loving father—all fairly typical campaign fodder for an election in a western capitalist 
country. What’s striking, in the Karelian context is how extraordinary her family’s success 
and standard of living is in comparison with the vast majority of citizens in Petrozavodsk.  In 
this way, the Galya turned her election campaign into a referendum on her embodied vision 
for the future of Karelia.  The next section talks specifically about her political ambitions and 
her run, fittingly enough, against a communist candidate for a seat on the local Duma.   
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5.4 THE POLITICS OF ACCUMULATION 
Political activism in Russia is integral to capital accumulation and is in many ways 
indistinguishable from other business activities. Galya and a number of her peers (other 
entrepreneurs in the City were no exception.  By 2001, holding political office in Russia was 
considered by many successful businesspersons to be a necessity.  Motivations for holding 
office fell, according to my informants, into one of two categories:  Those seeking personal 
enrichment though holding public office or those seeking to maintain and grow their wealth 
through development of democracy and a good business climate.  As one entrepreneur put it: 
 
It's not a secret that the majority of our deputies who are 
businessmen, the ones who actively defend their interests, 
do not care much about the problems of the city. The fate 
of the projects must be determined by economists, 
scientists, city mayors – those who are interested in the 
development of the city's economics and the replenishment 
of the budget. 
 
Political rhetoric and campaign posturing aside, politicians in Karelia are 
sorted into these two motivational groups.  First, as Galya’s husband put it: “The only 
way we know our businesses and families will be safe is to work for our own interests 
from the inside”.  This perspective seems somewhat cynical when compared to 
Galya’s own explanation of her primary motivation to run for local office, which was 
“taking a civic stand” and to work for regulatory reform and tax relief for small 
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business.  Nonetheless she did note that any publicity or information about her and the 
campaign would ultimately be good ‘branding’ for her products: 
 
We’ve had to move some staff around to other enterprises 
and now nobody is engaged in marketing. I have said that 
after elections we will focus again [on 
marketing/branding]...of course elections are a good school 
for marketing…after you advance yourself it is easier to 
advance your products. Therefore, I now think I will have a 
good return on my efforts, even if I don’t win the election. 
 
A good example of this co-branding are the stickers she placed on her bread products 
touting twists on old Russian expressions such as “the Measure of a Man…’ (again, a nice 
play on gender). The sayings were printed on small, neon colored stickers and affixed to the 
bread wrappers and cake boxes for weeks before the election.  This stealthy campaign tactic—
the notes did not include Galya’s name, but were tied into other campaign material and news 
articles about Galya and her companies—was one of a number of subtle strategies she used to 
augment more traditional campaign posters and mailings.    
Galya also conducted campaign activities that fell outside of commercial activities 
associated with day-to-day operations of her enterprises.  A critical part of her strategic 
positioning was to secure protection and influence beyond the normal ‘roof’ (kreshe) 
associated with paying for security.  The activities insulate her from the regional and local 
government apparatuses that might, for example, decide to raise her rent or try to break her 
lease on her store or audit her books.  Examples of these activities include formation of the 
Noncommercial  League of Private Bakers discussed in Chapter 2, sponsorship of a new 
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pensioners club that was allowed to meet in the café (and get free cakes and tea) and where 
they met a variety of candidates, all of whom needed their votes and who would in turn be 
grateful for Galya’s help.  Galya also sponsored a local auto road rally team and even made 
charitable donations to support the city’s summer festivals.   
Other strategies were more direct and included old-fashioned patronage.  For instance, 
she had a van affixed with campaign posters and a loudspeaker on the roof, which she filled 
with idealistic students who would do community service projects such as cleaning the 
notoriously dirty courtyards between apartment buildings.  Campaign operatives following the 
van would secure promises of votes with promises for apartment entry doors that had code 
locks for securing the buildings. These apartment dwellers—more likely to be pensioners and 
vote for the communist party candidates— often could not afford, (or would not pay) for such 
communal amenities.  The doors with locks and call boxes were a huge hit and Galya told me 
that she had set aside about $10,000 for new doors in the downtown district. 
Galya’s robust campaign, which took place during the final third of my research, 
provided me a goldmine of information on Galya, and her extensive business interests and 
relationships, while complicating the research picture considerably.  Galya used newspaper 
interviews to introduce herself and her family to potential voters and define what she believed 
should be central issues in the campaign.  The published interviews—two of which I share 
and analyze below—were often verbatim my own interview questions to her, as are her 
responses.  I have used the published versions because she wrote the questions, selected the 
order and provided the responses, which provides important clues to her sense of which issues 
are most pressing.  The public discourse that these interviews represent reveal tensions around 
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class, wealth, gender and changes in Galya’s own life as well as what she feels she needs to 
negotiate both for her political and commercial professional life. 
The first interview is provocatively titled “Who’s Afraid of Galya L. and appears over 
the byline of a respected young female journalist, even though Galya wrote or at least 
approved both the questions and answers. 
  
Question: Galya L.—Just like on the stage of the "Bolshoi" 
theatre, everyone can see you. If you sit down to table and you 
are surrounded by people straight away.  Some of them will tell 
you the latest news, some will have a cup of coffee with you, 
and the others will just ask to borrow some money. This way of 
living turns your life into a series of get-togethers. Do you find 
time to live a normal life? 
Response. I like this way of living. People from my circle come 
here; there always are a lot of students here. Here you can learn 
the latest news without having to go out into the street. 
Analysis.  The interview starts with invoking a famous cultural 
icon and is accompanied by a photograph of Galya and a well-
known Russian actor sipping tea in her café.  The goal is  build-
up the her café as a spot for artists, musicians and patrons to get 
together (tusovka), as well as young people who frequent the 
cafe during the day, all of which are important themes in 
Galya’s political campaign and part of what she calls her ‘image 
branding’ for the cafe. 
 
Question:  Who are the people from your circle? 
Response. It is the so-called middle class. 
Analysis.  This early reference to the middle class is important.  
Because stereotypes of Russian business men and novyi russkiy 
in Russia are overwhelmingly negative, Galya is careful to align 
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herself with what she says every Russian should have, which is 
reinforced with the next question and response.  We also get, 
acknowledgement—by way of the question—of the importance 
of connections and one’s circle of friends.  Later in the 
interview she when name-drops a number of famous Russians 
who frequent the cafe, she credits a local friend and actor for 
bring these Stars to Petrozavodsk.  This nod to the importance 
of social capital is a further way of acknowledging that her 
work is not extraordinary, but just making the best out of her 
circumstances.  
 
Question.  Is it middle by income or by mentality [outlook]? 
Response: It's middle by income. Of course, in other countries 
middle class is the intelligentsia, office workers, owners of little 
firms, and all of them are well-to-do. Here, in Russia, middle 
class is represented by the owners of middle and small-scale 
business. Of course, when I am dressed in my mink fur, drive 
up to our café in my jeep, and come to meet my friends, who 
earn less than 2000 rubles a month, I feel uncomfortable. In a 
normal country with a normal economy everyone can afford it. 
And we must aim for this too. 
 
Question.  Yes, but it may be that in order to change things in 
our country, your circle—the people of the middle class—ought 
to stand out as some kind of a new formation?  It is the middle 
class that began to earn money without the help of the State and 
support those who had to be supported by the State? 
Response: At present the middle class is just being born. Yes, I 
feel that by degrees a lot of my associates actively participate in 
social and political life. Some of them are the heads of different 
funds, social organizations, some become participants of 
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political movements. I myself am the member of the party 
Jabloko. 
Analysis. This is an important political statement.  By 
unambiguously aligning herself with an opposition party against 
the incumbent government, she is directly confronting the ruling 
party in the government  Vasili is head of the Jabloko ticket, has 
significant political base in the Petrozavodsk city government, 
which shields Galya from politically motivated attacks on her 
businesses.  Finally, the question itself—which is about 
supporting the middleclass—helps to align Jabloko with 
economic reform.   
 
Question. A lot of poor people dream of becoming rich. You 
are a wealthy person. Does it mean that you've deprived 
yourself of a dream?  
Response. Of course, there were times when I didn't have 
enough money to buy boots or fruit for my children. By the 
time when I was 30, I already had three little children. But 
money has never been an end in itself for me. Of course, it gives 
you a kind of freedom, but a business is not just a means of 
enrichment. All the money earned by the business is spent on 
the improvement of the business. Money turns into a 
mechanism of making money. Moreover, when I started my 
business, we've already had a car, a yacht (we built it ourselves) 
and a 100 square meter apartment (Volodja earned it after 
having worked for 15 years as a foreman on a building site). So 
my motivation was not a craving for profit but a pure 
commercial interest and mere curiosity whether I would 
succeed or not. One girl from the management of [the café] 
says: ‘Why do we work at all, if even the heads don't need the 
money?’ 
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Analysis. In this question and response two themes are 
apparent:  First is a nod to her husband and how he was the 
breadwinner of the family for 15 years.  And second, that they 
did not always have money—they earned it through hard work.  
This is an area where Galya was feeling a great deal of pressure 
during the campaign—labeled a mini oligarch and derisively 
called nuvorish by her main, communist party, rival, this 
question seeks to explain away her wealth.  At the same time 
she was expressing a deep-seated belief in the efficacy of 
capitalism and the notion that a person can work his or her way 
to success.  This is a theme she uses liberally in speaking to 
managers and employees. 
 
Question.  Tell me, how did you get acquainted with your 
partner not only in business but in life also, your husband? 
Response. We were acquainted through sports. Volodja is a 
avid sportsman, no one has broken his record of 1982 in track 
and field. When both of us were university students, our team 
was sent to Tula for competitions. We met on the train and had 
a typical student romance, and a typical young family with a 
child and lived in the university's dormitory. When two younger 
children were born, we had already been living in a wooden 
house with stove heating. We wore valenki at home because it 
was very cold. Side by side Volodja and I have gone through 
everything. Soon we will be celebrating our silver wedding. 
Analysis. Here she is advancing ideas of gender parity.  Putting 
this question at the end of the interview brings potential voters 
back to the issues of the family.  Also, she is making sure her 
husband is seen as masculine, which is extremely important at a 
time when Russian society and discourse is being pretty harsh 
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on post-socialist men and their role in raising families and 
solving problems (Kay 2005; Kuznetsov 2002). 
 
A second interview in the same edition of the paper was labeled “An interview 
not taken,’ and intended to provide an insider’s view on Galya, her business, and 
family, and maybe answer some questions people would like to know, but won’t 
usually ask.  The interview reads in places like a gossip article and can be seen as part 
of  Galya’s strategy to personalize her  message and candidacy.   
 
Question.  Galya, can you say that you are a damned wench? 
Response. Yes, I can say so. But why are men, who have and 
defend their own point of view, or who take action, considered 
strong and purposeful personalities, and women in the same 
situation are called "damned wenches"? 
Analysis.  Galya directly confronts the double standard she 
faces on a daily basis. In the early 1990s when the economy was 
in ruins, Gorbachev called for “women to return to their rightful 
place as wives and mothers and voluntarily give up their jobs to 
men” (Bridger 1996a; Wells 2003).  This sentiment, especially 
as it relates to the idea that the implementation of Soviet 
ideology went too far in moving women out of the home and in 
the process emasculated men, has received a good deal of 
attention in the popular press and in media ads.  Galya, in her 
public persona and dealing with elected male officials on behalf 
of her business, was continually challenged by men seeking to 
marginalize her efforts. 
 
Question. Whom do you prefer to work with, men or women? 
Response.  I'm against discrimination (smiling), But the best 
cooks are men, best confectioners are men, best bartenders and 
waiters are men so let them stay in their places. 
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Analysis. A little cutting humor can go a long way in making 
her point that being a woman entrepreneur is difficult. 
 
Question. Do you like to be in charge of everything? 
Response. Galya: Not really… But I have to. Being in charge 
does not mean simply giving orders to people; it is a skill of 
seeing and solving problems, taking the responsibilities. 
Analysis. The theme throughout her campaign and in all the 
background literature about her and her companies, as well as in 
her interactions with employees, she uses circumstances, and 
being at the mercy of circumstances, as the reason for being 
forceful and demanding change or performance.  It is an 
example of how indeterminacies in power relations, brought 
forth by structural changes to the economy and how people 
make a living, can be used as leverage to justify a powerful 
woman’s voice in the commercial and public spheres.  
 
Question. Do you like to earn money? 
Response.  I'll give you a simple answer to such a simple 
question: yes. But it isn't the end in itself. You need money so 
that you won't have to think about it, it gives you freedom and 
chances for development. 
Analysis.  For Galya, money equals freedom and a chance for 
personal development.  This question is designed to take the 
edge of her capitalist activities, which pension-aged citizens 
(the majority of constituents in Galya’s district) still generally 
frowned upon. 
 
Question. What was the first business that helped you to earn 
money? 
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Response. I don't know whether you can call it business but 
once (it was in 1992), when I was going home by car, I gave a 
lift to a passenger who offered me money for the lift. And for 
the reason that I had absolutely no money, I worked as a taxi-
driver all evening. During that evening I earned more money 
than I got for a month of working as a doctor. That's enough, I 
don't want to talk about money anymore! 
Analysis.  This vignette is a great example of appealing to a 
populist sentiment or everyday condition people face.  It 
reinforces that it was not ambition, but circumstances that drove 
Galya to become an entrepreneur. 
 
Question  Ok, then we'll talk about status. We'll talk about art and  
about the "stars" that you have to socialize with at the café.  
Response  I remember well the tour of Bulat Okudzhava61. It was 
his last tour.  When he forgot his lines, the audience sang them for 
him. He and his family spent the next day at our summer cottage.  
Shevchuk62 is a philosopher and an absolute authority, but I must 
mention the inefficiency of having harsh rules. Even though alcohol 
was strictly forbidden, after the concert the group was filling the 
glasses with alcohol under the table so that no one could see.  
Grebenschikov composed a song in the green hall of "NS Café" and 
that night he went out into the other hall, and while the pianist 
played he danced with a patron.63  And I absolutely cannot forget 
the dances that were arranged by Filipenko—all the staff of "NS 
                                                 
61 Bulat Okudzhava (1924-1997) Famous poet and musician.  His 200 plus songs are a mixture of Russian poetry 
and folksong traditions. He was not overtly political, but was a truly loved Russian musician. 
62 Yuri Shevchuk (b 1957) is a singer/songwriter who leads the rock band DDT.  He is often accredited for being 
the greatest song-writer in present Russia. 
63 Boris Grebenshikov—was famous in the West for performing ‘antisovetchiki,” music in the late 1980s.  
Known as ‘Russia’s greatest living songwriter,’ he used to play in Russian underground clubs in the 1970s 
because he would not submit his lyrics to the government sensors.   
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café" remembered them!64 Thanks to Gennadii Z., he introduced us 
to a lot of interesting people.  Igor Guberman also left an 
unforgettable impression.65 We were telling each other jokes and 
funny stories all night. Towards morning only two story-tellers 
were left: Guberman himself and my son. No one won because the 
dawn came.  What do all these people have in common? They are 
interested in people, and their interest is true and startling. When 
"Agata Kristi" was leaving, the drummer, Andrei Kotov, said: 
"Seems strange, but our relationship is more personal than business-
like". 
Analysis.  This response captures in a nutshell the ‘vibe’ or culture 
Galya has worked hard to develop at her café.  These are some of 
the most famous musicians and artists in all of Russia—like having 
Dylan, Springsteen and Angelou, stop by to play and socialize with 
patrons at a local coffee shop.  Beyond the true star power, the use 
of these artists is significant.  Collectively the group embraces both 
tradition and resistance to the Soviet State.    Finally, Gennadii Z, 
whom she thanks for making the introductions, is a local citizen 
who is part of Galya’s personal circle of friends from their school 
days—showing the importance of everyday social capital. 
 
Question.  I have witnessed many times how people ask you: 
"Galya L, do you remember me?" 
Answer.  I have lived in this city for 44 years, there are people 
whom I studied with at school and at the university, there are 
people I trained with, people I treated while working as a doctor—I 
worked as a sports doctor for 10 years. Recently, when I was 
                                                 
64 Alexander Filipenko (b. 1944) famous film and TV actor.  A picture of Galya and Filipenko drinking tea fronts 
the interview quoted here.  
65 Igor Guberman (b. 1936) is a Russian-born Jewish writer and poet who has received a great deal of acclaim for 
his satirical rhyming poetry.  His subjects include anti-Semitism, immigrant life and his own complicated 
relationship with Russia. 
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coming home from Moscow by train, a handsome young man came 
up to me and asked the same question. He was the famous football 
player Denis Zubko. We talked all night long. 
Analysis.  This question is intended to show Galya is a local 
person.  The reference to her medical career is followed up on in 
the next question.  Her response also, again, reinforces the 
importance of social capital.   
 
Question.  Why did you drop medicine and turned to business? 
Response. There are quite a few reasons. Let's remember: the year 
of 1992 was the year of Pavlov's reform, food became more 
expensive, which really affected children.66 I was working in a 
medical clinic for children in Drevljanka and saw trauma and 
problems that I had never seen before. It was all because of the lack 
of protein.  The needs served as a kind of stimulus, a reason to think 
of our health, and especially of the health of my children. I have 
three of them.  Besides that, I had a wish to fulfill myself in a new 
sphere. 
Analysis. This response reinforces two central themes in Galya’s 
campaign and in her management style—she’s doing what she does 
for her family and she’s doing in large part because of 
circumstances not of her making. 
 
Question.  Have you managed to be successful? 
Response.  Well, I'm satisfied with our results. Although, I have 
had to face a lot of problems. When we were planning the 
production of cakes and pastry, one man whom I really respected, 
the doctor at the sanitary-and-epidemiological center, said: "Galya, 
                                                 
66 While the calamities that befell the Russian economy in 1992 could be attributed to Valentin Pavlov, he was in 
jail by January 1992 for his involvement in the aborted coup against Gorbachev.  
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stop and think about it—You're poking your nose into other 
people's affairs." But I was really self-confident then, and having 
set up "Bakery #1" and "NS Café", I wanted to fill our shops with 
original and beautiful cakes and pastry in a short period of time. 
And I'm still trying to do that.  First of all, we rented a building then 
we repaired it. Then we got a certificate for the production. Then 
we realized that the space was too small and it took us another six 
months to find new space! Finally we found one, repaired it, set the 
equipment, but were allowed to produce only traditional biscuit-
and-cream products. We entered the market with these, but all the 
stores were filled with cakes made in St-Petersburg and made by 
the new technology, exactly the one we were planning to use, but 
couldn’t get permission to do so.  The process of getting the 
permission to produce cakes with cream and soufflé took up about a 
year. At the same time we were trying to solve the problem with the 
personnel. Under the guidance of our technologist we had to train 
our own experts.  We are still working on this project. 
Analysis.  The first part of her answer is probably in reference to an 
on-going battle Galya waged with the sanitation and licensing body 
that refused to give certifications for new products, even when all 
the ingredients were certified for a different product.  It also could 
be referencing the simple fact Galya had no practical experience 
managing commercial bakeries when she started out.  Galya 
believes the regulatory body is being pressured by formerly state-
owned bakeries not to let her bring new products to market because 
they fear competition. The rest of the response is intended to 
humanize Galya—show how hard she works and the fact that she 
does make mistakes.   
 
Question.  But what is it all for? 
Response.  For the thrill of it. 
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Question. Seriously? 
Response. Well, if speaking seriously… it might sound banal, but 
we want to live well, and we want our children to live well, so we 
have to work. 
Analysis.  Taking care of one’s children, but also living well—
being able to afford nice things and being middle-class both by 
income and mentality—these are themes from the beginning of the 
interview and are reinforced here.   
 
Question.  What do you want your children to be like and did they 
become what you wanted them to be? 
Response.  Yes, they did. When my eldest son, Ilya, was seven his 
teacher wrote in his record-book: "Does not know how to walk in 
line like everyone!" And it's good that all his generation does not 
walk in a line, everyone is different and unique.  I love my children 
and I am proud of them. My elder son and daughter study at the 
university, and the younger one studies at school. They are 
different, each one has outlook of his/her own, but they all have the 
same values. All in all, they are honest, kind and respectable. 
Analysis.  Here Galya seems to be speaking directly to the issue of 
socialization of the next generations of workers.  She encourages 
independence and finding one’s own way.  She’s also sounding like 
a very typical Russian mom extolling the virtues of her children.   
 
Question.  Do you want to talk about the upbringing? 
Response.  There are two themes that I never talk about – child 
upbringing and repairs. I don't talk about upbringing because I'm 
not sure I know the proper ways and I don't talk about repairs they 
follows me everywhere.  I will say, I like this rather banal definition 
of happiness: “you are happy when in the morning you want to go 
to work and in the evening you want to go home”. 
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Question.  On this optimistic note… I'll tell you a couple of things. 
A successfully developed person, a successful businesswoman, a 
beautiful woman, a loved wife and a mother of three children – but 
God forbid I had such a way of living. 
Response.  At least it's not boring. 
Analysis:  The final question seems a bit self-serving, but that’s 
probably because I know that Galya wrote the question.  In the end, 
though,  she does seems to be saying that despite all the challenges and 
difficulties she has faced, she is happy with her lot in life.  Optimism is 
not something that a great deal of Russians have in 2001-02, but it was 
something that Galya felt was important for her political campaign and 
the branding and marketing of her enterprises.   
 
When considering that the interviews are for public consumption and designed to win 
over the public for Galya the candidate, her answers take on additional significance.  Her 
efforts in this area do not go unnoticed by her employees.  In response to the survey question 
“It's good that the owners/managers of this enterprise engage in politics.”  Nearly 50 percent 
of women employees, but only a little over one quarter of the male employees surveyed were 
in agreement on the question.  About equal percentages of men and women were neutral on 
the subject.  Men however were 2.5 times more likely as women to be in disagreement with 
the statement.  In speaking with individual women, many were clearly impressed with the 
political campaign.  As one young baker put it: “I just love all of her activism and energy.”  
She also noted that it was good that a woman was participating in the election. 
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Table 15. Employee Support for Political Activity 
Gender  
Male Female 
  
N= 11 45 
  3 22 
Agree (fully and partially)  27.27% 48.89% 
  5 18 
Neutral  45.50% 40.00% 
  3 5 
Disagree (fully and partially)  27.30% 11.10% 
  2 1 
Fully disagree  18.20% 2.20% 
    
Percentage of employees who agree with the statement: “It’s good that the owner/managers of this 
 enterprise engage in politics” (survey question #5) 
5.5 ‘ALWAYS IN THE CENTER’ 
One of Galya’s campaign slogans for her 2002 campaign was ‘Always in the Center,’ a play 
on words denoting the physical location of her café, her political orientation and position as 
matriarch of the family businesses.  She campaigned on a platform of pragmatism;  her policy 
platforms were pro-capitalist, but the campaign relied on images, techniques and ideas that 
were socialist in nature; she ran her campaign from the front of the café, in the heart of 
downtown; and lastly, as the matriarch of the family and business interests, Galya was truly 
always at the center of things. 
Beyond following Galya’s written material, perhaps the best way to gain insights into 
Galya’s political campaign and its implications was to spend some significant time at her café.  
The NS Café achieves her goal of creating a ‘democratic place’ to sit and have coffee with 
low-cost food and drink and floor-to-ceiling windows that create an open, light-filled 
atmosphere—a notable departure from the typically dark and foreboding atmosphere of many 
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Russian bars—and a reputation for being the place where politics, business, and the arts mix 
in a cocktail that local elites and most others find quite desirable.  
The marketing slogan for the café—‘Life beats at the NS Café’ (a play off 
‘heartbeat’)— is fitting because the place serves as the hub for the commercial, political, and 
social projects associated with Galya’s family.  Much of the group’s business dealings are as 
seemingly open as the light-flooded restaurant.  At any given time, members of the family can 
be found hunched over a table engaged in earnest conversation on everything from the day’s 
activities to planning for a visit from German factory representatives.  Additionally, the 
dozens of state inspectors—from fire, to sanitation to alcohol control—that show up 
seemingly weekly, are asked to present their reports over coffee and croissants at the 
restaurant, thus making public what is often conducted in private and resolved with the 
passing of ‘envelope money.’  This practice, which leaves rather nervous-looking inspectors 
sipping coffee and waiting for Galya’s attention, lends credence to Galya’s emphatic claims 
that they go to great lengths to legitimately meet all government inspections and 
requirements.   
The campaign was a public manifestation of the many struggles Galya goes through as 
a wife, business owner and mom.  She turned her entire election into a referendum on her 
lifestyle, vocation, and values, and was soundly defeated in a three-way race between a 
communist and a candidate sponsored by the incumbent party in power.  The communist won 
a clear majority, relying almost entirely on the pensioner support from a district in the heart of 
the city where they are the majority of the population. 
Zaman argues that “…women's multiple responsibilities and specific social locations 
as women and paid workers create a distinctive form of activism and political consciousness” 
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(2002: 121).  She suggests that the intersections of family and their networks with other 
women create "double consciousness" as women and as workers.  This chapter focused on the 
owners of capital, not workers, but this may make the notion of a double consciousness more 
important.  I have argued that Galya uses her circumstances to help her assume a non-
traditional role (and prerequisite power) outside the home, which Russian society may not, as 
evidenced by the public’s rejection in the local election of Galya’s careful public positioning 
as a mother and entrepreneur, entirely support.  Although, to be fair it’s hard to draw the firm 
conclusion that the voting public repudiated her orchestrated identity, as the demographics in 
her voting district include many pensioners that still always vote for the communist party 
candidate.   
Returning to Moore’s semi-autonomous social fields, despite the electoral rebuke, 
Galya has clearly used gender to influence certain fields to her advantage. Within her 
enterprises she uses the language and symbolism of capitalism wrapped in public and private 
discourse that centers upon a mother’s duty to her family to create a range of hegemonic and 
brute-force control strategies that guarantee accumulation of capital at tremendous rates. 
There is also clearly a social field that is intertwined with the business network run by Vasili, 
which has created commercial relations that are market driven but have enforcement 
mechanisms rooted not in law or threat of coercion but ties of friendship and common 
interest.  I would also argue that the creation of the League of Private Bakers, which many 
scholars would argue as evidence of civil society development (I would not dispute this), 
provides a mechanism to defeat or at least mitigate the power of the social field associated 
with the corrupt practices of the taxing and regulatory bodies of the state and local 
governments. 
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This chapter has illustrated a number or points.  First, the politics and business are not 
clearly delineated in Russia, or probably anywhere else for that matter.  Galya was running for 
office to protect her investments through the political system as much as she was running to 
market her investments to the public.  Secondly, none of this activity is gender neutral.  
Where gender has traditionally stopped women from earning the same as men in Russia, this 
chapter gave examples of how Galya had turned gender into an asset, especially in terms of 
carrying out her responsibilities as a mother.  Galya, Victor, and Vasili also all actively 
exploited the fact that while women had superb training, there were relatively few positions 
open to them to exercise leadership and skills.  Creating a space for these ‘golden’ managers 
to excel has created new careers for many women while at the same time helping to develop 
and maintain an effective capitalist regime of accumulation.  Finally, Galya’s campaign 
seemed to seek validation for her hard work and the choices she has made in her life.  To the 
extent the election can be seen as a referendum on a capitalist, consumer economy future 
Galya embodies, she has made good progress, but has a ways to go.   
 205 
6.0  CONCLUSION 
When the Russian Federation embarked on social and economic reforms in pursuit of 
a market economy in the early 1990s, (proponents of neoliberalism conflated markets and 
capitalism in a way that made even Adam Smith’s market rationality seem benign [cf. Stiglitz 
2003]), it dismantled the institutions and political-economic power configurations that had 
been  responsible for controlling the Soviet-era economy.  The results were well documented, 
devastating, and led to the  “hypothesis of a pure market economy [being] discarded and 
replaced by a more eclectic analysis of the complementarities of State, market, norms, values, 
and even constitutional order” (North 2005:18).   
The new policies made schemas, and thus structures, more transportable, which 
allowed individuals and groups to garner new or reformulated political-economical power in 
the pursuit of new livelihoods.67  Entrepreneurial-minded individuals began organizing labor 
and production to create businesses that are now thriving within a flavor of capitalism that is 
emerging as a part of their efforts.  The entrepreneurs have used their energy, imagination, 
western-inspired ideas, and very real Soviet-era structural continuities to effectively harness 
and reproduce an efficient workforce that allows for accumulation of capital at impressive 
rates.  This dissertation focused on the activities of a small number of entrepreneurs, testing 
                                                 
67 Sewell describes schema within the ‘duality of structure’ (Gidden’s 1979) as being the ‘virtual’ aspect of 
structure, which is “generalizable or transportable procedures applied in the enactment of social life” (2005:149).   
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the observation that a capitalist economy in Russia was more easily attainable in the early 
1990s in some sectors of the economy than most politicians, policy makers, or scholars 
acknowledged or understood.   
To undertake this analysis, I made explicit several issues that often go unexamined, or 
left implicit, when studying formerly socialist economies.  First, I set aside my own and 
indeed most western commentators’ normative understandings of how Western businesses 
and entrepreneurs operate to help avoid orientalizing Russian business practices. In the case 
of Galya and Anna, a ‘family business’ is a good way to describe a small-scale version of 
what is sometimes called a clique, or clan, or simply criminal enterprise in discussions of 
businesses in the former Soviet Union.  Second, I considered the domains of private and 
public not as fixed entities with defined roles, but free-floating, context-dependent concepts 
that have different meanings for different people.  The distinction helped me avoid notions 
such as ‘captured states’ or failed sectors to present a picture of how important functions in 
the emerging regime of accumulation were being coordinated and by whom. 
I also avoided particularization of Russia’s capitalism. It is almost a truism to say that 
capitalism is unique in how it is implemented and accepted, rejected, or accommodated—it is 
a system that thrives on creativity and one that is incredibly responsive to initial conditions.  
While the detailed machinations of unique adaptations or resistances point to such influences 
as imagination, cultural flows (Appadurai 1996), and historically-arrived-at situations, they 
should not be taken as necessary and sufficient inputs to determine the trajectory capitalism 
takes at a given place and time.  I focused on the underpinnings of capitalist circulation in 
Russia—the ways individuals, institutions, and sectors are coordinating a process, which at its 
essence seeks to reproduce social life through commodity production.   
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Before weaving together and summarizing the arguments and observations I have 
presented in this thesis, it is worth reviewing the theoretical framework I used to guide my 
research and analysis.  The French Regulation School takes an interdisciplinary approach to 
developing a formulation of capitalism that relies upon Marx’s analysis of how capitalist 
economies function, but stays away from Marxist political ideology that inevitably leads to a 
doctrine of liberalism set in opposition to political ideologies of socialism or communism. 
This school defines capitalism as, “…a legal regime, an economic system and a social 
formation that unfolds in history and that is built upon two basic social relations: the market 
competition and the capital/labour nexus” (Boyer 2007: 4). A central message of the 
Regulation School is that “understanding and explaining capitalism cannot be limited to a 
single discipline since the very resilience of this economic regime derives from its 
embeddedness in society and polity” (Boyer 2007: 3).   
The Regulation School’s approach, as I have employed it in the research and 
production of this dissertation, attempts to address three weaknesses Sewell (2005) associates 
with how structural analysis is employed in the social sciences: “1) recognize the agency of 
social actors; 2) build on the possibility of change in the concept of structure; and 3) 
overcome the divide between semiotic and materialist visions of structure” (2005:126). 
At the center of the Regulation School model is the concept of a regime of 
accumulation, which describes the stabilization accumulation and consumption through the 
conditions of production and the conditions of reproduction of wage earners over a long 
period (Harvey1990: 122). How such a regime is stabilized and managed is captured in their 
notion of mode of regulation—the “materialization of the regime of accumulation taking the 
form of norms, habits, laws, regulating networks” (Lipietz 1987 in Harvey 1990:122). I used 
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these concepts as a heuristic device to create ‘ideal types’ (Ringer 1997) to better understand 
the regime of accumulation being created and maintained by Russian entrepreneurs.  The 
framework helped me focus on the structures and interplay of individuals with those 
structures as important forces in the organization of labor and stabilization of production and 
consumption in Russia’s economy.   
Of course, none of the above is completely new ground for anthropologists.  I would 
argue that the Regulation School builds upon a rich tradition of political economic theory and 
approaches in anthropology.  Notable examples include Wolf’s (1982) project to infuse 
culture, history, and practice with issues of capitalism, class, and power; Roseberry’s (1988) 
call to insert human action into the structural frameworks of capitalism; Well’s (1996) work 
describing how a state and its legal system impacts class formation; or Ong’s (1987, 1991) 
work on resistance as it related to cultural constructions of status and social relations.   
An important question the Regulation School attempts to address is whether the “sea-
change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices [in the US] since around 1972 has 
resulted in a new regime of accumulation” that is more ‘flexible’ than the Fordism-Keynesian 
framework, which relied on specific labor control practices, production techniques, 
consumption patterns, and configurations of political-economic-power capitalism (1990:189).  
Harvey’s opinion is a qualified ‘no,’ but his answer may be less important than his approach 
to the question.  Harvey (1990) and others documented labor processes, consumption patterns, 
and the systems of production in an attempt to pinpoint changes in Fordist-Keynesian 
accumulation regime.  When the comparison is extended to the Soviet-era practices, deep 
similarities in terms of how labor and production were organized and reproduced are readily 
apparent. Importantly, the techniques or characteristics of more ‘flexible’ accumulation 
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strategies and corresponding modes of regulation are also present in post-soviet economy as 
well, suggesting that, stripped of its ideological baggage, the soviet regime of accumulation’s 
form of wage labor and close coordination of production provided a solid foundation for 
capitalism to survive and indeed thrive.  
This dissertation moved through important aspects of the development of a regime of 
capitalist accumulation and the mechanisms used by specific entrepreneurs to create and 
sustain it.  I used Moore’s (1974) notion of semi-autonomous fields to understand how 
different types of players, institutions and organizations influence the entrepreneurs to operate 
in a capitalist milieu.  Moore makes the points that the fields often act in ‘chains of 
interdependence’ generating rules and coercing or inducing compliance to the rules, and that 
these are often more effective than formal or institutional rules. Both of these observations 
hold-up in the Russian context.  
Because I had met sisters Galya and Anna in the early 1990s, and because I had access 
to them, their families, their businesses and extended networks from 1999 through 2002, their 
story is the heart of this dissertation.  But they are hardly unique. There are thousands of 
women entrepreneurs with similar characteristics and with similar backgrounds and 
motivations throughout Russia (Wells et al 2003). The semi-autonomous fields, like the ones 
generated or engaged by these two women and their families, are significant in that they are 
being duplicated throughout Russia as independent businesses become increasingly more 
important drivers of economic growth, and thus continue to develop and solidify the 
structures and power arrangements necessary for capitalists’ accumulation strategies to thrive. 
There are, for instance, 400 independent bakeries in the Samara region alone, and over 40 
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percent of the milk products market in that region is now in the hands of independent firms—
up from 10 percent in 1998.68   
Speaking with Galya or spending time in her café in downtown Petrozavodsk, one 
begins to understand that the café, bakeries, and other businesses are about much more than 
simply making ends meet or even making money.  Galya especially, as the leader of the 
family business, is selling a lifestyle and a middle-class future. The cafe embodies a future for 
ex-soviet intelligentsia as middle-class consumers that Galya wants to make as widely 
accessible as possible. At the same time she gives a decided nod towards nostalgia, as 
evidenced not only in her labor and production practices, but in such actions as her shameless 
name dropping of iconic musicians, playwrights, and social activists as patrons in her café, 
guests in her home, and, most recently, as guest acts in her newest venture—a jazz club on the 
east side of town. 
Galya’s imagination, relentless innovation, and eye for all things ‘Western’ helps 
create one of many modernities that can be found in Russia at present.  Galya uses the café to 
provide lessons about competition, customer service, civic engagement, and charity work that 
she transmits to her managers and employees within her enterprises and to the larger 
community through the media, which she has access to in her extended network.  
Contrasting examples provided by Galya and Victor show that they are engaged in 
creating and replicating a certain set of workplace rules and norms, while at the same time 
advancing a lifestyle and future based upon consumption of goods, images, and lifestyles.  
Galya draws on the notion of being a private firm and facing stiff competition to demand a 
high level of productivity and quality from her workforce.  She uses the images and lifestyle 
                                                 
68 BusinessWeek Online: October 16, 2000 Issue (http://www.businessweek.com/datedtoc/2000/0042.htm). 
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associated with the café to draw young people in to work for her.  She also uses the pre-
existing trade and secondary school infrastructure to find young workers and create career 
paths for them as part of their work experience with her.  However, her efforts to stop theft 
and control the workforce tend toward authoritarian and direct control, versus the often more 
hegemonic, but paternalistic strategies, practiced by Victor. Galya’s efforts to control 
inventory and manage worker time through the highly invasive inventory system do work, but 
the success reveals two things. First, as a negative, her long-term ability to build the 
allegiance of a steady workface seems undermined by her harsh tactics, as measured by 
worker loyalty and satisfaction.  But the efforts also reveal something about the workforce 
that may be a harbinger for the success of capitalist conditioning of the workforce.  The 
workforce responds to Galya’s techniques by turning inward and forming tight brigade 
‘collectives’ that help to reinforce and ensure the success of Galya’s methods. In contrast, 
Victor’s employees show much higher fidelity to him and to the success of the company, 
suggesting that there is a range of control techniques that can be employed to ensure that the 
production side of the accumulation regime is maintained. 
Galya also uses what I have called gendered capital—the power associated with 
controlling means of production that is strengthened through use of gender—as a control 
strategy with her employees and by extension a strategy for creating an effective regime of 
accumulation.  The mix of gender and capital is a good reminder that capital is not a thing but 
a social process—for example, Galya’s invocation of maternal obligations and historical 
circumstances as a justification for her role in the family and the business and her harsh 
management techniques.  From the vantage point of Galya, her sister, and the entrepreneurial-
minded managers they both hire and do business with, they are making the best of the 
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circumstances because they have to take care of their families.  Galya and Anna’s personal 
stories and career trajectories can be seen as a meta-narrative for the diverging paths men and 
women took in Russia’s post-socialist era.   
To be sure, there are also many successful Russian men, but with a life expectancy 
that is now only 59 years they seem to have suffered differently from the economic 
dislocations associated with the end of socialism.69 They also don’t have the same incentives 
women have to strike out on their own.  In 2006, for example, Russian women held less than 
10 percent of all executive-level jobs in the private sector and made about 37 percent less for 
the same work as men. 
As a group, women also benefited from a first-class education, thanks to a socialist 
ideology that encouraged work outside the home in positions that, while not giving them top 
spots in business and industry, placed them in areas where their skills and experience would 
serve them well in a different regime of accumulation. This shift has a familiar ring in Russian 
society, where men are generally seen as the weaker of the sexes, especially when it comes to 
holding the family together.  In a nice twist on the ideal of the soviet paternal factory director, 
Galya invokes her identity as a mother who is the principle breadwinner as a justification to 
treat workers harshly.  At the same time, she cites “mothering instincts” in a more positive 
light as managers ‘protect’ workers by giving them breaks from the strict rules and fines 
because they see them as their young daughters.  It’s important to note that the woman’s role 
in business is not uncontested.  If the results of Galya’s political campaign and the public 
dialogue she initiated are used as a proxy for the public’s acceptance of her role as a business 
                                                 
69 Fortune Magazine, October 19 2006. 
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woman, primary breadwinner, and embodiment of a future lifestyle, there is not consensus or 
even a plurality of support for her. 
Galya also works with organizations and institutions in a manner that that can be 
viewed as supporting civil society, which is becoming another semi-autonomous field.  Her 
efforts to provide herself with needed political cover or protection from the State apparatuses 
(e.g. tax police. health inspectors, etc.), which are often deployed against individuals and 
firms that are seen as aligned against the political establishment, can be seen in the founding 
of the League of Private Bakers and the Pensioners club.  Galya pens opinion editorials that 
speak for the League and she has also used the league’s collective social and financial capital 
to challenge predatory and retaliatory regulatory practices by the state in court.  The success 
of her efforts in this arena has strengthened those institutions and buttresses and important 
aspect of the capitalist regime of accumulation. 
Perhaps the most significant semi-autonomist field is that of the business networks—
both formal and informal.  Rooted in personal circles of friends, as well as newer ties forged 
during the early years of the transition away from state socialism, the groups play a vibrant 
role not only in the management of individual businesses and smaller networks, but in 
influencing formal institutions and structures that are vital to a capitalist regime of 
accumulation.  Examples include using the trade school networks to train and create 
promotion paths for young workers, sponsoring the media outlets that allow for alternative 
opinions to be heard by the public, accumulating significant reserves of capital to be used for 
anything from political contests and legal challenges to unfair or corrupt government policies.    
Russian entrepreneurs use their energy, imagination, western-inspired ideas, and very 
real Soviet-era continuities to effectively harness and reproduce an efficient workforce that 
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allows for the accumulation of capital.  Business networks and groups within which these 
entrepreneurs operate—regardless of how nefarious (Volkov 2002) or benign and irrespective 
of the labels placed on them by commentators and social scientists—are one of the most 
salient reminders that the emergence, direction, and workings of Russia’s capitalist system is 
a product of socialist-era structures and relationships that entrepreneurs and employees alike 
respond to, and in the process modify, as they go about the business of living.   
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Appendix 1 English 
 
Employment Satisfaction Questionnaire    
1. Age of Respondent   
17-21  19 24%   
22-25  18 23%   
26-29  10 13%   
30-33  9 12%   
34-37  8 10%   
38-41  4 5%   
42-45  4 5%   
45+  6 8%   
Total 78 100%   
       
2. Gender   
Male  20 26%   
Female  58 74%   
Total 78 100%   
       
3. Married   
Yes  24 32%   
No  35 46%   
Divorced  17 22%   
Total 76 100%   
4. Children   
0  38 51%   
1  20 27%   
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2  16 21%   
3  1 1%   
4  0 0%   
Total 75 100%   
5. Number of years worked at enterprise.   
>1  26 35%   
1+  11 15%   
2+  19 26%   
3+  11 15%   
4+  7 9%   
Total 74 100%   
6. Current Salary Level   
>1500p  15 20%   
1500-2500  20 26%   
2501-3000  25 33%   
3001-4000  9 12%   
4001-5000  3 4%   
5000+  4 5%   
Total 76 100%   
7. Current Living Situation   
Live with parent(s)  29 39%   
Live with my own family  38 51%   
Live with grandparents  3 4%   
Rent apartment/room  5 7%   
Other, please specify  0 0%   
Total 75 100%   
8. Education Level   
Didn't complete high school  3 4%   
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High School  16 21%   
Trade School  44 57%   
Higher  14 18%   
Total 77 100%   
9. Respondent Opinions 
Top number is the count of 
respondents selecting the option. Bottom % is 
percent of the total respondents selecting the 
option. fully agree partially agree neutral partially disagree fully disagree 
23 27 6 16 1 
1. I like to work at this place. 32% 37% 
8
% 22% 1% 
30 25 11 7 2 
2. The collective here is healthy. 40% 33% 
15
% 9% 3% 
10 33 7 9 16 
3. My salary corresponds well to the 
work I do. 13% 44% 
9
% 12% 21% 
18 26 14 14 3 
4. This is good place of work in 
comparison with other places where I could work. 24% 35% 
19
% 19% 4% 
16 9 23 5 3 
5. It's good that the owners/managers 
of this enterprise engage in politics. 29% 16% 
41
% 9% 5% 
11 28 14 14 8 
6. To work for a private company is 
better than to work for the government. 15% 37% 
19
% 19% 11% 
12 23 18 16 8 
7. The system of fines and rewards 
here is fair. 16% 30% 
23
% 21% 10% 
41 14 9 2 6 
8. The quality of what I produce 
depends on me. 57% 19% 
12
% 3% 8% 
9. In the next year I plan to look for a 20 14 21 5 11 
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new job. 
28% 20% 
30
% 7% 15% 
10. I would take a new job if I could make:   
300r more per month  4 
6
%   
500r more per month  6 
8
%   
700r more per month  13 
18
%   
Other, please specify  48 
68
%   
Total 71 
10
0%   
11. For a normal life I would need to make ___ r per month.   
70 Responses   
12. suggestions for improvement   
65 Responses   
13. Percent of household budget spent on food.   
>30  1 
1
%   
30-50  12 
18
%   
50-70  19 
28
%   
<70  35 
52
%   
Total 67 
10
0%   
14. What percentage of your pay do you spend each month in the 
following categories? (Note responses recorded here reflect the two 
categories that received the highest percentage responses from each 
respondent on actual surveys).   
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Food/produce  66 
92
%   
Clothing, cosmetics, etc for self  12 
17
%   
Household goods  8 
11
%   
Utilities and rent  34 
47
%   
Entertainment  6 
8
%   
Transportation  8 
11
%   
Other   0 
0
%   
15. If your salary was increased 500r per month, in what two areas 
would you spend the money first? 
  
Food/produce  20 
28
%   
Contribute to rent and utilities  22 
31
%   
Food/produce for children  19 
27
%   
Clothing for children  25 
35
%   
Clothing for self  34 
48
%   
Entertainment   10 
14
%   
16. Enterprise Surveyed (question not on survey—coded by author 
for sorting purposes).   
Bakery #3  12 
15
%   
Bakery #1  8 10   
 237 
% 
Independent Bakery  12 
15
%   
Bakery #2  21 
27
%   
North Star Cafe  11 
14
%   
Food Distributor  14 
18
%   
Total 78 
10
0%   
      
 
